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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of four chapters investigating the role of buyers in 
regulating suppliers‟ compliance with labor standards in the Cambodian garment sector.  
The first chapter evaluates an innovative monitoring scheme of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) in the Cambodian garment sector, Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC). The findings suggest that monitoring standards and procedures are 
rigorous and positive impacts are felt in monitored factories. Nonetheless, BFC runs in 
parallel to state institutions and enforcement depends on buyers, throwing its 
sustainability into question.  
The second chapter examines the effects of „reputation-conscious buyers‟ on labor 
standard compliance in supplier facilities. Using unique factory-level panel data, this 
chapter shows that factories producing for reputation-conscious buyers are associated 
with higher compliance levels than other factories, controlling for factory characteristics. 
Field interviews also demonstrate that reputation-conscious buyers regulate supplier 
compliance both „reactively‟ and „proactively.‟  
The third chapter explores the determinants of labor standard compliance across 
different issue categories (i.e. contract, wage, hours, leave, welfare, occupational safety 
and health, fundamental rights). Suppliers of reputation-conscious buyers are 
consistently associated with better compliance levels across many different issue 
categories including fundamental rights. The result lends support to the behavioral 
theory rather than the deterrence theory of regulatory compliance and challenges claims 
that buyer-driven regulation produces effects that are confined only to visible and easy-
to-fix issues.  
The fourth chapter exploits original survey data and examines different channels 
through which buyers influence their supplier compliance. The findings suggest that the 
main channel linking buyers and supplier compliance-performance is the nature of their 
relationships: market-based relationships mediated through agents are systematically 
associated with poorer compliance performance than established relationships. The 
result suggests the need to develop longer-term buyer-supplier relationships marked by 
open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which in turn help to foster an environment 
supportive of continuous improvement in working conditions. 
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Overall Introduction 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters on the role of buyers in regulating and 
influencing working conditions in their supplier facilities, with a particular focus on 
labor standard compliance in Cambodia‟s garment sector. Working conditions in global 
supply chains have come under increased public scrutiny. Faced with a growing demand 
for accountability, some multinational enterprises have come to play de facto regulatory 
roles in developing countries where they do business. The thesis seeks to contribute to 
the on-going debate on the effectiveness of non-state regulation of labor standards and 
the ways in which working conditions in global supply chains can be improved. 
Theoretically, this thesis aims at demonstrating the utility and limits of different theories, 
thereby reconciling disparate literature.  
Initially, this PhD project was motivated by an innovative scheme in the 
Cambodian garment sector that subjects all exporting garment factories to labor 
standard monitoring by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Convinced of the 
potential benefits that factory-level data on working conditions can bring to our 
knowledge, I have chosen Cambodia‟s garment sector as my thesis topic. After 
conducting fact-finding fieldwork in the summer of 2007, it became clear to me that, 
amid various factors influencing working conditions in factories, buyers are playing an 
exceedingly important role, which then became the focus of my inquiry.  
This dissertation exploits unique factory-level data on labor standard compliance 
and firm characteristics collected by the ILO monitoring program, Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC). The dataset covers 344 exporting garment factories from 2006 to 
2008, from which I created a panel dataset of 1230 observations. In addition, with the 
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help of ILO BFC, I conducted surveys of both suppliers and buyers to gather 
information not covered by the panel data. Survey results enabled me to delve into the 
causal mechanism of how buyers influence working conditions in supplier factories. In 
addition, I conducted 61 interviews during the summers of 2007 and 2008 with various 
stakeholders in the Cambodian garment sector including factory managers, buyer 
representatives, union leaders, government officials, industry experts, labor activists, 
and donor representatives.  Further, participant observation at ILO BFC in Phnom Penh 
gave me an excellent insight into the context and dynamics surrounding the garment 
sector in Cambodia.  
The richness of the data enabled me to mix different methods of inquiry, thereby 
increasing inferential leverage and enhancing the validity of hypotheses (Brady and 
Collier, 2004). Chapter 1 is purely qualitative based on interviews and participant 
observation in Cambodia‟s garment sector. Chapter 2 is a mixed piece, combining panel 
data regressions and interview materials. Chapter 3 and 4 are quantitative chapters 
based on the panel and survey data. The results of surveys targeting suppliers and 
buyers are summarized in Appendix I and II, respectively.  
In terms of theoretical framework, this thesis does not operate in a single 
framework, but rather it tests competing hypotheses to identify the utility and limits of 
different theories. While Chapter 1 is an empirical piece, Chapter 2 operates in the 
rational expected utility framework, which emphasizes enforcement and deterrence to 
encourage compliance. Chapter 3 introduces the behavioral theory of the firm and 
shows the limits of rational assumptions. Chapter 4 goes one step further and contrasts 
the deterrence theory of regulatory compliance with the transaction cost economics and 
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relational exchange theory; the findings are supportive of the latter theoretical 
perspective.  
The plan of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the 
following chapters by describing the context of the Cambodian garment sector and 
assessing the ILO monitoring program, Better Factories Cambodia (BFC), one of the 
most promising models of labor regulation. The findings suggest that monitoring 
standards and procedures are rigorous and positive impacts are felt in monitored 
factories. Nonetheless, the ILO program runs in parallel to state institutions and 
enforcement is dependent on buyers, leading to patchy outcomes and throwing the 
scheme‟s sustainability into question.   
Chapter 2 examines the role of reputation-conscious buyers in regulating working 
conditions in their supplier factories. In consistent with the rational theory of deterrence, 
this chapter shows that factories producing for reputation-conscious buyers are 
associated with higher compliance levels than other factories, controlling for factory 
characteristics. Field-based interviews also demonstrate that reputation-conscious 
buyers regulate supplier compliance both „reactively‟ in the sense that they respond to 
complaints and „proactively‟ as evidenced by active involvement of local buyer 
representatives.  
Chapter 3 extends the analysis of Chapter 2 and explores the determinants of labor 
standard compliance across different issue categories (i.e. contract, wage, hours, leave, 
welfare, occupational safety and health, fundamental rights). Factories producing for 
reputation-conscious buyers are consistently associated with better compliance levels 
across many different issue categories, supporting the behavioral theory of the firm. On 
the one hand, the results challenge the claim made by some critics that the effects of 
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buyer-driven regulation are confined solely to visible and easy-to-fix issues. On the 
other hand, the findings point to the growing gaps between rigorously regulated supply 
chains controlled by reputation-conscious buyers and other sparsely regulated supply 
chains, painting a more nuanced picture of buyer-driven regulation.  
Chapter 4 seeks to investigate the different channels through which buyers 
influence their supplier compliance-performance. The regression results suggest that the 
main channel linking buyers and supplier compliance-performance is the nature of their 
relationships. Market-based relationships mediated through sourcing agents are 
systematically associated with poorer compliance performance than established 
relationships. The findings indicate the need to develop longer-term buyer-supplier 
relationships marked by open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which in turn help to 
foster an environment supportive of continuous improvement in working conditions. 
The dissertation concludes by highlighting empirical, methodological and 
theoretical contributions made, pointing out limits, and suggesting future areas of 
research. In summary, this PhD thesis significantly adds to the literature on labor 
regulation in global supply chains and buyer-supplier relationships by providing new 
facts, offering new perspectives, and suggesting novel solutions.  
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Chapter 1. The ILO Program in the Cambodian Garment Sector 
 
1.1 Introduction 
While the fundamental debate on the benefits and costs of labor regulation remains 
contentious, growing consensus is emerging on the concept of a „core set of labor 
standards‟ as stipulated in the “Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work” adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1998.1 Moreover, 
activists, consumers as well as investors increasingly demand multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) to regulate labor conditions in their global supply chains. The focus of the labor 
regulation debate has therefore shifted from whether or not to regulate to how to design 
an effective regulatory framework. 
Given that many developing country governments lack capacity to regulate their 
economies, various non-state regulatory approaches have been proposed and tried: 
labeling and certifying labor standards, corporate codes of conduct, transparent 
monitoring, and transnational solidarity to empower workers. Among these competing 
initiatives, one of the most promising models has been experimented in the Cambodian 
garment sector.  
The ILO monitoring program called Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) harnesses 
public and private authority to bring about continuous improvement in working 
conditions: the Cambodian government obliges all exporting garment factories to be 
monitored by ILO BFC. With consent of factories, buyers can access to ILO monitoring 
reports by paying a modest fee to ILO BFC. When major non-compliance issues are 
                                                 
1
 The fundamental principles and rights include i) freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining, ii) Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, iii) effective 
abolition of child labor, and iv) Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
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identified in the reports, buyers demand their suppliers to rectify problems. While the 
ILO monitoring program under the quota regime (i.e. from 2001 to end-2004) has been 
assessed elsewhere (e.g., Kolben, 2004; Polaski, 2006; Wells, 2006; Miller, 2007), the 
latest functioning of the program in the post-quota era has not been evaluated. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the context of the Cambodian garment 
sector and evaluate ILO BFC, thereby laying the groundwork for the following 
analytical chapters. It is important to understand the potential and limits of ILO BFC 
given that it is a prototype of the next generation model, Better Work. The ILO, in 
partnership with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has replicated and refined 
the Cambodian model and launched a global version, Better Work Program, to improve 
working conditions globally using value chain dynamics.
2
 Evaluating ILO BFC, 
therefore, can provide insights into the next generation model while shedding light on 
the broader question about the effectiveness of non-state regulation.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses various non-state 
approaches to regulate labor conditions. The following section discusses the genesis of 
the ILO monitoring program and evaluates its rigor, legitimacy and accountability, 
perceived impacts, complementarity with state regulation, and sustainability. The 
assessment is based on 61 field-based interviews with stakeholders (i.e. factory 
managers, buyer representatives, union leaders, government officials, industry experts, 
labor activists, and donor representatives) and participant observation at ILO BFC office 
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia during the summers of 2007 and 2008.  
                                                 
2
 Currently, programs are operating in Lesotho, Haiti, Jordan, and Vietnam, and other countries are 
expected to join. The major difference between the Cambodian model and Better Work is that monitoring 
is mandated by the government in the former while it is mostly optional (decided by buyers) in the latter. 
For details, consult their website: http://www.betterwork.org/public/global 
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The fieldwork demonstrates that the standards and monitoring procedures are 
rigorous and positive impacts are felt in monitored factories. Further, ILO BFC seems to 
perform better than other private initiatives in terms of cost-effectiveness, coordination, 
capacity building, and credibility. Nevertheless, the system lacks direct accountability to 
workers and enforcement depends on buyers. ILO BFC runs in parallel to the state 
institutions, and its sustainability is in question.  In conclusion, this chapter highlights 
government and market failures facing developing countries and suggests solutions that 
require efforts on all fronts.  
1.2. Non-state Approaches to Labor Regulation 
In response to the regulatory vacuum created by lack of government enforcement in 
developing countries, various private schemes to regulate labor standards have emerged, 
which can be classified as market, empowerment, and transparency approaches as 
described below.  
Market-based Approach 
The market-based approach seeks to improve working conditions by unleashing 
the market force. Freeman (1994) proposes treating labor standards as a normal 
consumer good and creating a mechanism to meet the demand for such commodity. The 
proposed mechanism to sort out the demand and supply for such product is labeling of 
the conditions under which products are produced. While accurate labeling requires a 
third party organization to correctly inform consumers, the scheme lets consumers 
determine the „price‟ for labor conditions.  
Based on consumer surveys, Elliott and Freeman (2003) claim that there is a 
market for ethically produced goods; the majority of respondents said they were willing 
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to pay a small premium for products made under good working conditions. Examples of 
labeling schemes include the Rugmark label, which certifies child-free carpets and the 
Fair Trade label, which ensures that their producers (e.g. coffee, bananas, tea etc.) are 
paid above world market prices.  
Nevertheless, these schemes have been criticized for their limited reach and 
overestimation of consumers‟ good will. Those social labels account for a tiny market 
share while companies that command price premiums for being ethical are small 
operators in niche markets (Vogel, 2005). Moreover, those consumers ready to pay 
extra for ethical products are limited to a subset of educated, upper-middle class 
consumers, and even those who say they are willing to pay a premium often do not 
behave as they say they would.
3
 
Another market-based approach emphasizes corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).
4
Faced with pressures from activists, investors, shareholders, as well as 
employees, a growing number of MNEs have embraced some sort of CSR policies 
(Graham and Woods, 2006). While CSR‟s positive contributions to corporate financial 
performance remain debated, the negative impacts of bad publicity arising from lack of 
CSR are well-recognized; the main driver for corporations to engage in CSR is to avoid 
damage to their reputation, which is a major source of corporate wealth (Klein, 1999; 
Conroy, 2007). Especially in garment, footwear, toy, and sport industries dependent on 
cheap labor, many international buyers have adopted codes of conduct (CoC) and 
                                                 
3
 There exist large gaps between what consumers say they would do and what they actually do because 
respondents tend to give what they consider as the „right‟ answer rather than their true opinions. Vogel 
(2005: 48). 
4
 CSR remains an ill-defined and contested concept partly because societal expectations about the role of 
business keep evolving. Here, CSR is used as an umbrella term that refers to ideas and practices about 
expanding corporate roles in managing their social and environmental impacts as well as relationships 
with wider society. See the definition of CSR in Blowfield and Frynas (2005): 503.    
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monitoring procedures to regulate labor conditions in their supply chains (Schrage, 
2004).  
Nevertheless, these corporate-driven schemes have been criticized for 
manipulation of codes, ineffective monitoring, and lack of worker participation (Jenkins, 
Person and Seyfang, 2002; Esbenshade, 2004; Braun and Gearhart, 2005). Moreover, 
some criticize that these schemes depend on consumer/investor preferences and vigilant 
NGOs and that private regulation may end up weakening or substituting state regulation 
(Kolben, 2007; Seidman, 2007).    
Empowerment Approach 
Some critics of the market-driven schemes emphasize that empowering workers is 
the key to improving labor conditions. Esbenshade (2004) argues that private 
monitoring reinforces workers‟ vulnerability and that in order to counter the “triangle of 
power” made up of manufacturers, contractors, and the national government, there 
needs to be a “triangle of resistance” consisting of consumers, workers, and local civil 
society. Specifically, Esbenshade calls for an alternative model, which enables workers 
to be monitors of their own factories.  
Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) concurs that it is vital to empower the countervailing 
forces through political alliances and institutional designs. He sees freedom of 
association and collective bargaining as the key institutional mechanisms to mitigate 
power asymmetries between workers and employers. He proposes “empowered 
participatory labor regulation,” in which CoC are designed to empower workers and 
cross-border organizing strategies are used to hold MNEs accountable.  
Hence, advocates of the empowerment approach call for greater participation and 
freedom of association to enable workers to defend their own rights. They are also in 
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favor of bottom-up schemes, notably the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC), a non-
governmental organization which responds to worker complaints and conducts 
investigations at the local level. The WRC is generally considered to be “the most 
effective, transparent, and „participatory‟ model of transnational labor monitoring 
(Barenberg, 2005: 38)”. 
The empowerment approach is not without criticism, however. In particular, case-
by-case, cross-border organizing strategy is time and resource-intensive and vulnerable 
to employers‟ „cut-and-run‟ strategies (Merk, 2009). Moreover, these transnational 
alliances are often driven and financed by union federations and NGOs in the North, 
and some Southern unions become dependent on external finance, creating client-patron 
relations (Spooner, 2005). Further, not all sectors are amenable to such transnational 
alliances and some countries are opposed to the freedom of association, requiring 
different tactics.  
Transparency Approach 
An innovative scheme to „ratchet up‟ labor standards has been proposed by Sabel, 
O‟Rourke and Fung (2001). The model called the Ratcheting Labor Standards (RLS) is 
based on transparency and competition among firms as well as monitors. The 
mechanism functions as follows: (i) all firms in a targeted sector (e.g. garment) submit 
to external monitoring, (ii) independent monitors inspect firms‟ suppliers unannounced 
and disclose methods and monitoring results (by ranking firms‟ social performance), 
(iii) consumers and investors pressure firms to compete for better working conditions in 
their supply chains, and (iv) monitors compete to improve their reliability (monitors are 
to be monitored by international organizations such as the ILO).  
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The RLS model is close to the market-based approach in that it seeks to exploit 
market pressures by providing information to the public and fuelling competition among 
firms that care about reputation. The RLS model has been criticized for neglecting 
unions and government involvement (Sabel et al., 2001). Indeed, the RLS model 
requires some kind of authority that obliges all firms to submit to standard monitoring, 
standardizes monitoring procedures, and ensures disclosure of information. In other 
words, the RLS model implicitly assumes government regulation although it was 
supposed to be an alternative (Levinson, 2001).  
ILO BFC is unique in that it incorporates some elements of all the approaches 
discussed above. The scheme has sought to label Cambodia as a „sweat-free‟ sourcing 
destination and to attract reputation-conscious buyers (i.e., market). The ILO has not 
only monitored factories, but also provided training for workers and empowered unions 
through wider institutional engagement (i.e., empowerment). BFC also resembles the 
RLS model as it conducts industry-wide and independent monitoring (i.e., transparency). 
The key difference is that factories are monitored by ILO BFC rather than private 
monitors and monitoring information is shared with buyers rather than consumers. This 
Cambodian model is also consistent with the proposal by Kuruvilla and Verma (2006) 
to combine soft and hard regulation, localize initiatives, and to bring national 
governments back in. 
1.3. Background 
Genesis of the ILO Monitoring Program 
The ILO‟s unique experiment in the Cambodian garment sector grew out of the 1999 
bilateral trade agreement with the United States. The rapid growth in Cambodia‟s 
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apparel exports to the US in the 1990s caused reactions from the domestic textile and 
apparel industry as well as labor unions. In 1998, the industry demanded import 
restrains while the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) petitioned the US government to review alleged worker-right 
abuses in Cambodian factories. It was against this backdrop that the US and Cambodia 
negotiated and agreed on the trade agreement with a clause on labor conditions (Polaski, 
2006).  
The social clause stipulated that the US would increase Cambodia‟s export quota, 
namely access to the US market, provided that working conditions in Cambodia‟s 
garment sector substantially improved in line with the local law and international core 
standards. As the Cambodian government clearly lacked resources and capacity to 
monitor labor conditions in all exporting garment factories, the US government turned 
to the ILO. The ILO, which had never conducted factory-level monitoring, initially 
hesitated but finally agreed to a compromise that included a technical assistance 
program (Kolben, 2004). Funded principally by the US government, the ILO Garment 
Sector Program started its operation in 2001.  
Gradually, a quota-increase incentive became less important as categories of 
garment exports not covered by the quota grew rapidly. In fact, the quota incentive has 
been replaced by another unanticipated incentive, as buyers started using ILO 
monitoring reports to assess compliance performance of their suppliers (Kolben, 2004). 
Over time, the Cambodian government has come to see the ILO monitoring scheme as a 
niche strategy to attract reputation-conscious buyers while these buyers have come to 
appreciate ILO monitoring as a stamp of approval. This explains why the ILO 
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monitoring program has been renewed even after the expiration of the quota regime at 
the end of 2004.
5
 
Labor Relations in Cambodia’s Garment Sector 
Before evaluating ILO BFC, it is essential to understand the context of labor 
relations in Cambodia‟s garment sector. Tense labor relations are corroborated by the 
consistently high incidence of strikes, about 80 incidents per year for an industry size of 
300 exporting factories (Figure 1-1). The number of person days lost has significantly 
increased in recent years, indicating a rise in the level of participation and the duration 
of strikes (Figure 1-2). The Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC) 
blames unreasonable demands of unions while unions blame employers‟ disrespect for 
the labor law and persistent low wages.
6
  
Another feature of Cambodia‟s labor relations is a profusion of trade unions. As of 
mid-2007, 1113 trade unions and 30 union federations were registered with the Ministry 
of Labor and Vocational Training (Figure 1-3).
7
 Since there is no system of de-
registering, the number of active unions is lower. Nonetheless, for an industry of about 
300 exporting factories, unions are exceptionally numerous; it is common to find a 
factory with three or four unions. Competition among unions to attract members leads to 
aggressive tactics, contributing to a higher incidence of strikes.
8
  
According to insiders, unions proliferate because it is a “profitable activity.” 9 
Some unions operate like gangs and extort money from factory management by 
                                                 
5
 For more information about the ILO monitoring program, BFC, consult their website: 
http://www.betterfactories.org/ 
6
 Interview with GMAC representatives and union federation leaders, September 2007.  
7
 These figures cover unions and federations in all the industries, but ministry officials estimate about 
1000 unions belong to the garment industry. 
8
 Interview with representative, Garment Industry Productivity Center, 30 August 2007. 
9
 Interview with labor dispute officer of GMAC, 24 September 2007. 
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threatening to go on strike. Union federations notorious for such practices are not 
penalized because they share profits with high-ranking officials who protect them.
10
 The 
majority of unions are paper-unions or yellow-unions supported by the government or 
management. Few independent unions, namely the Free Trade Union Workers in the 
Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC) and the Coalition of Cambodian Apparel Workers 
Democratic Unions (CCAWDU) are linked to the opposition parties, making them 
prone to harassment and violence.
11
 A few unionists have been murdered to date, 
notably the president of the FTUWKC, Chea Vichea in 2004 prior to the national 
election. Politically divided unions often politicize workplace disputes, complicating 
Cambodia‟s labor relations. 
Broader Engagement of the ILO 
Faced with difficult labor relations, the ILO has made broader engagement that 
goes beyond monitoring. While monitoring is the best known element of the ILO 
program, BFC is actively involved in remediation and capacity building of workers and 
supervisors. The training arm of BFC offers a variety of training courses to workers and 
supervisors upon request. For instance, factory-based training teaches workers‟ rights 
and obligations stipulated in the labor law as well as practical issues related to safety 
and health, HIV, and maternity. Since most workers are poorly educated, training is 
done through watching soap operas and playing games. BFC also offers training that 
helps improve quality, productivity, as well as negotiation and supervisory skills.   
In addition to BFC, the ILO also operates Dispute Resolution Program, which 
helped establish the Arbitration Council. The Arbitration Council, set up in 2003 to deal 
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 Interview with union federation leader, 10 September 2007. 
11
 Interview with former president of union federation, 29 August 2007. 
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with collective disputes, is a tripartite body composed of arbitrators nominated by 
unions, employer organizations, and the government. Each case is decided by a panel of 
three arbitrators, two of whom are chosen by the parties to the dispute and the third is 
decided jointly by the two arbitrators. The summary of cases is published on their 
website both in Khmer and English, contributing to its transparency.
12
 
One feature that compromises its effectiveness is that the awards of the Arbitration 
Council are generally non-binding unless both parties agree to have binding awards. In 
this sense, the system lacks enforcement capacity. Despite this non-binding and non-
enforceable nature of awards, between 2003 and mid-2007, the Arbitration Council 
presided over 441 cases and 68 percent of them were resolved successfully.
13
 Major 
issues that are brought to the Arbitration Council are the use of undetermined duration 
contracts, various cash payments (i.e. attendance bonus, severance pay), and unfair 
dismissal of union workers.
14
 The Arbitration Council is seen as a successful alternative 
to judiciary reform in Cambodia, where the formal court system lacks capacity and 
suffers from corruption (Adler, 2007). 
Currently, Dispute Resolution Program is mainly involved in capacity building at 
the institutional level. Specifically, it provides training for the Ministry of Labor and 
Vocational Training (MLVT) on conciliation and collective bargaining, promotes 
collective bargaining among employers, reviews the labor law to avoid conflicting 
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 The website of the Arbitration Council http://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/eng_index.htm  
13
 Here, success refers to either of the following: i) binding awards are implemented, ii) employers reject 
binding awards, but adopt similar solutions, iii) both parties agree to conciliation before awards are issued.  
Interview with Executive Director, the Arbitration Council Foundation, 30 August 2007. 
14
 Interview with Executive Director, the Arbitration Council, 30 August 2007. 
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interpretations, trains the police about the labor law and appropriate use of force, and 
helps unions to work out representativity.
15
    
The ILO also helps build capacity of workers and especially union leaders through 
Workers Education Program. One of the problems in Cambodia‟s garment industry is 
that workers‟ education level is very low. A recent survey shows 65 percent of workers 
attained only the elementary school level or less (EIC 2007: 67). Even some union 
leaders cannot read or write. WEP is in charge of training union leaders about the rights 
and obligations stipulated in the labor law. WEP is also the focal point of union 
coordination to form a untied front vis-à-vis the government and employers. 
Nonetheless, union coordination is increasingly difficult with growing numbers of union 
federations. 
1.4. Assessment of the ILO Monitoring Program 
The desirability and effectiveness of any schemes need to be measured against a set of 
criteria. O‟Rourke (2006) proposes the following criteria for evaluating non-
governmental labor regulation: i) rigor of standards and monitoring ii) legitimacy of the 
system, iii) accountability to local stakeholders, and iv) complementarity with state 
regulation. Moreover, a successful model should cover all workers and all sectors 
beyond exporting consumer products (Verma, 2003; Elman and Verma, 2007). Further, 
it needs to be effective in the long-term. Thus, coverage and sustainability are also 
considered.     
Rigor 
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 Interview with the Chief Technical Advisor of the ILO Dispute Resolution Project, 7 September 2007. 
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In terms of rigor, O‟Rourke (2006) suggests examining whether the codes meet or 
exceed the ILO conventions and local laws, if standards are measurable, and if 
monitoring is technically competent. ILO BFC scores high on these dimensions. The 
current Cambodian labor law was drafted with the assistance of the ILO and adopted in 
1997. Behind this revision lied mounting pressures from the US government during the 
trade negotiation to modernize the labor law.
16
 Consequently, the labor law of 1997 is 
one of the most progressive ones in the region, encompassing all the basic international 
norms such as freedom of association and right to collective bargaining.
17
  
ILO monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labor standards, which are 
based on the Cambodian labor law and the international labor standards. The monitored 
standards have been agreed by a tri-partite governing body, Project Advisory 
Committee, comprising of the Cambodian government, employer association, and 
unions in the garment industry. Standards are clearly measurable and ILO monitors 
check whether each item is in compliance or not.  
The ILO monitoring program has been characterized by its industry-wide 
participation, independence, and credibility. First, the Cambodian model obliges all 
exporting garment factories to submit to monitoring by the ILO like the RLS model. In 
fact, participation in the program is mandated by the Cambodian government as a 
requirement to obtain an export license. Second, since ILO monitors are not directly 
paid by factories or buyers, conflict of interests often seen in private auditing is less 
severe.
18
 Third, unlike some commercial auditors detached from local contexts and 
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 Interview with representative of the US Solidarity Center, 29 August 2007. 
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 However, the law is silent on other important issues such as occupational safety and health, which are 
typically addressed by letters of instruction and Ministerial degrees.  
18
 The ILO program has been mostly financed by international donors, namely the US Department of 
Labor (USDOL), USAID, the World Bank, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), as well as by 
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unable to talk directly to stakeholders, ILO monitors are locally hired Cambodian 
nationals who understand the language and local context, increasing their sensitivity and 
effectiveness as monitors. Fourth, ILO monitors are hired through competitive 
procedures, extensively trained, and well-equipped, helping ensure the quality of 
monitoring.  
As for monitoring procedures, ILO monitors make unannounced visits to factories 
every 6 to 8 months. Un-announced monitor visits span an entire day or longer for 
larger establishments. The process includes on-site inspection, meetings with human 
resource managers, union leaders, and shop stewards as well as interviews with workers. 
Copies of pay slips and hour records are collected for verification. ILO monitors assess 
each checklist item and determine whether a factory complies with a specified standard. 
When the factory is deemed out of compliance with a certain item, monitors make a 
standardized suggestion for improvement.  
Legitimacy and Accountability 
Legitimacy can be derived from expertise and authority on the issue in question or 
a democratic organizational structure that enables representation of voice.
19
 The ILO 
certainly commands international respect for its expertise and authority on labor 
standards and rights. Moreover, the ILO program is mandated by the government to 
monitor and report working conditions in all exporting garment factories, strengthening 
its legitimacy despite dissatisfaction voiced by some factory managers.
20
  
                                                                                                                                               
the Cambodian Government, the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (GMAC) and 
international buyers. As the program seeks to be self-sustaining beyond 2010, the financing scheme is set 
to change and the issue of conflicting interests may arise. 
19
 Hudson (2000) mentions expertise, democratic organizational structures and grass roots links as 
possible bases of legitimacy of NGOs. 
20
 Some factory managers argue that only the government should have the right to monitor factories. 
Interview with factory manager, 10 October 2008. 
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Accountability consists of two concepts: answerability and enforceability 
(Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, 1999; Goetz and Jenkins, 2002). Answerability is the 
right to monitor and obtain explanation for actions. This requires wider access to 
accurate, relevant, and timely information, in other words, transparency. On the other 
hand, enforceability is the right to demand justification for actions and impose sanctions 
if necessary. In short, implied in the concept of accountability is a principal-agent 
relationship.  
In terms of answerability, ILO monitoring has provided accurate, relevant, and 
timely information, but access to the information has become limited. Transparency was 
one of the original features of the program. Until 2006, the ILO published the 
compliance status of individual factories in their biannual reports on their website. This 
was revolutionary in the realm of social auditing as no private auditing firms or NGOs 
disclosed monitoring results by naming factories. Polaski (2006: 924) commended that 
“…the specificity of the reports allows for challenges by any actors that hold 
information to the contrary. This operates as a reality check and reinforcement of the 
credibility of the ILO.” 
Since October 2006, however, the ILO stopped disclosing compliance 
performance for individual factories. Detailed monitoring reports are stored in the web-
based database, and the right to access is reserved for monitored factories and 
authorized parties (i.e. buyers). This limited access to information precludes the “reality 
check” and transparency-driven competition among factories as envisaged by the RLS 
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model. This regression in transparency may reflect the ILO‟s need to placate the 
garment industry as the program seeks to raise funds from garment factories.
21
 
As for enforceability, the scheme does not have any built-in enforcement 
mechanism like many other self-regulatory schemes. The ILO is an independent and 
credible monitor and a provider of information, but it lacks power to enforce the 
standards in case of non-compliance. The government ministry in charge of labor 
inspection and remediation suffers from incapacity and corruption, preventing it from 
effectively enforcing the labor law. Given the lack of enforcement, buyers often act as a 
virtual enforcement authority.  
Buyers weary about sweatshop allegations in their supply chains have come to 
appreciate ILO monitoring given its independence and credibility. As internal 
monitoring is criticized for lack of independence and external auditing for conflict of 
interests, ILO monitoring provides a badly needed solution. Since 2006, willing buyers 
pay modest fees to access to the ILO monitoring reports of their supplier factories and 
they enforce labor standards through pre-order selection and post-order enforcement. 
Before placing orders, buyers check whether the compliance levels of potential 
suppliers meet their thresholds. After placing orders, buyers constantly oversee their 
suppliers‟ compliance performance through ILO monitoring reports and sometimes their 
own or third-party monitoring. When buyers identify major or recurrent issues, they ask 
their suppliers to provide corrective action plans and follow them up.  
While the current system makes factories accountable to buyers, workers are 
largely left out. Factory-level ILO monitoring reports are not accessible to workers, and 
there is no system of complaint-based inspection. This lack of accountability to workers 
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 Interview with industry expert, 30 August 2007. 
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may partly stem from the fear that ILO monitoring reports may be abused by 
unscrupulous unions and further fuel disputes and strikes. Also, the accountability gap 
has been partially offset by broader engagements of the ILO in Cambodia, namely the 
Arbitration Council and capacity building of workers and union leaders. Nonetheless, 
the monitoring system itself has scope for improving its accountability, for instance by 
publicly disclosing monitoring reports after a certain period and responding to worker 
complaints.  
Perceived Impacts on Working Conditions and Exports 
As a lack of comparable data before and after the ILO program precludes rigorous 
impact assessment, this section draws on interview materials to discuss perceived 
impacts of the ILO monitoring program. Field-based interviews show that working 
conditions have generally improved in monitored factories, but conditions remain 
substandard in non-monitored factories and sectors. In terms of export performance, 
although it is difficult to directly attribute export growth and resilience to the ILO 
program, some buyers find the presence of the ILO important or even crucial for their 
decisions to source from Cambodia. 
In the mid-1990s, at the dawn of the garment sector in Cambodia, working 
conditions were dismal: 14 hour work day, forced overtime, no freedom of association, 
and a monthly wage of USD 35.
22
 While the adoption of the labor code in 1997 marked 
a milestone, non-compliance was widespread. The 1999 bilateral trade agreement and 
factory monitoring by the ILO since 2001 changed industry dynamics and compliance 
improved markedly.  
                                                 
22
 This paragraph is largely based on the interview with former union federation leader, 29 August 2007. 
Hall (2000) also describes abusive working conditions prior to the ILO program. 
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The post-quota era since 2005 has seen more competitive pressures, squeezing 
profit margins of factories and speeding up industry consolidation, with negative 
implications for working conditions. While the firm-level data after the quota regime 
(2006 onwards) show continuous improvement as will be shown in Chapter 2 and 3, a 
lack of comparable data during the quota regime hinders rigorous assessment of 
evolution in working conditions before and after the quota regime.   
Currently, while issues remain regarding short-term contracts and anti-union 
discrimination, interviewees from labor activists to industry experts agree that 
„sweatshop‟ conditions are no longer seen in Cambodia‟s exporting garment factories. 
According to the latest ILO monitoring report, the average compliance level is at about 
90 percent. Further, the majority of collective labor disputes brought to the Arbitration 
Council are concerned with interests rather than rights, indicating that workers are 
mainly fighting for future benefits rather than defending existing legal rights.
23
 
Nevertheless, working conditions are much worse in non-monitored factories, namely 
subcontractors and other sectors as discussed later.  
Cambodia‟s garment exports have grown significantly since the mid-1990. In 
1995, only 20 garment factories existed with 18,700 workers and USD 26.2 million in 
export.
24
 As of mid-2008, 312 factories were operating with 350,000 workers, and 
exports reached almost USD 2.8 billion in 2007.
25
 Garment accounts for about 80 
percent of exports, 12 percent of GDP, and employs 65 percent of the industrial 
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 Interview with Arbitrator of the Arbitration Council, 19 September 2007. 
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 Figure from the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia. 
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 Figure from ILO BFC. 
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workforce.
26 
The growth of the sector was spurred by the US-Cambodia trade agreement 
in 1999 as it promised increases in a quota, attracting both investors and buyers.  
Although the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) expired at the end of 2004, the 
predicted demise of Cambodia‟s garment sector in the post-quota era did not materialize. 
Some see this resilience as a proof that Cambodia succeeded in becoming an alternative 
„ethical‟ sourcing destination. Nevertheless, an industry expert points out that the 
safeguard measures placed on China and Vietnam temporarily shielded Cambodia from 
competitive pressures and that buyers simply preferred diversifying because “in a time 
of uncertainty, no one wants to put all eggs in the same basket.”27 
The global economic crisis has hit the Cambodian garment sector hard particularly 
since the US has been Cambodia‟s major export destination: 70 percent of garment 
exports were shipped to the US in 2007. The first quarter of 2009 saw a nearly 20 
percent drop in garment export while 63,000 jobs have been shed—18 percent of 
garment sector workforce—and more than 70 factories have closed down.28 Clearly, 
better working conditions did not make Cambodia immune to a downturn.   
Since export performance is directly tied to the volume of orders placed by buyers, 
it is important to examine how buyers perceive ILO BFC. Some buyers, though not all, 
consider the presence of the ILO as an important factor for their sourcing decisions. 
Both Nike and Disney left Cambodia in the 1990s for child labor and other abuses in 
their supplier factories, but the ILO program has reportedly enabled them to come back 
to Cambodia (Wells, 2005: 368). One brand representative confirmed the vital 
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 Interview with industry expert, 30 August 2007. 
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 Figure from ILO BFC Newsletter No. 13, May 2009.  
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importance of the ILO in returning to Cambodia.
 29
 Another major brand said they 
would probably source from fewer factories without the ILO.
30
  
Many buyers, however, have less pronounced views about how the ILO presence 
has impacted their sourcing decisions since they have other considerations such as price, 
quality and delivery.
31
 Considering that these buyers participating in BFC are more 
reputation-conscious, the other buyers (buying about half of Cambodia‟s garment 
exports) are likely to care less. General consensus appears to be that the ILO program 
has not helped increase orders significantly, but rather it has enabled some reputation-
conscious buyers to stay put and not to reduce orders.  
This lack of uncontested commercial benefits of ILO monitoring antagonizes the 
garment industry association, GMAC. Although GMAC did not object to ILO 
monitoring when it was combined with quota increases, they started to fiercely oppose 
the ILO once trade benefits were removed. GMAC contends that Cambodia‟s garment 
sector is facing unfair competition from neighboring countries since only Cambodian 
factories are subject to ILO monitoring and obliged to pay the price of better working 
conditions.
 32
 Besides, these efforts are not compensated by increased price or orders. 
Further, factory managers complain that buyers demand better working conditions on 
the one hand and lower prices and faster delivery on the other, squeezing factory profits 
and their capacity to improve working conditions.
33
  
Coverage  
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 Conversation with buyer representative, 9 October 2008 at the Buyers Forum. 
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 Conversation with buyer representative, 9 October 2008 at the Buyers Forum. 
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 Conversations with buyer representatives, 9-10 October 2008 at the Buyers Forum. 
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 Conversation with GMAC representative, 9 October 2008 at the Buyers Forum. 
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 Conversation with factory managers, 9 October 2008 at the Buyers Forum. 
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Many scholars have voiced concerns that non-state or buyer-driven regulation is 
inevitably limited in terms of the kinds of workers and sectors it can cover. Workers 
employed by subcontractors often face the worst conditions and receive few or no 
benefits from buyer CoC and monitoring (Barrientos, 2008).  Moreover, non-consumer 
and non-exporting sectors are not covered, leaving the majority of workers in the 
developing world unprotected (Verma, 2003). Furthermore, buyer-driven regulation is 
likely to create gaps as buyers choose the level of standards for their target consumers 
(Seidman, 2008). These gaps create “regulatory enclaves,” leaving the most vulnerable 
behind (Posthuma, 2008).  
In this respect, ILO BFC does not fare much better than other non-state initiatives 
even though BFC monitors all exporting garment factories. The next chapter 
demonstrates that there are compliance gaps between factories producing for reputation-
conscious buyers and other factories. Further, union representatives and government 
officials confirm that working conditions are much worse in subcontractors and other 
sectors. One garment factory manager remarked that many illegal small workshops are 
operating and that they are more productive and profitable since workers who want to 
earn more go there so they can work many hours without restrictions.
34
  
While there is no official figure of subcontractors and domestically-oriented 
garment factories, it is likely to be in the order of several hundreds. The Ministry of 
Labor and Vocational Training (MLVT) has registered 525 garment factories while the 
ILO monitoring program has registered about 300 exporting garment factories. The 
difference indicates the number of non-exporting garment factories although it is likely 
to be larger given many illegal workshops operating. 
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 Interview with factory manager. 17 September 2008. 
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Furthermore, workers in sectors without transnational linkage and buyer pressure 
suffer from substandard or dangerous conditions. Official at the Department of 
Occupational and Safety Health (DOSH) points out that child labor and dangerous 
working environment are commonplace in brick-making and construction industry.
35
 
The official also notes that there is a growing gap in OSH compliance between ILO- 
monitored garment factories and other establishments. 
Nevertheless, unionization and transnational solidarity linkages are growing in 
other sectors that are not typically dependent on ethical consumerism. In the 
construction industry, Cambodia Construction Trade Union Federation (CCTUF) is 
affiliated with Building and Woodworkers International (BWI), and BWI has lodged a 
formal complaint to the ILO committee on freedom of association against the 
Cambodian government on behalf of CCTUF.
36
 Similarly in education, Cambodian 
Independent Teachers Association (CITA) is a member of Education International (EI), 
which has helped CITA to establish its branches in all provinces and train leaders.
37
 In 
tourism, Cambodian Tourism and Service Workers Federation (CTSWF) is affiliated 
with The International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, 
Tobacco and Allied Workers‟ Associations (IUF). IUF and its international members 
turned labor disputes in Raffles Hotel, Cambodia‟s most luxurious hotel, into an 
international campaign by demonstrating in front of Raffles chains, sending protest 
letters, and calling for boycotts, which ended in a settlement in 2004.
38
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 Interview with official of the Department of Occupational Safety and Health. 21 September 2007. 
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 See the website of BWI: http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=1762&Language=EN  
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 See the website of Education International: http://www.ei-ie.org/developmentcooperation/en/ 
project_detail.php?id=147&country=cambodia& geography=asiapacific     
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 See the website of IUF: http://www.iuf.org/cgibin/dbman/db.cgi?db=default&ww=1 
&uid=default&ID=2008&view_records=1&en=1 
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This growth in organized sectors in Cambodia does not owe to the ILO program, 
but to the international political dynamics that gave rise to the ILO program: pressure 
from the US government. Growing US pressure during the trade negotiation pushed the 
Cambodian government to revise and adopt the labor code in 1997, despite fierce 
opposition by the garment industry and the ruling political party.
39
 The 1997 labor code 
acknowledges workers‟ right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
Behind this US pressure was American organized labor, namely the AFL-CIO, one of 
the key constituents of the Democratic Party.  The AFL-CIO has established Solidarity 
Centers around the world including Cambodia to help organize workers and train local 
union leaders. In sum, transnational solidarity and local worker organization may help 
fill some of the regulatory gaps when the political environment allows organized labor 
to play an active role as in the case of Cambodia. 
Complementarity with State Regulation 
It is important that non-state regulation does not replace or weaken state regulation, 
but rather it should strengthen and complement it (O‟Rourke, 2006). In essence, the ILO 
has created systems of monitoring and dispute resolution that run in parallel to the 
government systems of labor inspection and justice. While it was necessary given the 
prevalent government failure in Cambodia, the lack of convergence may compromise 
the long-term effectiveness of the ILO program.  
Cambodia‟s Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) has the 
Department of Labor Inspection (DLI) with 44 inspectors who conduct pre-announced 
inspection of all factories (garment and non-garment).
40
 In 2006, inspectors conducted 
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 Interview with representative of US Solidarity Center, 29 September 2007. 
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 This paragraph is based on the interview with official at the Department of Labor Inspection, 18 
September 2007. 
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2105 “simple” routine inspections and 577 “special” inspections for control of non-
compliance. In terms of sanctions, they issued 902 warnings and charged fines for 19 
cases, of which 17 cases went to court. Fines range from USD 250 to 5000, depending 
on the severity of violation, but expensive fines are rarely charged. In egregious cases, 
suspension of export license is considered together with the Ministry of Commerce. 
Suspension has been ordered to only 5 firms so far. 
Unfortunately, labor inspectors are not considered as the effective enforcement 
authority of the labor law. Labor inspectors often demand bribes from factories they 
inspect. One factory manager complains: “inspectors come so often that it‟s like their 
house. They will find something to complain about, and rather than reporting, they ask 
for bribes, about USD 20 to 40 each time.”41 Given that inspectors earn as little as USD 
35 per month, which is lower than the minimum wage of USD 50 in the garment sector, 
visiting factories for them is a way of supplementing their meager salary.   
Within MOLVT, there is also the Department of Occupational Safety and Health 
(DOSH) with 12 medical inspectors, who visit each factory about 4 times per year. 
Unlike the Department of Labor Inspection (DLI), DOSH has no authority to sanction 
firms even in case of egregious violations. Deprived of enforcement power, OSH 
inspectors sometimes collaborate with labor inspectors to impose fines and sometimes 
even turn to buyers. OSH inspectors contact well-known buyers when they find major 
violation of OSH standards in their supplier factories and ask them to pressure their 
suppliers to rectify the problems.
42
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 Interview with official at the Department of Occupational Safety and Health, 21 September 2007. 
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MOLVT also has the Department of Labor Dispute (DLD) with 25 staff charged 
with mediating workers and employers as well as overseeing collective bargaining 
agreements.
43
 For collective labor disputes, unions and employers are expected to 
negotiate first. Once negotiations fail, they must turn to the DLD for mediation. Only 
when the government-led mediation fails, could parties bring the case to the Arbitration 
Council, a tripartite body set up by the ILO to resolve collective disputes. According to 
one former union federation leader, the DLD tries to prevent cases from proceeding to 
the Arbitration Council.
44
 This is probably because MOLVT sees the Arbitration 
Council as a threat to their jurisdiction.
45
  
All in all, there is clearly duplication between the work of MOLVT and the ILO. 
Although there is little cooperation between the ILO and MOLVT at the program level, 
there is some collaboration at the institutional level. The ILO has been helping to build 
the capacity of MOLVT through training and joint investigation of child labor cases. 
Currently, they are working together to create an enterprise physician accreditation 
scheme. These and other kinds of cooperation including joint factory visits should be 
strengthened to fill the governance gap. Further, to avoid duplication and enhance 
effectiveness, the ILO and MOLVT should coordinate their monitoring efforts. While 
ILO BFC continues to monitor exporting garment factories, MOLVT could concentrate 
their monitoring efforts on non-exporting garment factories and other sectors. In the 
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 In fact, MLVT and the Arbitration Council compete for the legitimacy of interpretations of the labor 
law. The labor law contains ambiguities, which covet different interpretations. For instance, the article 67 
prohibits the use of the undetermined duration contract that exceeds 2 years. MOLVT considers that 
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Arbitration Council Foundation, 30 August 2007. 
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long run, however, these efforts need to converge and MOLVT needs to take center 
stage in labor regulation.  
Sustainability 
Since 2006, ILO BFC has been going through a transition period. The ILO has 
continued to manage the program with the aim of transferring its capacity to a local 
independent entity in 2010. Funding of the program is also set to be self-sustaining 
beyond 2010 as donor funding is gradually taken over by contributions from the 
Cambodian government, GMAC, and buyers. This transition is not without problems, 
however. 
Sustainability of any regulatory schemes requires both political and financial 
support. BFC has won solid political support from the Cambodian government and 
major buyers. The Cambodian government is keen to continue selling Cambodia as an 
ethical sourcing destination. Reputation-conscious buyers are pleased to have a stamp of 
approval from the ILO for compliance performance of their suppliers. Even though the 
industry association GMAC is not pleased with BFC, they will be obliged to go along 
with buyers and the government.  
In terms of financing, BFC has not yet come up with a viable plan to become self-
sustaining. The current minimal fees that buyers pay for BFC to view monitoring 
reports need to be substantially raised. As fees increase, buyers are likely to demand 
more value for money, requiring BFC to offer more buyer-oriented services. On the 
other hand, GMAC is putting increasing pressures on BFC to be a helpful partner rather 
than a watch dog. In light of the changing business needs, BFC is going through 
organizational changes to shift its core mission from compliance monitoring to 
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problem-solving. Monitors are being re-trained to become “factory advisors,” who 
identify issues and suggest solutions.  
These on-going changes pose both opportunities and risks to BFC. Shifting its 
focus to problem solving and remediation may enable monitors to better assist the 
garment factories in meeting compliance challenges as evidenced by the “Latin” model 
of labor regulation. Piore and Schrank (2008) argue that the Latin model based on 
rehabilitation rather than sanction is more effective and conducive to reconciling labor 
standards with competitiveness.  
In the literature on labor inspection, a distinction is often made between the 
Anglo-Saxon approach to enforcement rooted in sanctions and deterrence and the Latin 
approach (practiced in France, Spain, and Central/Latin American countries) based on 
conciliation and rehabilitation. The Latin model gives inspectors discretion and 
flexibility to work out a realistic plan to bring firms into compliance, paying attention to 
production demands and specific situations (Piore and Schrank, 2008). Besides, 
inspectors play the role of business consultants by spreading best practices in the 
industry.   
Similarly, Locke, Amengual and Mangla (2009) argue that a traditional 
“compliance approach” that emphasizes policing and sanction has not induced progress 
in working conditions. They maintain that a “commitment approach” characterized by 
joint problem solving and capacity building between buyers and suppliers is more 
effective at addressing the root causes of poor working conditions in supply chains. Yet 
other scholars argue for a hybrid approach, combining advisory and punitive roles of 
labor inspectors (Pires, 2008). 
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While the problem-solving approach has important advantages, its effectiveness is 
likely to be compromised under certain circumstances. The Latin model is a state 
regulatory mechanism entirely funded by the government while the ILO model is a 
public-private partnership, which is increasingly funded by the garment industry. 
Monitoring and consulting the very firms that finance their activities may replicate the 
classic dilemma and conflict of interests facing auditing firms (Seidman, 2008). 
Moreover, the commitment approach is effective only when buyers and suppliers are 
willing to invest in their relationships. When neither suppliers nor buyers are motivated, 
policing and sanction may be necessary to bring suppliers into compliance. Overall, 
BFC needs to strike a difficult balance between monitoring and advisory roles.  
Comparison with other non-state initiatives 
While the above assessment has revealed certain limits of the ILO program, it has 
important advantages in comparison with other existing private voluntary schemes.  The 
weaknesses of corporate CoC and private monitoring can be summarized as follows: 
high cost, lack of coordination, selective standards, mixed results, limited reach, lack of 
worker viewpoint, and parallel systems (Posthuma, 2008). While the Cambodian case 
shares some of the weaknesses such as limited reach and parallel systems, it fares better 
than other initiatives in many respects, such as cost-effectiveness, coordination, and 
capacity building, in addition to independence and credibility mentioned earlier.  
ILO BFC is clearly more cost-effective than private monitoring schemes. One 
sourcing agent remarks that third-party audit is expensive, costing about USD 2000 per 
audit, and the quality is questionable given its money-driven nature.
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 On the other hand, 
access to ILO monitoring report per factory per year is currently USD 500. Since all 
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factories are monitored every 6 to 8 months, cost per audit is about USD 250-330. The 
main difference in cost arises from the fact that ILO monitors are locally based 
Cambodian nationals while private auditors are often expatriates.  
Moreover, the coordinating role of the ILO has been important in bringing 
different actors together. The ILO has provided a forum for various stakeholders (i.e. 
the government, the garment industry association, union federations, and international 
buyers) to collaborate. One buyer remarked that it was unthinkable a few years ago that 
buyers could collaborate, as they saw each other only as competitors.
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 Indeed, private 
regulatory schemes often lack an institutional framework to coordinate different actors 
and responsibilities, compromising their effectiveness (Macdonald, 2007).  
In addition, the ILO helped reduce duplication of private audits as some though 
not all buyers have replaced their own or third-party audits with ILO monitoring. The 
idea is to use saving from monitoring for training and remediation.
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 Various training 
and capacity building are offered by ILO BFC, and some buyers burden share the cost 
of training. This contrasts with purely private schemes where various initiatives co-exist 
and compete without coordination, leading to duplication in some areas and lack of 
provision in others, given free rider problems. In short, by setting standards, monitoring 
industry-wide, coordinating stakeholders, and providing training, the ILO has provided 
semi-public good to the industry. 
1.5. Conclusion 
Based on interviews and participant observation, this chapter has evaluated the ILO‟s 
innovative scheme to monitor and improve working conditions in Cambodia‟s garment 
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replaced their audits with ILO monitoring. 
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sector. The ILO program is unique in that it combines different elements of non-state 
approaches to improve working conditions: market forces, empowerment, and 
transparency. Overall, ILO BFC scores high on rigor and perceived impacts on 
monitored factories, medium on accountability and export performance, and low on 
coverage, complementarity with state regulation, and sustainability. BFC fares better 
than other private initiatives in terms of cost-effectiveness, coordination, and capacity 
building in addition to its independence and credibility. The next generation model 
should build on the strengths of the Cambodian model while addressing the weaknesses.  
The question remains as to how the identified weaknesses, in particular regulatory 
enclaves and parallel systems can be addressed. The problem of limited coverage may 
be partially mitigated by promoting worker organization in non-monitored 
establishments and sectors, possibly with the help of transnational solidarity networks. 
However, workers are difficult to organize in small subcontractors and illegal 
workshops. Also, this strategy assumes that freedom of association is recognized and 
upheld by the government, which is not always the case in developing countries.  
Another way to regulate the sphere left unregulated by private initiatives is to let 
government labor inspectors concentrate their efforts on non-covered establishments 
and sectors. This solution may be effective when limited resources constrain monitoring 
efforts of the labor inspectorate.  
Often times, however, state regulation in developing countries faces additional 
difficulties. In Cambodia, culture of impunity for those in power is pervasive, 
undermining the rule of law and crippling effective law enforcement.
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  Corruption runs 
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 This point has been by repeatedly mentioned by many interviewees. Also, see Hall (2000) for field-
based accounts of impunity. 
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rampant not only among government officials and factory managers but also among 
union leaders. These problems are deeply rooted in politics at the core and thus 
extremely difficult to rectify. 
Parallel systems created to bypass such difficulties are not without problems, 
either. When buyers enforce labor standards instead of the government, improving 
working conditions is viewed as corporate social responsibility rather than legal 
compliance, and factories demand buyers to pay the price of good will. Yet buyers are 
unwilling to pay a premium for better working conditions; rather, they are keen to 
obtain lower prices.  Buyers therefore end up playing two contradictory roles: enforcing 
labor standards on the one hand and demanding lower prices and faster delivery on the 
other, squeezing supplier profits and their capacity to improve working conditions. 
Another question of buyer-driven regulation concerns sustainability. A similar program 
in Lesotho spearheaded by the ILO and the IFC is experiencing difficulty as brands are 
backing off and donors are failing to come through with funding (Seidman, 2009). To 
the extent that regulation depends on fickle market forces, its long-term viability is 
uncertain. 
The difficulty facing developing countries is therefore a combination of 
government and market failures. The inherent limits of private regulation are 
increasingly acknowledged (Vogel, 2005; Graham and Woods, 2006; Kuruvilla and 
Verma, 2006; Seidman, 2007). Ultimately, only government possesses undisputed 
legitimacy and potential to enforce labor standards across all sectors in a sustainable 
manner. Nevertheless, developing country governments are too often incapable of 
effectively assuming regulatory roles.  
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Given the lack of a simple solution, spreading the benefits of better labor 
conditions worldwide requires progress on all fronts. First, non-state initiatives need to 
better coordinate themselves as well as with state regulation. While ILO BFC has 
played an important coordinating role to bring together stakeholders in the Cambodian 
garment industry, it should further coordinate their monitoring efforts with state 
regulators.  
Second, future efforts need to go beyond monitoring. In Cambodia, the ILO had 
much broader engagement than just monitoring: the ILO helped revise the labor code, 
supported freedom of association, educated workers about their rights and duties, set up 
a dispute resolution mechanism, trained union leaders and factory supervisors. 
Moreover, such extensive ILO involvement was made possible by the political 
dynamics in the US and its relation with Cambodia, rendering the Cambodian case more 
unique than universal. 
Third, government officials should be given the right incentives to enforce the law. 
This necessitates a decent wage and much stricter discipline as regards corruption. 
Effective law enforcement in turn calls for the rule of law.  Given that it is a 
fundamental political issue, technical assistance alone is unlikely to bring about changes. 
The political class needs to change the prevailing rule of the game and put an end to the 
culture of impunity. This may be facilitated by internal and external pressures—both 
governmental and non-governmental—that demand democracy, transparency, and 
justice.  
All in all, through evaluating ILO BFC, this chapter has illustrated the complex 
and multi-level forces shaping the regulatory dynamics in the Cambodian garment 
sector. While it was US political pressures that initiated the ILO‟s extensive 
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engagement in Cambodia‟s garment sector, it is currently buyers‟ needs and demands 
that are driving ILO BFC.  Hence, the remaining chapters focus on the role of buyers in 
regulating and influencing working conditions in their supplier factories.  
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Figure 1-1. Number of strikes in the Cambodian garment industry  
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   Figure 1-2. Number of lost working days caused by strike 
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      Figure 1-3. Number of unions and federation registered 
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     Chapter 2. The Role of Reputation-Conscious Buyers in Regulating 
Labor Conditions 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Business has come to play an important role in regulating the sphere traditionally 
reserved for government, especially in developing countries. On the one hand, the 
globalization of production and the vertical disintegration of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) have contributed to the growing industrial capabilities in the developing world 
(Gereffi et al., 2005). On the other hand, persistent lack of capacity of developing 
country governments has created regulatory gaps, and transnational networks of 
activists have come to demand MNEs to assume responsibilities for regulating labor 
conditions in their supply chains (Elliott and Freeman, 2003). 
In particular, MNEs in labor-intensive sectors such as garment and footwear have 
been criticized for sourcing from countries where labor is cheap and regulation is weak: 
taking advantage of so-called „sweatshop‟ labor and aggravating a „race to the bottom.‟ 
The 1990s saw a remarkable growth in anti-sweatshop campaigns, mostly emanating 
from the United States and Europe. In particular, famous brands such as the Gap, Levi 
Strauss, and Nike were exposed and blamed for dismal working conditions in their 
supply chains in developing countries.  
As a response to the growing demand for more proactive involvement in 
regulating working conditions, many MNEs have implemented codes of conduct (CoC) 
and monitoring procedures while some brands have joined multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSI) to commit to better working conditions in global supply chains (O‟Rourke, 2006). 
The principal motivation of MNEs is to safeguard their reputation as damaging a brand 
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image incurs a considerable financial loss (Conroy, 2007). To a larger extent, therefore, 
non-state regulation has become one of the dominant modes of regulating labor 
conditions in global supply chains. 
The rise of non-state regulation of labor standards has provoked heated debates 
about its effectiveness. While some see CoC and private monitoring as a flexible 
response to the reality of poor regulation in developing countries (Nadvi and Wältring, 
2004), others find fault with private systems of CoC and monitoring, arguing that they 
exclude workers and lack transparency and credibility. Esbenshade (2004) points out 
that the system of private monitoring has inherent contradictions: manufacturers control 
monitoring that is meant to discipline them while workers have no voice in the system 
that is meant to benefit them.  Barrientos et al. (2003) criticize buyer CoC for their 
narrow scope and bias against labor rights such as freedom of association. Barrientos 
(2008) also maintains that CoC fail to protect the most vulnerable workers employed by 
subcontractors. Further, Seidman (2008) argues that even independent monitoring 
schemes face limitations as monitors are dependent on employers for access and 
funding.  
Moreover, some scholars voice concerns that anti-sweatshop campaigns‟ focus on 
brands restricts the regulated realm to export sector for brand products whereas working 
conditions elsewhere tend to be worse (Elliott and Freeman, 2003). Similarly, Seidman 
(2008) points out that under the private system of CoC and monitoring, buyers choose 
the level of standards for their target consumers: US brands targeting students such as 
the Gap may implement rigorous standards while retailers targeting price-conscious 
consumers such as Wal-Mart may care less.  
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This last point raises an important question about the potential and limits of buyer-
driven regulation. Do different buyers have different labor standards? Do reputation-
conscious buyers regulate suppliers differently from other buyers? Does buyer-driven 
regulation create pockets of best practices or ratchet up working conditions? These 
questions remain largely unanswered mainly due to lack of systematic data.  
Empirical studies have been largely limited to single case or small N case studies 
on private/independent monitoring or specific buyers. Even the most comprehensive 
evaluation of MSI to date, Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) impact study, covering 11 
ETI member companies 23 supplier sites in 5 countries, does not assess impacts 
quantitatively.
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 Further, the ETI impact study does not compare suppliers of ETI 
member companies with other suppliers, limiting the types of buyers under examination. 
Existing studies on buyers tend to be qualitative and limited to branded buyers (Frenkel, 
2001; Frenkel and Scott, 2002; Locke and Romis, 2006). Despite exceptions such as 
Locke et al. (2007) and Jiang (2009) that quantitatively evaluate the impact of buyer-
supplier relationships, there is a lack of systematic assessment on whether and how 
different types of buyers variably affect working conditions in supplier facilities.         
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is two fold: (i) to assess whether buyers 
with different degrees of reputation consciousness—defined in this paper using buyers‟ 
MSI membership status—variably influence supplier compliance with labor standards 
and (ii) to identify the patterns through which buyers regulate working conditions in 
supplier factories. This chapter seeks to achieve this task through a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. Quantitative analysis exploits the unique factory-level data 
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resources/eti-impact-assessment-part-1-main-findings  
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provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO) program, Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC). Qualitative analysis is based on the author‟s field research conducted 
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in the summers of 2007 and 2008. 
This chapter focuses on the unique nature of the Cambodian model that combines 
semi-public monitoring and private enforcement. While the ILO is mandated to monitor 
and report factory compliance with the Cambodian labor law and international labor 
standards, the ILO has no enforcement power. The Ministry in charge of labor 
inspection and remediation suffers from incapacity and corruption, which prevents it 
from effectively enforcing the labor law. Given the lack of government enforcement, 
buyers often act as a virtual enforcement authority.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses deterrence theory 
that links the motivations of buyers and suppliers with compliance performance. Then, 
the methods and data will be discussed. The quantitative section shows that factories 
producing for reputation-conscious buyers have better compliance levels than other 
factories. The qualitative section demonstrates that reputation-conscious buyers enforce 
labor standards both reactively and proactively while suppliers also make proactive 
efforts despite constraints imposed by purchasing practices. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by highlighting the potential and limits of buyer-driven regulation and the 
actions needed to spread the benefits of better working conditions more widely.  
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Theoretical literature on compliance has traditionally focused on the role of 
enforcement and deterrence. The literature has been inspired by the economics of crime 
literature pioneered by Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970), who argued that individuals 
 50 
and firms rationally weigh the cost and benefit of non-compliance when deciding 
whether or not to violate a law. This deterrence theory posits that a firm‟s propensity to 
comply with regulations is positively related with the probability of detection and 
expected penalty of violation. In other words, unless detection is probable and 
punishment is sufficiently severe, firms always have an incentive to evade regulation. 
This logic has been applied to a number of compliance issues including occupational 
safety and health (Viscusi, 1979; Bartel and Thomas, 1985) and minimum wage 
compliance (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979).  
More recently, this theory has been applied to private monitoring of minimum 
wage compliance in the US garment industry (Weil, 2005; Weil and Mallo, 2007). They 
find that more stringent forms of monitoring by manufacturers are associated with better 
compliance. Indeed, scholars increasingly recognize that public enforcement is no 
longer the dominant force driving compliance behavior of firms and that various third-
parties are actively shaping regulatory environment (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; 
Black, 2003; Hutter and Jones, 2007). Particularly in the global garment industry, which 
has seen a wave of anti-sweatshop campaigns and boycotts since the 1990s, societal and 
media pressures have become the driving force of firms‟ compliance behavior with 
regard to labor standards.  
While the deterrence theory was initially developed to explain compliance 
behavior in response to public enforcement, it can be applied to private enforcement as 
well. Those buyers facing a higher probability of detection and expected penalty are 
more willing to invest their time and resources in regulating their supply chains than 
other buyers. Expected penalty is higher for those buyers that derive much of their value 
from brand image. For major apparel brands such as Adidas, the Gap, and Nike, brand 
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value accounts for 40 to 50 percent of the companies‟ market capitalization (Conroy, 
2007). Bad publicity arising from negative campaigns seriously damages brand 
reputation and thus profits. Knowing the vulnerability of brands, activists have 
deliberately targeted them and often succeeded in modifying corporate behavior (Ibid.). 
Given the higher probability of detection and expected penalty, buyers who have the 
most to lose from bad publicity have come to regulate their supply chains more 
rigorously.  
Most buyers enforce CoC in their supply chains through pre-order selection and 
post-order monitoring. Before placing orders, almost all buyers assess the compliance 
levels of candidate factories either by internal compliance teams or external auditors. If 
compliance level is deemed unsatisfactory, compliance teams demand corrective action 
plans. Only when the factory‟s compliance reaches an acceptable level, can sourcing 
teams place orders. In this way, buyers‟ compliance departments play the role of a gate 
keeper. After orders are placed, factories are regularly monitored, and once important or 
persistent non-compliance issues are signaled, buyers ask for corrective action plans. If 
factories do not rectify the problems within a given time frame, buyers may cancel 
orders. While most major buyers have CoC that include the national labor law and 
international core labor standards, the acceptable level of compliance and the degree of 
actual enforcement are likely to depend on buyers‟ vulnerability to negative publicity 
and thus reputation consciousness. 
For supplier factories, therefore, the expected cost of labor standard violation 
varies with the type of buyers they are producing for.
 
Reputation-conscious buyers, 
facing the higher expected cost of non-enforcement, are more likely to carefully assess 
their supplier compliance before placing orders and enforce rigorously after placing 
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orders. Consequently, the cost of non-compliance facing suppliers of reputation-
conscious buyers is higher than that of other suppliers, making the former more likely to 
comply with labor standards than the latter.  
The expected cost of non-compliance may also depend on the number of buyers a 
factory is producing for. From the deterrence perspective, when a factory is being 
watched by a number of buyers, non-compliance is more likely to be detected and 
punished, raising the cost of non-compliance. Based on the ETI impact study, 
Barrientos and Smith (2007:720) point out the importance of “critical mass” of buyers 
for inducing supplier compliance. Nonetheless, when a factory is producing for only one 
buyer, the probability of detection may be lower, but the cost of punishment (i.e. 
eventual cancellation of orders) may be larger.  
The cost calculation of suppliers, then, is likely to depend on a combination of the 
type and number of buyers: when a factory is producing for only one or a small number 
of very reputation-conscious buyers, given their rigorous enforcement and potentially 
high cost of punishment, the factory is likely to maintain a relatively high level of 
compliance.  When a factory is producing for only one or a small number of less 
reputation-conscious buyers, however, it is unlikely to give a sufficient incentive for 
suppliers to improve compliance performance significantly. In other words, the effect of 
critical mass is likely to be more important for less reputation-conscious buyers. Given 
the above discussion, we can form the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis I. Factories producing for at least one particularly reputation-conscious 
buyer will have a higher level of labor standard compliance than factories producing 
for other types of buyers.  
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Hypothesis II. Factories producing for a larger number of less reputation-conscious 
buyers will have a higher level of labor standard compliance than factories producing 
for fewer of these buyers. 
 
This chapter combines quantitative and qualitative methods as each method can make 
distinct contributions (Brady and Collier, 2004). The quantitative method helps establish 
statistical relationships between variables and an outcome and identify whether and how 
much each variable matters for the outcome. The qualitative method can account for the 
causal mechanisms and processes: why and how those variables lead to the outcome. 
Moreover, triangulation of different methods approaching the same problem increases 
inferential leverage and enhances the validity of hypotheses (Ibid.).  
Specifically, the following quantitative section describes variables and estimates 
regression models to explain variation in compliance performance of Cambodia‟s 
garment factories. The purpose here is to evaluate the hypotheses that reputation 
consciousness of buyers and the number of such buyers sourcing from a factory 
significantly affect supplier compliance performance. The subsequent qualitative 
section builds on the quantitative findings and seeks to explain the black box: through 
which mechanisms buyers regulate supplier compliance.    
2.3. Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative section of this paper draws on the wealth of information collected 
by ILO BFC.
 
ILO monitors conduct un-announced visits of all exporting garment 
factories every 6 to 8 months. As monitoring covers the entire population of exporting 
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factories in Cambodia (approximately 300), there is no problem associated with 
sampling. While the ILO has been monitoring factories since 2001, monitoring and firm 
characteristic data have been systematically stored only since 2006. Accordingly, the 
data used for this study cover the period from January 2006 to December 2008 for 344 
factories. During this period, ILO monitors visited factories 4 times on average. The 
data have been pooled to make a panel dataset of 1230 observations.  
Dependent Variable 
ILO monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labor standards, which are 
based on the Cambodian labor law and the international labor standards. The monitored 
standards have been agreed by a tri-partite governing body, comprising of the 
Cambodian government, employers, and unions in the garment industry. These 
standards are grouped into the following categories: contracts, wages, hours, leave, 
welfare, occupational safety and health (OSH), and fundamental rights. 
As for monitoring procedures, un-announced visits span an entire day or longer for 
larger establishments. The process includes on-site inspection, meetings with human 
resource managers, union leaders, and shop stewards as well as off-site interviews with 
workers. Copies of pay slips and hour records are collected for verification. ILO 
monitors assess each checklist item and determine whether a factory complies with a 
specified standard. When the factory is deemed out of compliance with a certain item, 
monitors make a standardized suggestion for improvement. Therefore, the presence of a 
suggestion is equivalent to non-compliance and the absence of a suggestion, compliance. 
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In general, fewer suggestions or non-compliance items indicate better working 
conditions.
51
  
The average compliance level during the period between 2006 and 2008 is 89 
percent, where a score of 100 indicates full compliance. This suggests a very high level 
of overall compliance in Cambodia‟s garment industry during this period. Nonetheless, 
there is large variation in compliance performance, ranging from near-full compliance 
to over 100 non-compliance items. Figure 2-1 shows the frequency distribution of the 
number of non-compliance items in the sample. This quantitative section seeks to 
explain this variation: why do some factories have better labor compliance levels than 
other factories? The dependent variable, therefore, is the number of non-compliance 
items found in each monitoring visit.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are the presence and number of reputation-conscious 
buyers. This concept is operationalised by buyer membership of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSI). Since reputation-conscious buyers tend to participate in MSI to show 
their commitment to better working conditions and safeguard their reputation, it is a 
reasonable proxy. Following O‟Rourke (2006: 899), this thesis defines MSI in labor 
regulation as a scheme that involves various stakeholders in negotiating labor standards, 
monitoring compliance with these standards, and establishing mechanisms to encourage 
firms to comply with these standards. While MSI can take various forms from 
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Moreover, monitoring fundamental rights, including freedom of association, discrimination, child labor, 
remains a difficult task. Despite these challenges, ILO monitoring results in Cambodia‟s garment sector 
are the most comprehensive and reliable industry-wide data available on the general state of working 
conditions in garment factories. 
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certification of production facilities to collaboration of buyers, this chapter concentrates 
on buyer-oriented schemes given our interest in the role of reputation-conscious buyers.  
This chapter considers three MSI: Better Factories Cambodia (BFC), the Fair 
Labor Association (FLA), and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). BFC embodies an 
MSI approach given its tripartite governance structure. Buyers participating in BFC 
(hereafter BFC buyers) pay moderate fees to access to ILO monitoring reports with 
factories‟ consent. At the end of 2008, there were 37 international buyers participating 
in BFC, most of which are brands and well-known retailers. The FLA, an American 
initiative, is the oldest and the best known brand-oriented MSI in labor regulation. It 
emphasizes transparency, disclosure, and certification (Hughes et al., 2007). Member 
companies are required to implement the FLA CoC, submit to un-announced monitoring, 
and to commit to remediation and public reporting. Currently, 26 companies are 
participating, most of which are well-known apparel and sportswear brands. The ETI, a 
UK scheme, is geared toward collaboration and learning rather than monitoring and 
enforcement (Ibid.). The ETI encourages its member companies to implement its base 
code in their supply chains and require them to submit annual progress report on their 
code implementation. Currently, 50 companies are participating, most of which are 
European brands and retailers. 
It is important to note the key differences between BFC and the other two MSI, 
the FLA and the ETI. First, BFC does not certify buyers and does not require buyers to 
implement certain codes or monitoring/reporting procedures. Second, buyers can fully 
rely on ILO monitoring and replace their own (or third-party) audits if they choose to, 
given the ILO‟s industry-wide monitoring. Third, while membership of the FLA and the 
ETI involves expensive fees, BFC only asks buyers to pay very reasonable fees to 
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access to monitoring reports. Overall, BFC is more economical and less burdensome 
than the FLA and the ETI.  
This thesis operationalizes the degree of reputation consciousness by dividing 
buyers into three groups: buyers that participate in BFC and the FLA or the ETI 
(hereafter MSI buyers); buyers that participate in BFC but not in the FLA or the ETI 
(hereafter BFC-only buyers); and buyers that participate in none of the MSI mentioned. 
The degree of reputation consciousness is considered high for MSI buyers, given the 
extra burden involved. Indeed, all the MSI buyers in the sample are branded buyers that 
have experienced negative publicity. BFC-only buyers are considered less reputation-
conscious than the first group. These buyers are mostly large and well-known retailers. 
The third category of buyers that participates in none of the MSI is mostly smaller 
generic retailers that consumers hardly hear of and thus least reputation-conscious.  
Table 2-1 shows the summary statistics of variables. BFC-only buyers are present 
in 31 percent of the factories in the sample. The number of BFC-only buyers sourcing 
from a factory ranges from 0 to 4. As for MSI buyers, 27 percent of the factories in the 
sample produce for at least one MSI buyer, participating in either the FLA or the ETI in 
addition to BFC.
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 This leaves 42 percent of factories producing for buyers that join 
none of the MSI.  There appears to be a significant negative association between the 
number of more or less reputation-conscious buyers in a factory and non-compliance 
(Figure 2-2 shows the number of all BFC buyers, which is a combination of BFC-only 
and MSI buyers). 
Control Variables 
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 The number of MSI buyers sourcing from the same factory is small, and thus this variable is highly 
correlated with the presence variable (>0.89), which is why it is dropped from regression analysis. 
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However, buyer variables are unlikely to be the only factors that affect the factory-
level compliance performance. Various establishment-level characteristics are clearly 
related to working conditions, and thus need to be controlled for. First of all, the size of 
the establishment, as measured by number of employees, can affect the level of 
compliance. Larger factories have made larger investment, raising their opportunity 
costs of exit, which, in turn, justifies larger investment to comply with labor standards. 
In particular, when investment involves large fixed costs, a minimum efficiency scale 
may be needed. Moreover, given that size increases employee alienation and 
supervisory costs, larger establishments are more likely to see the benefit of respecting 
labor standards to raise self-motivation and to minimize the source of disputes and 
monitoring cost (Bryson et al., 2007). For all these reasons, larger establishments are 
more likely to be associated with better compliance. The natural logarithm of total 
number of employees measures the size of the establishment. 
Second, the age of the establishment is likely to influence the level of compliance. 
Factory management may learn the benefit of compliance or the cost of non-compliance 
over time (age).
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 On the other hand, the age of the establishment may impose physical 
constraints: older establishments tend to have older facilities and limited space, making 
it more difficult and costly to comply with certain standards concerning welfare as well 
as safety and health (Bryson et al., 2007). Given the lack of precise data on this variable, 
total number of visits by ILO monitors since 2001 is used as a proxy, ranging from 1 to 
9.
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 Factory management can also learn from training. The ILO provides various training on labor standards 
and human resource management to factories on a voluntary basis. While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, this avenue may be explored in future work. 
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Third, unions are likely to affect the factory‟s working conditions. That unions 
raise wages and improve worker benefits has been widely researched and acknowledged 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Moreover, unionized establishments are found to violate 
fewer safety and health standards (Weil, 2001).  In Cambodia, labor unions have grown 
both in number and in power since the revision of the labor code in 1997.  In the sample, 
the number of unions ranges from 0 to 6, with a mean of 1.3 unions in a factory. 
Disputes and strikes are a major threat for employers in a time-sensitive business like 
garment. Since unions are likely to raise the cost of non-compliance through possible 
disputes and strikes, employers of unionized establishments and especially those with a 
larger number of unions are more likely to comply with labor standards.  
Fourth, the factory‟s ownership may help explain the variation in labor standard 
compliance. Foreign-owned firms tend to provide better pay to workers than their 
domestic counterparts, given the MNEs‟ advanced technological know-how and 
management systems (OECD, 2008). In Cambodia, over 90 percent of exporting 
garment factories is foreign owned while 61 percent is owned by investors from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and China.
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 This study will assess whether a minority of factories under 
the Western and Cambodian ownership is different from the rest in terms of compliance 
level.  
Model Specifications 
This section tests whether the degree and number of reputation-conscious buyers 
have a significant effect on supplier labor standard non-compliance. In addition to the 
variables discussed above, year control dummies for 2006 and 2007 are added to form 
the following model:  
                                                 
54
 Figures from Garment Manufacturers‟ Association of Cambodia (GMAC). 
 60 
 
Non-compliance it = α + β1 ∙ presence of MSI buyers it + β2 ∙ presence of BFC-only 
buyers it + β3 ∙ number of BFC-only buyers it + β4 ∙ establishment size it + β5 ∙ 
establishment age it + β6 ∙ union presence it + β7 ∙ number of unions it + β8 ∙ domestic 
ownership it + β9 ∙ western ownership it + β10 ∙ year 2006 it + β11 ∙ year 2007 it + ε it  
 
Three types of specifications have been estimated: an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimate using the raw number of non-compliance items (raw OLS), an OLS 
estimate using the natural logarithm of non-compliance items (semi-log OLS), and a 
between effects estimate using the natural logarithm of non-compliance items (semi-log 
between effects). While the raw OLS model allows for the most straight-forward 
interpretation of coefficients, it suffers from considerable heteroskedasticity, 
compromising its efficiency. With the semi-log model, heteroskedasticity is 
significantly reduced.  
To address the concern that the OLS assumption of constant intercept across cases 
and time may be unreasonable, fixed, random, and between effects are considered. 
Fixed effects regression is often used for panel data to control for omitted variables that 
differ between cases but are constant over time. It uses time-series information of panel 
data to measure the expected change in the dependent variable given a unit change in a 
variable within cases. As the fixed effects model is equivalent to introducing dummy 
variables, which reduces a degree of freedom for each case, this technique is more 
appropriate for panel data with fewer cases and longer time periods.  
In contrast, between effects is used to control for omitted variables that change 
over time but remain constant between cases. This model uses cross-section information 
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of panel data to measure the expected change in the dependent variable given a unit 
change in a variable across cases. This is equivalent to taking the mean of each variable 
for each case across time and estimating a regression with the collapsed dataset of 
means. The random effects are weighted average of the fixed and between effects, 
assuming that the unit change in an independent variable leads to the same effect on the 
time-series and cross-section data. The Hausman test does not justify the use of random 
effects for the data.  
Considering the nature of the data (i.e. panel data with a large number of cases and 
a small number of time periods) and the question this paper seeks to answer (i.e. why do 
some factories have better compliance levels than others), between effects model is 
more appropriate. The between effects model is used as a check to the semi-log OLS, 
our preferred model given its intuitive results, efficiency, and larger degrees of freedom. 
Results 
All three models show a significant negative association between reputation-
conscious buyer variables and non-compliance (Table 2-2). In other words, non-
compliance is reduced when a factory is producing for reputation-conscious buyers. 
Specifically, the presence of MSI buyers is consistently significant at the 0.001 level. In 
terms of coefficients, the presence of MSI buyers reduces non-compliance by 35 percent. 
In the raw OLS model, this translates to a reduction in non-compliance items by 13 
items. This result supports the first hypothesis that factories producing for at least one 
particularly reputation-conscious buyer have better compliance performance than other 
factories. 
As for BFC-only buyers, the presence of BFC-only buyers is not consistently 
significant although the number of BFC-only buyers is highly significant across all 
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models. An additional BFC-only buyer in a factory reduces non-compliance by 11.2 
percent, which is equivalent to 2.8 items in the raw OLS model. This indicates that a 
less reputation-conscious buyer alone does not induce a marked improvement in 
supplier compliance, but when more of them are sourcing from the same factory, they 
create a critical mass of pressure to bring about better working conditions. This result 
supports the second hypothesis about the number of buyers. 
Among control variables, the size of the establishment is statistically significant 
across all three models. Larger factories enjoy economies of scale and tend to have 
more resources and sophisticated management systems. The age of the establishment is 
positively associated with non-compliance, suggesting that newer purpose-built 
factories have better compliance levels. Union presence is positively associated with 
non-compliance while the number of unions is negatively associated with non-
compliance, though both variables are statistically non-significant.
55
 Domestic 
ownership is highly significant and it increases non-compliance while Western 
ownership reduces non-compliance. This result is consistent with the theory of foreign 
wage premium as Cambodian-owned factories tend to lack managerial know-how and 
financial means while the opposite is the case for Western-owned factories. Year 
dummy controls show that compliance performance has significantly improved in 2008 
compared to 2006 and 2007. Product types, which indicate complexity and skill levels, 
were initially included in the regressions, but none of them were found significant. This 
is likely to stem from the fact that Cambodia specializes in low-end products. 
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 This unexpected result may stem from the fact that a number of dubious „yellow‟ unions have sprung 
up in Cambodia in recent years, and that corruption runs rampant as corroborated by multiple interviews. 
Although the type of unions may have made the difference for the outcome, data limitation precludes 
further investigation. ILO (2006) finds that independent unions are more helpful for workers than 
government-supported unions. 
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2.4. Qualitative Analysis 
While the above quantitative analysis has confirmed the statistically significant 
relationship between reputation-conscious buyers and supplier compliance, data 
constraints prevent us from delving into the mechanisms through which buyers regulate 
their supplier compliance. The strength of case study research lies in in-depth analysis 
of few cases to shed light on causal processes. While various types of case studies exist, 
this section represents a “pathway case,” which seeks to demonstrate causal 
mechanisms building on quantitative analysis (Gerring, 2007: 122).  
This section is based on the author‟s fieldwork conducted in the summers of 2007 
and 2008 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The author conducted 61 semi-structured 
interviews with factory managers, buyer representatives, industry experts, union 
federation leaders, labor activists, government officials, and international donors. All 
interviewees remain anonymous as the content includes sensitive issues. While a 
number of factors influence working conditions, reputation-conscious buyers were 
frequently mentioned as a key player. Specifically, these buyers steer suppliers both 
reactively and proactively while some suppliers make proactive efforts to improve 
working conditions despite constraints imposed by purchasing practices.    
Pressure-driven Enforcement 
Buyers can make a significant impact at the factory level particularly when 
transnational advocacy networks are mobilized to pressure buyers. Specifically, activists 
engage in what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call “accountability politics,” where 
transnational advocacy networks act as a source of countervailing power, hold MNEs to 
their CoC, and pressure them to adopt more stringent standards. Important networks for 
anti-sweatshop campaigns are international trade union federations, student 
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organizations, and other pro-labor NGOs. Such transnational linkages have proved 
helpful in improving working conditions in a few garment factories in Cambodia as 
demonstrated by the following two examples.   
A union federation leader cited one major case that mobilized a transnational 
solidarity network to address anti-union discrimination.
56
 River Rich factory dismissed 
30 union leaders and members after they organized an election to form an independent 
union in October 2006. Strikes calling for the reinstatement of the union members faced 
the riot police. As the union belonged to the federation, the Coalition of Cambodian 
Apparel Workers Democratic Unions (CCAWDU), which was affiliated with the 
International Textile Garment Leather Workers‟ Federation (ITGLWF), they asked for 
assistance. Lack of cooperation from the management led the ITGLWF to pressure the 
factory‟s major buyers, Inditex and H&M for action.  
In June 2007, the senior representatives from the ITGLWF, Inditex, H&M, and 
CCAWDU had intensive discussions with the factory‟s top management, which resulted 
in a historic agreement that went beyond the reinstatement of fired workers.
57
 Since then, 
River Rich has been enjoying stable and cooperative industrial relations, thanks to this 
transnational linkage between the union, the international union federation, and the 
buyers.
58
 Since the union has a close connection with the key buyers, the factory 
management is aware that the union may contact the buyers if any issues arise.  
Another illustrative case involves the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), Adidas, 
and PCCS garment factory. The WRC is a US NGO that investigates worker complaints 
and promotes information disclosure in factories producing University branded products. 
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 Interview with union federation leader, CCAWDU. 10 September, 2007. 
57
 The agreement is available from the website of the ITGLWF:  
http://www.itglwf.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?idarticle=15317&langue=2 
58
 Interview with training expert. 12
 
September, 2008. 
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In 2006, the WRC was contacted by workers to investigate the misuse of short-term 
contracts in the factory.
59
 The Cambodian labor law stipulates that fixed duration 
contracts should be used for temporary positions and that they cannot exceed 2 years. At 
the factory, some workers were hired under the contract of fixed duration for 2 to 3 
months, after which time they were instructed to take a week-off and then come back to 
work under new fixed term contracts. This practice deprives workers of their right to 
seniority bonus, maternity and annual leave among other benefits while it undermines 
employment security from inappropriate dismissal. At the time of WRC investigation in 
March 2006, around 1000 employees, about 25 percent of workforce, were under the 
fixed term contracts.
60
 
As the initial discussions between the WRC and the management produced no 
effects, the WRC pressured Adidas, the factory‟s major buyer, to take action. With the 
intervention of Adidas, the discussions started to take on a different tone. Adidas issued 
a warning to the management that unless the factory converted all fixed-term contracts 
to non-determined ones in one month, it would cancel its orders.
61
 Only after this key 
intervention by Adidas, the management started to change and finally agreed to make 
drastic changes.
62
 The factory agreed to convert the majority of fixed-term contracts 
into non-determined ones, and this has been respected since. 
Despite these successful examples, this transnational tactic of using buyer leverage 
to bring about positive changes at the factory level has its limitations. The WRC 
investigator acknowledges that reputation-conscious brands are more prone to pressures 
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 Interview with WRC investigator. 4 September, 2007. 
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 The WRC investigation report on this case is available from their website: 
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Update_Dec2006.asp#PCCS 
61
 Interview with general manager, PCCS Garment. 21
 
June, 2008. 
62
 Interview with WRC investigator. 4 September, 2007. 
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and therefore more cooperative, but other buyers care less.
 
While this transnational 
strategy may work for major issues, it cannot deal with smaller day-to-day issues. A 
union federation leader involved in the River Rich case concurs that it is time-
consuming and costly to pursue this tactic.
63
 Moreover, those who can exploit 
transnational linkages are limited to well-connected and English speaking union 
federations.
64
 All in all, mobilization of transnational networks may bring about positive 
changes in some factories that produce for reputation-conscious buyers, but it is 
unlikely to address various day-to-day issues in the majority of factories.  
Even if such transnational networks cannot be mobilized every time, however, the 
possibility of such an alliance has changed dynamics. Establishment-level unions have 
also come to see buyers as a source of leverage and an authority that can enforce the 
labor law and improve worker welfare. Indeed, more than a few factory managers 
complain that unions threaten that they will call buyers if management does not 
cooperate. In fact, not only unions but also government officials sometimes turn to 
buyers for help. Since government safety and health inspectors lack enforcement power 
unlike labor inspectors, they contact buyers to ask for remedial action when serious 
safety and health issues are found in garment factories producing for famous brands.
65
  
Buyer-driven Enforcement 
Through repetitive interactions with transnational activist networks over the past 
decade, some buyers have come to take a proactive approach to regulating working 
conditions in their suppliers. Bartley (2005) discusses the dynamic interplay between 
companies and pressure groups, which gradually changes the terms of debate and 
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 Interview with union federation leader, CCAWDU. 10
th
 September, 2007. 
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 Interview with union federation leader, FTUWKC. 26 September, 2007. 
65
 Interview with official, Department of Occupational Safety and Health. 21 September, 2007. 
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regulated terrain. Indeed, some buyers have become proactive and increasingly involved 
in remediation at the factory-level.  
Major brands sourcing from Cambodia, the Gap and H&M have local 
representatives who deal specifically with compliance issues. The Gap takes a pre-
emptive approach and tries to stay well-informed of situations in their supplier factories 
so that they can intervene at an earlier stage. “We don‟t want a bad surprise. We don‟t 
want to learn about a problem in our supplier factory in some newspaper. Rather, we try 
to intervene before the problem gets bigger.” 66  The Gap‟s local representative has 
extensive contacts with union leaders and helps resolve issues on a daily basis. In fact, 
other buyers without local staff sometimes even ask them to intervene in their supplier 
factories when problems arise. The Gap is also heavily involved in dispute resolution. 
They pressure their suppliers to implement both binding and non-binding awards of the 
Arbitration Council, a tripartite entity set up by the ILO to deal with collective disputes. 
They enjoy such leverage vis-à-vis their suppliers partly because they tend to be the 
major buyer for their suppliers, accounting for up to 70 percent of production in some of 
factories.  
The policy of H&M vis-à-vis their supplier compliance is “transparency, 
cooperation, and openness.”67 Locally-based compliance staff visit their suppliers 3 to 4 
times a year for two different purposes. First, there are visits based on a remediation 
cycle of 18 to 24 months, consisting of an un-announced visit and three follow-up visits. 
Then, there are “ordinary visits,” whose purpose is to engage in continuous dialogue 
and share best practices. This way, H&M compliance staff try to foster an open 
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 Interview with the Gap representative. 24 June, 2008. 
67
 Interview with H&M representative. 16 October, 2008. 
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relationship with suppliers, which helps to keep them informed of the situation and to 
contribute to suppliers‟ continuous improvement. H&M local compliance staff also 
work closely with unions. When problems arise, they try to play a neutral mediator role 
between factory management and unions. When collective disputes are settled at the 
Arbitration Council, H&M enforces binding awards and sometimes also non-binding 
awards, depending on the nature and context of cases.     
Nonetheless, not all buyers are so proactive and willing to invest their time and 
efforts to understand and solve problems in supplier factories.  Multiple interviews have 
confirmed the difference in buyer approaches. Well-known brands, in particular those 
with local representatives, are more well-informed of the local situation and readily 
available to help solve problems on the factory floor. Moreover, these buyers tend to 
have more direct contact and established relationships with supplier factories, increasing 
their leverage. In contrast, other lesser known retailers were never mentioned as helpful 
partners. These generic retailers tend to use sourcing agents, and thus their relationships 
with supplier factories are much more distant and mediated, diluting their leverage.  
Supplier Efforts and Purchasing Practices 
Some factories are also taking a proactive approach. Since most buyers require 
factories to comply with their CoC and the national law before placing orders, factories 
learn about the required standards in advance and try to meet them, and some even try 
to go beyond the minimum standards. One factory manager mentioned that their current 
buyers do not have issues with their compliance performance, but the factory makes 
continuous and proactive efforts to improve working conditions to attract more buyers.
68 
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 Interview with factory manager. 11 September, 2008. 
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Given the fickle nature of the industry and the sluggish global economy, factories are 
keen to diversify risks by producing for different buyers from the US and Europe.  
Different buyers have different standards. One factory manager remarks “Nike is 
much stricter about everything.”69 Since buyers who require higher standards tend to be 
famous brands that give higher profit margins, factories trying to attract them need to 
improve compliance and sometimes go beyond the national labor law. “Buyer CoC 
often go beyond the legal requirements, so if we comply with CoC, naturally, we go 
beyond legal compliance.” 70  Nonetheless, many factory managers complain that 
compliance with buyer CoC is simply a minimum requirement to get orders, and better 
compliance does not bring more orders. “No compliance, no orders. But better 
compliance is not rewarded. It just gets you at the start line.”71  
In fact, purchasing practices of buyers—including reputation-conscious ones—
sometimes contradict with the goal of improving working conditions (Oxfam, 2004; 
CCC, 2009). A factory manager explains that significant fluctuations in orders make it 
difficult to keep all of their workers during the low seasons.
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 The garment industry is 
strongly marked by seasonality. In low seasons, some workers remain idle although the 
factory has to keep paying their wages. While some buyers require suppliers to hire 
workers on permanent contracts, they do not share the burden of extra labor costs. 
Consequently, factory management is sandwiched by buyers‟ increasing demands and 
falling profits. 
In recent years, intense competition and rising prices have squeezed garment 
producers‟ profits. One factory manager laments as follows: “Three years ago, the price 
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June, 2008. 
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 Ibid. 
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of pant was $10 a piece and the cost to produce was $6 a piece. Now, the price stays the 
same and the cost has gone up to $8-9 a piece. Buyers don‟t increase the price because 
they can go elsewhere if they want to. It‟s a buyers‟ market.”73 While brands are also 
pushing for lower prices, generic retailers are much more aggressive. One factory 
manager says he does not consider producing for retailers such as Wal-Mart because 
margins are too narrow to make profits.
74
 
Summary 
All in all, the gap in compliance performance appears to stem from reputation-
conscious buyers‟ tendency to rigorously regulate supplier compliance performance 
through pre-order selection and post-order enforcement, both reactively and proactively. 
Buyers act reactively in cases where transnational advocacy networks are mobilized to 
pressure them and demand remedial action in supplier factories. Through repetitive 
interactions, however, some reputation-conscious buyers have learned to be more 
proactive in addressing compliance issues in their supplier factories. On the other hand, 
some factories have come to see better compliance as a way of attracting reputation-
conscious buyers and actively try to improve working conditions. Nonetheless, better 
compliance is not rewarded by buyers and some purchasing practices conflict with the 
goal of improving working conditions.  
While engaged buyers tend to be famous brands, this may change as labor 
practices of large-scale retailers such as Wal-Mart increasingly come under scrutiny 
(CCC, 2009). If this trend continues and intensifies, these giant retailers may eventually 
follow reputation-conscious brands and learn to actively engage with suppliers. The 
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quantitative findings indicate that a larger number of less reputation-conscious buyers 
sourcing from the same factory are associated with better compliance performance. This 
suggests potential for a critical mass of less reputation-conscious buyers to induce better 
compliance in supplier factories.   
2.5. Conclusion 
The role of business in development continues to expand. In particular, business has 
been taking over some of the regulatory roles traditionally assumed by government. The 
globalized garment industry provides a striking example of how MNEs have come to 
regulate labor conditions in their supply chains in developing countries. Despite the 
scale and significance of this phenomenon, systematic investigation of the impact of 
buyers on supplier working conditions has been scarce. In particular, the question of 
whether buyer-driven regulation creates only pockets of best practices or leads to 
overall improvement remains largely unanswered. 
Based on the unique firm-level data and field interviews in Cambodia‟s garment 
sector, this chapter has sought to examine whether and how different types and number 
of buyers affect labor standard compliance of suppliers. The quantitative findings 
clearly show that factories supplying for at least one very reputation-conscious buyer 
tend to have a better compliance level than other factories. Moreover, as the number of 
less reputation-conscious buyers sourcing from the same factory increases, so does the 
compliance level. The qualitative section has demonstrated that reputation-conscious 
buyers enforce labor standards both reactively and proactively, but buyers willing to 
engage with stakeholders are often branded buyers under public scrutiny.  
 72 
The findings point to both the opportunities and limits of private sector-driven 
regulation in the developing world. Contrary to the criticism that global brands are 
exacerbating a „race to the bottom‟ and that private regulation is ineffective, this chapter 
has shown that reputation-conscious buyers exercise an important regulatory role. 
Nonetheless, the study has revealed compliance gaps among factories supplying for 
buyers with different degrees of reputation consciousness.  
In fact, the gap is not inherently harmful if some factories achieve better standards 
and the other factories follow in their footsteps. In Cambodia‟s exporting garment sector, 
the general compliance level has significantly improved over the past decade and 
„sweatshop‟ conditions are virtually non-existent. This result owes much to the ILO, 
which has constantly monitored all exporting garment factories, helped resolve 
collective disputes by setting up a tripartite Arbitration Council, and provided training 
and raised worker awareness about labor rights.  
All these factors, however, make the Cambodian case more unique than universal, 
which is one of the limitations of this study. The Cambodian case does not reflect purely 
buyer-driven regulation, but rather a combination of public and private regulatory 
mechanisms. This implies that working conditions in purely buyer-regulated supply 
chains are likely to be worse. Another limitation of this research is its exclusive focus 
on exporting factories although working conditions in subcontractors are reportedly 
worse.  
Nevertheless, important lessons can be learned from examining the Cambodian 
case. To spread the benefits of better working conditions more widely, each actor has an 
important role to play. First, activists and the media need to expand the scope of their 
attention and target not only branded buyers but also non-branded buyers so that the 
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latter start changing the cost-benefit calculation and become more engaged with 
suppliers. Second, buyers need to reward suppliers for better compliance and address 
purchasing practices that conflict with better working conditions. Moreover, buyers 
should join forces and better coordinate themselves to use the leverage of critical mass. 
Lastly, better coordination and enforcement requires capable government and effective 
international organizations, which are the ultimate source of sustainable progress in 
working conditions. 
While this chapter has focused on reputation-conscious buyers and how they 
influence overall labor standard compliance in supplier factories, buyers may affect 
different categories of labor standards in a distinct manner, which is examined in the 
next chapter.     
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 Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min.  Max. 
            
Number of Non-compliance items 1230 37.58 19.81 2 137 
            
Log of number of non-compliance items 1230 3.47 0.59 0.69 4.92 
      
Presence of MSI buyers (1=yes, 0=no) 1230 0.27 0.44 0 1 
            
Presence of BFC-only buyers (1=yes, 0=no) 1230 0.31 0.46 0 1 
            
Number of BFC-only buyers 1230 0.71 0.99 0 4 
            
Establishment Size 1230 6.8 0.78 2.77 8.92 
(Log of total number of employees)           
            
Establishment Age 1230 4.34 2.09 1 9 
(Total number of ILO monitor visits)           
            
Union Presence (1=yes, 0=no) 1230 0.78 0.41 0 1 
            
Number of Unions 1230 1.36 1.16 0 6 
            
Domestic Ownership (1=yes, 0=no) 1229 0.05 0.23 0 1 
            
Western Ownership (1=yes, 0=no) 1221 0.06 0.24 0 1 
            
Note: "BFC-only buyers" are those buyers participating in ILO Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) but not in other 
major MSI, namely the Fair Labor Association (FLA) or the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). "MSI buyers" are 
those buyers participating in BFC as well as the FLA or the ETI. 
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Table 2-2. Regression results of labor standard non-compliance  
(Jan 2006- Dec 2008) 
  
OLS    Between Effects  
Non-Compliance    Ln (Non-Compliance)    Ln (Non-Compliance) 
            
Presence of MSI buyers -13.254****   -0.346****   -0.451**** 
(1=yes, 0=no) (1.46)   (0.04)   (0.08) 
            
Presence of BFC-only buyers -4.594***   -0.048   -0.024 
(1=yes, 0=no) (1.56)   (0.05)   (0.10) 
            
Number of BFC-only buyers -2.769****   -0.112****   -0.148**** 
  (0.56)   (0.02)   (0.05) 
            
Establishment Size -3.775****   -0.127****   -0.082* 
(Log of total number of employees) (0.87)   (0.02)   (0.04) 
            
Establishment Age 0.551**   0.019**   0.015 
(Number of ILO monitor visits) (0.24)   (0.01)   (0.02) 
            
Union Presence 0.718   0.026   -0.048 
 (1=yes, 0=no) (1.44)   (0.04)   (0.08) 
            
Number of Unions -0.590   -0.024   -0.010 
  (0.45)   (0.02)   (0.03) 
            
Domestic Ownership 9.754****   0.190****   0.167* 
(1=yes, 0=no) (2.79)   (0.06)   (0.10) 
            
Western Ownership -3.538*   -0.123*   -0.117 
(1=yes, 0=no) (1.82)   (0.07)   (0.10) 
            
Year 2006 14.297****   0.416****   0.702**** 
(1=yes, 0=no) (1.26)   (0.04)   (0.11) 
            
Year 2007 2.115**   0.081**   0.326** 
(1=yes, 0=no) (1.05)   (0.04)   (0.12) 
            
Constant 62.416****   4.293****   3.923**** 
  (5.53)   (0.16)   (0.26) 
            
Number of observations 1221   1221   1221 
           
            
R-squared 0.318   0.302   0.366 
            
F-value  50.82   50.52   17.40 
  (11, 1209)   (11, 1209)   (11, 322) 
            
Prob>F 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Notes: "BFC-only buyers" are those buyers participating in ILO Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) but not 
participating in other major MSI, namely, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) or the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). 
"MSI buyers" are those buyers participating in both BFC and the FLA or the ETI. * Statistically significant at the 
0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level, ****at the 0.001 level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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Figure 2-1. Frequency distribution of non-compliance items 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Relationship between BFC buyers and non-compliance items 
 
Notes: BFC buyers are those buyers participating in ILO Better Factories Cambodia (BFC).  
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Chapter 3. Issue-specific Determinants of Labor Standard Compliance 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The debate on the effectiveness of non-state labor regulation is heated and on-going. In 
addition to the criticism that brand-driven schemes only create pockets of best practices, 
skeptics argue that the scope of buyer influence is severely limited in terms of issue 
areas: buyers are likely to monitor and implement certain labor standards more 
rigorously than others. For instance, Seidman (2008) questions whether transnational 
campaigns targeting buyers really respond to ordinary labor grievances.  
 
Labor struggles have historically been local affairs, as workers demand a voice, 
calling on governments to protect citizens‟ rights at work. Transnational 
campaigns, by contrast, must appeal to outside audiences, and they tend to 
revolve around issues likely to attract international attention—physical attacks 
on vulnerable workers, child labor, and other visible example of a serious failure 
to live up to some broad universal standard of human treatment (Seidman, 2008: 
996). 
 
Impact studies on the UK‟s Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) suggest that the ETI 
code had larger impacts on visible and technocratic outcome standards such as health 
and safety and minimum wage than less visible and more fundamental process rights 
such as freedom of association (Barrientos and Smith, 2007). Similarly, based on 
research on garment and coffee industries in Nicaragua, Macdonald (2008) argues that 
codes of conduct (CoC) and monitoring had limited impacts on less visible and more 
structural and fundamental issues such as freedom of association, discrimination, and 
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distributive justice. Other scholars have also found similar patterns (Mamic 2004; 
Rodriguez-Gravito, 2005). Barrientos and Smith (2007: 717) explain this limited 
outcome as follows: “underlying this is an inherent tension between commercial actors 
who prioritize commercial imperatives over compliance with labor codes and social 
actors who prioritize workers‟ rights.”  
Despite growing qualitative evidence, the question of whether buyer-driven 
regulation can improve various areas of labor conditions in supplier facilities has not 
been quantitatively investigated mainly due to a lack of systematic data. The majority of 
existing studies are based on interviews and a small number of cases. Building on 
Chapter 2, this chapter unbundles overall compliance scores and examines the 
determinants of compliance performance across different categories of labor standards, 
with a focus on buyer variables.  In so doing, this chapter seeks to contribute to the 
debate on the limits and potential of buyer-driven regulation.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the deterrence and 
behavioral theories that generate different hypotheses, followed by a section on the data 
and methods. The regression results demonstrate that buyers influence labor standard 
compliance across issue areas: not only very reputation-conscious buyers but also 
moderately reputation-conscious ones are significantly and positively associated with 
better compliance with various categories of labor standards, including freedom of 
association. The following section discusses original survey results that suggest that 
some buyers prompt suppliers to go beyond legal compliance, albeit limitation. The 
chapter concludes by painting a more nuanced picture of buyer-driven regulation. 
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3.2. Theories and Hypothesis 
Deterrence Theory of Compliance 
The deterrence theory of compliance is inspired by the economics of crime literature 
pioneered by Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970). The theory assumes that profit-
maximizing firms rationally calculate the cost and benefit of non-compliance and 
optimally decide to comply with regulation only when the expected cost outweighs the 
benefit. In other words, unless detection is effective and punishment is sufficiently 
severe, firms always have an incentive to evade regulation.
75
  
The deterrence theory predicts gaps in compliance across issue categories given 
the varying priorities of buyers. Critics argue that buyers tend to enforce standards that 
are prone to the media‟s scrutiny and negative publicity (e.g. child labor and miserable 
working environment) while buyers tend to neglect other issues critical to workers but 
less relevant to reputation, such as freedom of association and discrimination. Given 
such uneven attention paid by buyers, the deterrence theory predicts gaps in labor 
standard compliance across issue categories as suppliers take into account buyer 
priorities and concentrate their efforts on those high-priority issues.  
Moreover, the cost of monitoring and enforcement is likely to affect the level of 
enforcement. While some issues are visible and easy to fix, such as placing soaps in 
toilets, other issues are less visible and more difficult to detect and rectify such as 
discrimination. Lastly, the benefit of non-compliance may also affect the degree of 
enforcement and compliance. Some of the labor standards such as a limit on overtime 
can conflict with buyers‟ business considerations. As buyers are keen to have their 
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 This view is still dominant in the policy circle. For instance, OECD (2000) makes this assumption.   
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merchandise delivered on time, they may be more lenient on overtime issues. Hence, the 
deterrence theory generates the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I: Suppliers of reputation-conscious buyers tend to perform better in labor 
standard compliance regarding issues that attract media attention, that are visible and 
easier to fix, and that do not conflict with business interests.  
 
However, this traditional view of compliance based on rational cost-benefit 
calculation has been challenged by studies that focus on the behavioral nature of firms. 
In particular, decision making under risk and uncertainty has systematically deviated 
from behavior considered as optimal (Shoemaker, 1982).  
Behavioral Theory of the Firm  
Behavioral theory of the firm developed by Cyert and March (1963) recognizes 
bounded rationality in decision making unlike the deterrence theory. Rationally 
bounded actors intend to be rational, but they are constrained by the lack of information 
and capacity for calculation (Simon 1952). The behavioral theory posits that the firm 
seeks to solve particular problems as they arise rather than optimize, addresses multiple 
issues sequentially rather than simultaneously, tries to avoid uncertainty by focusing on 
the short-run and by negotiating an environment, and adapts goals to the changing 
environment (Cyert and March, 1963).   
In the socio-legal literature, the concept of deterrence is classified into explicit and 
implicit deterrence (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan, 2005a,b). Explicit deterrence 
refers to rational responses based on careful calculation of the likelihood of being 
detected and punished, whereas implicit deterrence refers to actions based on the sense 
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that the mere existence of regulatory actions entails risk of punishment. The deterrence 
theory discussed above corresponds to explicit deterrence while the behavioral theory 
closely resembles implicit deterrence, where firms are vaguely aware of the risk of 
detection and punishment and imperfectly incorporate the risk in their decisions. Based 
on a survey of firms regarding environmental actions, Thornton et al. (2005a) found that 
company managers were not attentive to or knowledgeable about the frequency and the 
magnitude of penalties imposed on other companies. Rather, simply being aware of the 
existence of regulatory enforcement acted as an implicit deterrence, prompting firms to 
review their practices and take further actions. 
In the global garment industry, given the uncertainty and risk that the media and 
solidarity campaigns may target any substandard conditions and generate negative 
publicity, reputation-conscious buyers are likely to pay attention to labor conditions in 
general rather than to limit their attention to child labor issues. Especially for branded 
buyers deriving significant values from their image, the cost of any mistake is high, 
reinforcing their tendency to avoid risk and address issues beyond immediate concerns.  
In the empirical studies of OSH inspection, evidence is also more supportive of 
the behavioral theory than the expected utility theory of deterrence. Scholz and Gray 
(1990) found that firms respond to two dimensions of expected utility (probability of 
detection and amount of penalty) differently: firms respond disproportionately to 
changes in probability than to changes in the average amount of penalty. This finding is 
consistent with the behavioral view that firms solve problems as they arise rather than to 
optimize simultaneously. Further, Mendeloff and Gray (2005) demonstrate that OSH 
inspection reduces injuries including the types of injuries not covered by inspection, 
suggesting that inspection spurs managerial attention to a wider set of issues rather than 
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a subset of monitored issues. Such tendency may also apply to buyers: child labor and 
sweatshop allegations in the past prompt buyers to pay attention to other issues that 
could potentially cause problems in the future.  
Another important aspect of the behavioral theory is the understanding that the 
firm decisions are taken by collections of individuals with diverse interests (Argote and 
Greve, 2007). In contrast to the deterrence theory that assumes monolithic and rational 
actors maximizing benefits, Cyert and March (1963) introduced the concept of 
organizational coalition and conflict. Specifically, firms tend to deal with a complex set 
of interrelated problems by dividing them into a number of simple problems and assign 
them to different subunits, creating a latent conflict of goals among subunits. For buyers, 
this conflict can be seen in sourcing and compliance departments with different goals, 
interests, and identities: the former is driven by price, quality and delivery whereas the 
latter is primarily concerned with compliance with labor and environmental standards. 
While sourcing departments tend to overpower compliance departments, buyers are far 
from monolithic and can be contradictory in terms of what they demand from suppliers. 
All in all, the behavioral theory applied to labor standard compliance generates the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis II: Suppliers of reputation-conscious buyers tend to perform better in labor 
standard compliance across issues and beyond those issues that attract the media 
attention, that are visible and easier to fix, and that do not conflict with business 
interests.  
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3.3. Data and Methods 
This chapter exploits the monitoring and firm characteristics data provided by ILO BFC. 
ILO monitors visit exporting garment factories un-announced every 6-8 months and 
collect monitoring and other data. The data cover the period from January 2006 to 
December 2008 for 344 garment factories in Cambodia, making a panel dataset of 1230 
observations. ILO monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labor standards, which 
are grouped into the following categories: contracts, wages, hours, leave, welfare, 
occupational safety and health (OSH), and fundamental rights.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-1 presents the summary statistics of compliance measures for 2006-08. 
The average compliance ratio during the period between 2006 and 2008 is 89 percent, 
where a score of 100 indicates full compliance. Despite this very high level of overall 
compliance, full compliance is rare; in fact not a single factory is fully compliant with 
OSH standards. Although the average compliance ratio for fundamental rights is 
extremely high (99.5 percent), this category is not directly comparable with others as 
one violation of fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of association) has much more serious 
implications than one violation of a minor OSH issue (e.g. provision of adjustable back 
chairs). There is no weighing of labor standards and each item is given equal weight. 
Given that monitored standards under OSH account for nearly one third of total 
monitored items, overall performance is disproportionately influenced by performance 
vis-à-vis OSH. Compliance performance with different labor standards is positively 
correlated (Table 3-2).  
Figure 3-1 shows the industry average number of non-compliance items between 
2006 and 2008. The number of non-compliance items has consistently declined across 
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issue categories, suggesting overall improvement. Figure 3-2 shows the industry total 
number of non-compliance items regarding fundamental rights across sub-components 
between 2006 and 2008. The category of fundamental rights is composed of sexual 
discrimination, sexual harassment, freedom of association, anti-union discrimination, 
forced labor, child labor, and strike.
76
 The most frequent violation concerns sexual 
discrimination, notably dismissal of pregnant women, followed by freedom of 
association.  
Over the three year period, in all issues except sexual discrimination, the incidence 
of non-compliance has been significantly reduced. In 2006, the incidence ratio (i.e. the 
probability of detecting at least one violation of fundamental rights for each monitoring 
visit) was quite high at 40 percent, which was nearly halved in 2008 to 22 percent. 
Overall, descriptive statistics show that compliance has improved across different issue 
categories, beyond those visible and easy to fix issues like child labor and OSH. To 
understand what is driving this progress, the next section operationalizes variables for 
regression analysis. 
Dependent Variables 
The number of non-compliance items reported for each issue category measures 
the level of working conditions in a factory. Given that monitored standards for hours 
and leave are few and that they measure similar issues (i.e. the number of hours/days 
worked), they are combined together to form one category, hours-leave. Similarly, 
welfare is joined with OSH to form OSH-welfare, as welfare has only few monitored 
standards and the majority of them are closely related to OSH (e.g. drinking water and 
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 Admittedly, it is difficult to accurately monitor violation of fundamental rights especially sensitive 
issues like sexual harassment. Although sexual harassment is reportedly non-existent, a joint study by the 
ILO and the World Bank finds that it is quite common (ILO, 2006).   
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toilets). The dependent variables, therefore, are the number of non-compliance items 
regarding contract, wage, hours-leave, and OSH-welfare. 
Fundamental rights need to be treated separately since violation of fundamental 
rights occurs only rarely, but one incidence of non-compliance has serious implications. 
Hence, non-compliance of fundamental rights is measured by a binary variable (whether 
or not violation occurred) rather than a continuous variable (how many violations 
occurred). The monitored standards under fundamental rights are grouped into (i) sexual 
discrimination and harassment, (ii) child labor, and (iii) freedom of association (FOA).
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Independent Variables 
Independent variables are the presence and number of reputation-conscious buyers. 
Following Chapter 2, this chapter operationalizes the concept of reputation 
consciousness of a buyer by looking at whether or not a buyer participates in multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSI).
78
 Since reputation-conscious buyers tend to participate in 
MSI to show their commitment to better working conditions and safeguard their 
reputation, it is a reasonable proxy. While MSI can take various forms from certification 
of production facilities, compliant-based investigation, to collaboration of buyers, this 
study focuses on the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), given their prominence and buyer-oriented nature, as well as Better Factories 
Cambodia (BFC), a local ILO-managed scheme in Cambodia‟s garment sector.79  
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 The FOA variable is composed of interference with FOA, anti-union discrimination, and mistreatment 
of workers engaged in strikes. 
78
 Following O‟Rourke (2006: 899), this thesis defines MSI in labor regulation as a scheme that involves 
various stakeholders in negotiating labor standards, monitoring compliance with these standards, and 
establishing mechanisms to encourage firms to comply with these standards. 
79
 It is important to note the key differences between BFC and the other two MSI, the FLA and the ETI. 
First, BFC does not certify buyers and nor does it require buyers to implement certain codes or 
monitoring/reporting procedures. Second, buyers can fully rely on ILO monitoring and replace their own 
(or third-party) audits if they choose to, given the ILO‟s industry-wide monitoring. Third, while 
membership of the FLA and the ETI involves expensive fees, BFC only asks buyers to pay very 
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As in Chapter 2, the degree of reputation consciousness is operationalised by 
classifying buyers into three groups: buyers that participate in BFC and the FLA or the 
ETI (hereafter MSI buyers); buyers that participate in BFC but not in the FLA or the 
ETI (hereafter BFC-only buyers); and buyers that participate in none of the MSI 
mentioned. The degree of reputation consciousness is considered high for MSI buyers, 
given the extra burden involved. Indeed, all the MSI buyers in the sample are branded 
buyers that have experienced negative publicity. BFC-only buyers are considered less 
reputation-conscious than the first group. These buyers are mostly large and well-known 
retailers. The third category of buyers that participates in none of the MSI is mostly 
smaller generic retailers that consumers seldom hear of and thus least reputation-
conscious.  
Since various establishment-level characteristics are clearly related to working 
conditions, the following firm characteristics are considered as in Chapter 2: the size of 
the establishment as measured by the natural logarithm of total number of employees, 
the age of the establishment proxied by the total number of visits by ILO monitors since 
2001, 
 
presence and number of unions, and factory ownership (domestic and western).
80
   
Model Specification 
The determinants of non-compliance vis-à-vis issue categories other than 
fundamental rights, namely contract, wage, hours-leave, OSH-welfare, are estimated 
with pooled semi-log OLS models respectively as shown below [1]. As for non-
compliance regarding fundamental rights, pooled logit models have been estimated for 
sexual discrimination, child labor, and FOA respectively as follows [2]:  
                                                                                                                                               
reasonable fees to access to monitoring reports. Overall, BFC is more economical and less burdensome 
than the FLA or the ETI.  
80
 Refer to Chapter 2 for the detailed explanation of the control variables 
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Ln (Non-compliance) it = α + β ∙ Buyer it + γ∙ Zit + ε it     [1] 
 
Pr (Non-compliance) it = α + β ∙ Buyer it + γ∙ Zit + ε it      [2] 
 
where α indicates the intercept term, Buyer it  is a vector of variables concerning 
reputation-conscious buyers, Zit is a vector of firm characteristics and year controls, and  
ε it denotes the error term. Fixed effects techniques are not employed since fixed effects 
estimation for panel data with small T and large N is known to generate biased and 
inconsistent coefficients for dummy variables, which is known as incidental parameters 
problem (Baltagi, 2008). To take into account the presence of repeated firm 
observations, standard errors are estimated with firm-clustering so that observations are 
not treated as independent within each cluster. 
3.4. Results 
Reputation-conscious buyer variables turn out to be highly significant and negatively 
associated with non-compliance across all issue categories (Table 3-3). The presence of 
MSI buyers is consistently significant at the 0.001 level. Having at least one MSI buyer 
in a factory reduces the number of non-compliance items by 43 percent for hours-leave, 
followed by 39 percent for OSH-welfare, 34 percent for wage, and 30 percent for 
contract. BFC-only buyers—less reputation-conscious than MSI buyers—are also 
highly significant. For wage and OSH-welfare issues, having an additional BFC-only 
buyer in a factory reduces non-compliance items by 14 percent. As for contract and 
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hours-leave, the presence of BFC-only buyers reduces non-compliance items by 20 and 
28 percent respectively.    
The size of establishment is the most statistically significant control variable for 
contract, wage, and OSH-welfare, but not for hours-leave. The size is consistently 
negatively associated with non-compliance as larger factories enjoy economies of scale 
and tend to possess resources and sophisticated management systems. The age of 
establishment is positively associated with non-compliance and significant for OSH-
welfare, suggesting that older facilities face physical constraints. The presence and 
number of unions are not statistically significant except for hours-leave: having an 
additional union in a factory reduces non-compliance regarding hours-leave by 6 
percent. Domestic ownership is significant and positively associated with non-
compliance for wage and hours-leave while Western ownership is negatively associated 
with non-compliance. This result is consistent with the theory of foreign wage premium 
as Cambodian-owned factories tend to lack managerial know-how and financial means. 
Year controls for 2006 and 2007 are significant and positive, suggesting that 
compliance performance significantly improved in 2008.  
Table 3-4 presents the logit model results for non-compliance with fundamental 
rights, which reveals a more complex picture. Buyer variables are significantly and 
negatively associated with the probability of violating FOA issues. In other words, when 
a factory is producing for at least one MSI or BFC-only buyer, the probability of 
violating FOA issues is significantly lower, suggesting that both types of buyers pay 
attention to issues related FOA. The result also suggests significant compliance gaps 
between suppliers of MSI or BFC-only buyers and suppliers of the least reputation-
conscious buyers. In contrast, buyer variables have no significant effects on the 
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probability of sexual discrimination, suggesting that none of the buyers (including 
reputation-conscious ones) pay significant attention to this issue. As for child labor, 
buyer variables are slightly significant and negatively associated with the probability of 
violation, but statistical significance is much lower than for FOA. This may indicate that 
even the least reputation-conscious buyers are somewhat careful about child labor issues 
and therefore the gaps arising from buyer types are narrower than for other issues.  
In terms of the control variables, the size of establishment is highly significant and 
positively related to the probability of violating FOA-related standards, which contrasts 
with the earlier findings for other issue categories. While larger establishments may be 
better at complying with standards that require important investments and thus 
economies of scale, larger workplaces tend to alienate workers and increase their 
resistance to management (Hodson, 2001). This helps explain why larger establishments 
perform better for issues concerning OSH-welfare, contract, wage, but worse for FOA-
related issues. Union variables are generally not significant. Domestic ownership is 
significant and positively associated with non-compliance vis-à-vis FOA issues, 
contradicting the argument that factory owners sharing the same nationality as workers 
tend to respect and treat them better.    
In sum, not only very but also moderately reputation-conscious buyers are 
significantly and positively associated with suppliers‟ labor standard compliance across 
various issue categories including FOA, albeit lack of significant association with 
sexual discrimination. Hence, the findings are more supportive of the behavioral theory 
than the deterrence theory.                                         
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3.5. Discussion on Beyond Compliance 
In addition to the critique that buyers regulate only visible and easy to fix issues, there is 
criticism that buyer-driven schemes do little to promote distributive justice, notably 
living wage (Macdonald, 2008). In other words, critics argue that buyers may encourage 
supplier compliance but they are unlikely to bring about “beyond compliance.” This 
section briefly analyzes original survey results and discusses whether buyers motivate 
suppliers to go beyond compliance especially with regard to pay.  
According to the literature on environmental regulation, “overcompliance” by 
firms is motivated by “social license” pressures from activists and communities, firms‟ 
sensitivity to bad publicity and management style (Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan, 
2003, 2005b).  At the same time, economic pressures impose limits on investments 
required to go beyond compliance (Ibid.). In labor regulation, similar logic is likely to 
be at work although beyond compliance in labor regulation also includes providing 
better pay than the legally mandated one, which many firms use to enlist worker efforts.  
The supplier survey was conducted between June and October 2008 in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, and the survey targeted general managers of exporting garment 
factories. A total of 51 factory managers responded to the survey out of approximately 
300 of Cambodia‟s export garment factories. The survey collection procedure, sample 
representatively, and complete answers are detailed in Appendix I. This section focuses 
on the questions concerning whether factories provide working conditions that exceed 
legal requirements and whether buyers encouraged or required them to do so. 
65 percent of the factories responded that they provide conditions that are better 
than the legal requirements, not counting production bonus (Question 31). In terms of 
the areas in which factories go beyond legal compliance (Question 32), bonus tops at 45 
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percent, followed by allowance (39 percent), base salary (27 percent), and welfare (27 
percent). Thus, factories tend to provide pecuniary incentives that exceed the legally 
mandated requirements.  
When asked whether buyers required or encouraged the factories to go beyond 
legal compliance (Question 33), only 6 percent responded “required” and 42 percent 
responded “encouraged,” while 52 percent of the factories denied buyer influence on 
their decisions to go beyond compliance. For those factories that were required or 
encouraged by buyers, welfare and OSH were the principal areas that buyers asked for 
progress beyond legal compliance (Question 34). This is primarily because buyer CoC 
are often more detailed and stricter about welfare and OSH issues than the national 
labor law. In contrast, buyers rarely demand improvement in pecuniary conditions 
beyond legal compliance because they also seek lower prices as pointed out by several 
factory managers. 
Statistical analysis of associations between buyer types and beyond compliance 
variables reveals an interesting picture. Based on Pearson‟s Chi Square test, factories 
producing for at least one MSI buyer are much more likely to provide conditions that 
exceed the legal requirements (p=0.004). When moderately reputation-conscious buyers 
(BFC-only buyers) are included, the significance of association is somewhat reduced 
(p=0.041). Similarly, the factories that were encouraged or required by buyers to go 
beyond compliance are disproportionately producing for at least one MSI buyer 
(p=0.001). The significance of association remains important even when BFC-only 
buyers are included (p=0.006). 
Overall, the above analysis shows that some buyers do encourage suppliers to go 
beyond legal compliance, but the issue areas tend to be limited to welfare and OSH. 
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This suggests the limits of buyers in improving pecuniary conditions of workers beyond 
compliance with the minimum wage.
81
 Moreover, those buyers that encourage or 
require suppliers to go beyond compliance are disproportionately reputation-conscious 
buyers. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to answer the question of whether buyers help improve various 
categories of labor conditions in supplier facilities. Drawing on the factory-level data 
from Cambodia‟s garment industry, this chapter has shown that some buyers positively 
influence supplier compliance across various issue categories. Not only very 
reputation-conscious buyers but also less reputation-conscious buyers are significantly 
and positively associated with better compliance performance regarding contract, wage, 
leave and hours, OSH and welfare, and freedom of association in supplier factories, 
albeit lack of significant association with sexual discrimination.  
In terms of theories, the findings are more supportive of the behavioral theory 
based on bounded rationality than the deterrence theory assuming perfect rationality. 
Although negative publicity concerning supply chains tends to focus on child labor and 
sweatshop conditions, reputation-conscious buyers, vaguely aware and fearful of 
potential risk, have been paying increased attention to issues that go beyond those 
visible and easy to fix issues. If the behavioral theory indeed better explains buyers‟ 
regulatory and suppliers‟ compliance behavior, critics‟ concern that only the media-
sensitive issues can be regulated may be too pessimistic. Nevertheless, the least 
reputation-conscious buyers seem to behave in line with the deterrence theory: knowing 
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 The survey result indicates that productivity concerns and labor market dynamics play a prominent role 
in raising workers‟ pay. 
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their relative immunity from negative publicity, they let their suppliers systematically 
under-perform their peers across all issue categories.   
Indeed, the findings point to the growing gaps between increasingly regulated 
supply chains controlled by reputation-conscious buyers on the one hand and still 
sparsely regulated supply chains of the least reputation-conscious buyers on the other. 
While reputation-conscious buyers are increasingly committed to regulating various 
labor conditions including freedom of association, some buyers remain muted and do 
not participate in any initiatives aimed at improving working conditions. In this sense, 
therefore, the results paint a more nuanced picture of buyer-driven regulation than one-
sided criticism or acclaim that tends to fuel the debate.  
The last section briefly discussed survey results on whether buyers induce their 
suppliers to provide conditions that exceed legal requirements. The survey results show 
that some buyers do encourage suppliers to go beyond legal compliance, but the issue 
areas of their influence are often limited to welfare and OSH. Moreover, those buyers 
that encourage or require suppliers to go beyond compliance are disproportionately 
reputation-conscious buyers. This, together with the gaps identified in the regression 
analysis suggest the need to complement buyer-driven regulation, if a greater number of 
workers were to benefit from better working conditions.  
While this chapter has contributed to the empirical debate on buyer-driven 
regulation and to the theoretical debate concerning compliance behavior of firms, some 
limitations remain. There is endogeneity in the buyer variables given that buyers 
influence supplier compliance through pre-order selection and post-order monitoring. 
Thus, some may argue that the statistical association identified in this study simply 
captures matching process of better-performing suppliers and reputation-conscious 
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buyers and that nothing really changed. As demonstrated in the qualitative section of 
Chapter 2, however, reputation-conscious buyers regulate their suppliers more 
rigorously than other buyers, and knowing this, suppliers keen to attract reputation-
conscious buyers improve working conditions before trying to obtain orders. General 
progress in compliance in recent years also attests to the dynamic nature of buyer 
behavior: buyers including less reputation-conscious ones are becoming increasingly 
demanding in terms of labor and environmental standards.   
Nonetheless, the underlying characteristics of different buyers and the channels 
through which buyers influence their suppliers remain a black box. While this thesis has 
so far assumed that buyers affect supplier compliance only through enforcement, there 
may be other mechanisms through which buyers influence their suppliers such as 
relationship and learning. These are the issues investigated in the next chapter.   
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Table 3-1. Summary of compliance measures  
 
Compliance measures Contract Wage Hours Leave Welfare OSH 
Fund 
Rights 
Total 
                  
Number of monitored standards 43 69 22 33 24 98 52 341 
                  
Number of non-compliance items 4.2 4.6 3.2 4.0 3.9 17.3 0.3 37.6 
                  
Average compliance ratio 90.3 93.3 85.1 87.9 83.8 82.3 99.5 89.0 
                  
Standard Deviation 7.1 6.2 9.6 10.5 10.2 9.1 1.3 19.8 
                  
% of factories in full compliance 7.0 7.8 4.2 13.3 6.4 0.0 80.0 0.0 
 
 
 
Table 3-2. Correlations among labor standard compliance across issue categories 
 
  Contract Wage Hours Leave Welfare OSH 
Contract 1.00           
Wage 0.58 1.00         
Hours 0.51 0.57 1.00       
Leave 0.59 0.57 0.50 1.00     
Welfare 0.51 0.49 0.43 0.53 1.00   
OSH 0.59 0.54 0.48 0.57 0.66 1.00 
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Table 3-3. Determinants of labor standard non-compliance across issue categories  
                                                         (2006-08) 
  
 Ln (Total) Ln (Contract) Ln (Wage) Ln (Hours-Leave) Ln (OSH-Welfare) 
Presence of MSI buyers -0.346**** -0.317**** -0.292**** -0.304**** -0.376**** -0.337**** -0.328**** -0.428**** -0.368**** -0.385**** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Presence of BFC-only 
buyers -0.048 - -0.148 -0.202*** -0.082 - -0.138 -0.277**** 0.040 - 
  (0.08)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)   (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)   
Number of BFC-only buyers -0.112**** -0.124**** -0.031 - -0.118*** -0.143**** -0.065 - -0.154**** -0.144**** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)   (0.03) (0.02) 
Establishment size -0.127**** -0.131**** -0.182**** -0.193**** -0.159*** -0.161**** -0.069 - -0.144**** -0.147**** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Establishment age 0.019 - 0.015 - 0.008 - -0.008 - 0.029** 0.029** 
 (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Presence of unions 0.026 - 0.049 - -0.024 - 0.005 - 0.045 - 
  (0.06)   (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.08)   (0.06)   
Number of unions -0.024 - -0.027 - 0.002 - -0.049* -0.061*** -0.014 - 
  (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)   
Domestic ownership 0.190* 0.201** 0.153 - 0.349** 0.353** 0.285** 0.304*** 0.133 - 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)   (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)   
Western ownership -0.123 - -0.133 - -0.027 - -0.010 - -0.139 - 
  (0.13)   (0.11)   (0.15)   (0.12)   (0.12)   
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.293**** 4.381**** 2.377**** 2.530**** 2.321**** 2.356**** 2.192**** 1.810**** 3.787**** 3.826**** 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.06) (0.25) (0.25) 
Number of observations 1221 1229 1221 1230 1221 1229 1221 1229 1221 1230 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.29 
F-value  33.11 55.80 18.18 45.42 22.88 27.44 28.31 49.44 23.41 40.40 
  (11, 343) (6, 343) (11, 343) (4, 347) (11, 343) (5, 346) (11, 343) (6, 346) (11, 343) (6, 347) 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level, ****at the 0.001 level.  
Standard errors in the parentheses are adjusted to firm-clustering. 
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Table 3-4. Determinants of labor standard non-compliance for fundamental rights 
                                                              (2006-08) 
  
Total  FOA 
Sexual 
Discrimination 
Child Labor 
          
Presence of MSI buyers -0.440 -1.082*** 0.094 -0.875* 
  (0.30) (0.35) (0.42) (0.51) 
          
Presence of BFC-only buyers -0.669** -0.918** -0.563 0.107 
  (0.32) (0.39) (0.49) (0.55) 
          
Number of BFC-only buyers 0.126 0.198 0.118 -0.747* 
  (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.39) 
          
Establishment size 0.330* 0.712**** -0.062 0.198 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.26) 
          
Establishment age -0.065 -0.155* 0.047 -0.073 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
          
Presence of unions -0.073 -0.159 -0.287 0.155 
  (0.32) (0.41) (0.45) (0.47) 
          
Number of unions -0.059 0.080 -0.031 -0.442* 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.25) 
          
Domestic ownership 0.954*** 1.159*** 0.508 0.432 
  (0.37) (0.44) (0.54) (0.54) 
          
Western ownership -0.080 0.176 -0.402 -1.107 
  (0.32) (0.41) (0.56) (1.00) 
          
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Constant -3.090**** -6.348**** -1.494 -4.661*** 
  (0.78) (0.26) (1.25) (1.71) 
          
Number of observations 1221 1221 1221 1221 
          
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.14 
          
Wald chi square 54.95 53.88 38.69 58.45 
          
Prob>Wald chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
Note: * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level, ****at the 0.001 
level. Standard errors in the parentheses are adjusted to firm-clustering. 
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           Figure 3-1. Industry average of non-compliance items across issue categories 
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         Figure 3-2 Industry total of non-compliance items for fundamental rights 
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Chapter 4. Channels of Buyer Influence 
 
4.1. Introduction 
While the rise of non-state regulation of labor standards has provoked a heated debate about 
its desirability and effectiveness, the question of what determines working conditions in 
supplier establishments and how buyers influence them remains poorly understood. 
Recognizing this gap, Locke, Kochan, Romis and Qin (2007) call for a more comprehensive 
approach to understanding and addressing the root causes of poor working conditions. This 
chapter contributes to reframing the debate by shedding light on buyer-supplier relationships 
that influence supplier compliance-performance. 
The existing studies of buyer influence on suppliers‟ working conditions are 
predominantly case studies of branded buyers. Frenkel (2001) studies two global athletic 
footwear brands and their contractor factories in China and describes how brands shape 
employment relations in their suppliers. Through a matched-pair case study, Frenkel and 
Scott (2002) examine two otherwise similar Adidas suppliers and explain the difference in 
working conditions by their relationships with Adidas: one enjoyed a collaborative 
relationship while the other was kept at arm‟s length. They conclude that a close and 
collaborative relationship with Adidas has encouraged value-sharing, learning, and 
innovation, contributing to better working conditions. In a similar case study of Nike and its 
suppliers, Locke and Romis (2006) reach a similar conclusion. Though insightful, these case 
studies examine only a handful of suppliers.  
Addressing this weakness, Locke, Qin and Brause (2007) quantitatively assess the 
determinants of supplier compliance-performance using Nike‟s compliance data covering 830 
suppliers in 51 countries. They find that factories designated as Nike‟s “strategic partners” 
and those frequently visited by Nike‟s staff (both compliance and production) have higher 
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compliance scores. Although they see this as evidence that close supplier-buyer relationships 
foster trust and encourage knowledge sharing, positively influencing working conditions, 
they assume rather than demonstrate such a channel of buyer influence. Besides, their 
exclusive focus on one global brand precludes generalization. 
Jiang (2009) has found a statistically significant link between the nature of buyer-
supplier relationships and supplier compliance with CoC, based on survey data from China‟s 
garment industry. Jiang shows that buyer-supplier relationships characterized by open and 
two-way dialogue are positively related to supplier compliance with CoC. The article, 
however, does not differentiate the types of buyers, which are likely to affect supplier 
compliance-performance. Moreover, it does not consider other channels of buyer influence 
such as deterrence and learning.  
While the preceding chapters showed that factories supplying for reputation-conscious 
buyers have better labor standard compliance than other factories, data limitations prevented 
them from delving into the black box of buyer influence: through which channels buyers 
influence their supplier compliance-performance. At this time, original survey data collected 
in the Cambodian garment sector enable the author to address this question.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is two fold: (i) to examine different channels of 
buyer influence with regard to supplier compliance-performance and (ii) to assess whether 
reputation-conscious buyers affect those channels differently. The chapter proceeds as 
follows. The next section discusses hypotheses derived from the deterrence theory, 
transaction cost economics, and relational exchange theory. The subsequent section presents 
the data and methods, followed by estimation results, which show that market-based 
relationships between buyers and suppliers are systematically associated with poor 
compliance performance. The chapter then concludes with overall observations and practical 
implications.  
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4.2. Theories and Hypotheses 
This section discusses the theories that link buyer variables and supplier compliance-
performance. Three potential channels of buyer influence are examined: deterrence, 
relationship, and learning. Each of the three channels generates three hypotheses: a) the 
channel is directly linked to supplier compliance-performance, b) the channel mediates the 
effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier compliance-performance, and c) the 
channel interacts with reputation-conscious buyers and influences supplier compliance-
performance. 
Deterrence Theory 
In economic and legal studies, the traditional view of compliance behavior emphasized 
deterrence, assuming that rational and profit maximizing firms decide to comply with 
regulation only when the expected cost of non-compliance exceeds the expected benefit 
(Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970). This theory posits that a firm‟s propensity to comply with 
regulations is positively related to the probability of detection and the expected penalty of 
violation.  
Regarding reputation-conscious buyers, the deterrence theory would predict that those 
buyers facing a higher probability of detection and expected penalties for poor working 
conditions in their supply chains are more likely to rigorously regulate their suppliers than 
other buyers. Some buyers, predominantly global brands, have been repeatedly exposed by 
the media and criticized by labor activists. Moreover, the expected penalty is higher for those 
buyers that derive much of their value from their brand image, which could be easily 
damaged by sweatshop allegations (Conroy, 2007).  
Detection Hypotheses 
According to the deterrence theory, suppliers who are rigorously monitored and 
credibly sanctioned by buyers are likely to expect a higher cost of non-compliance, leading 
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them to reduce non-compliance. The probability of detection is higher when buyers‟ 
compliance staff visits supplier establishments frequently.  
 
Hypothesis I-a. The frequency of visits by buyers’ compliance staff is negatively related to 
supplier non-compliance. 
 
Reputation-conscious buyers may affect their supplier compliance-performance through 
factory visits in two ways. First, the frequency of visits may be different. Given the higher 
stakes, reputation-conscious buyers may visit their suppliers more often than other buyers, 
which may explain why reputation-conscious buyers are associated with better supplier 
compliance-performance.  
 
Hypothesis I-b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier non-compliance is 
mediated by the frequency of visits. 
 
Alternatively, the frequency of visits by reputation-conscious buyers may not be 
different, but the impact of their visits may be different from other buyers if the „quality‟ of 
their visits is superior. In this case, it is not the frequency of compliance visits per se, but the 
interaction of visit frequency and reputation-conscious buyers that influences supplier 
compliance-performance. 
 
Hypothesis I-c. The negative association between the frequency of visits and non-compliance 
is more pronounced in the presence of reputation-conscious buyers. 
 
Warning Hypotheses 
 103 
The other element in the deterrence theory is the expected penalty of non-compliance. 
For suppliers, a potential penalty for non-compliance is a cancellation of orders. When a 
buyer and a supplier sign a contract, it normally includes a clause that obliges suppliers to 
abide by the buyer‟s CoC. Although it occurs only rarely, buyers have the right to terminate 
the contract in the event of non-compliance. Hence, buyers who want to rigorously enforce 
their CoC are likely to communicate the negative consequence of non-compliance (i.e. 
cancellation of orders) by warning their suppliers implicitly or explicitly. In turn, suppliers 
who receive such warnings are likely to take compliance issues more seriously.  
  
Hypothesis II-a. Warnings by buyers about the negative consequence of non-compliance are 
negatively related to supplier non-compliance. 
 
As discussed above, reputation-conscious buyers with higher stakes in regulating labor 
conditions in their supply chains may influence their suppliers through warnings in two ways. 
First, they may be more likely to issue warnings than other buyers, which may help reduce 
non-compliance.  
 
Hypothesis II-b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier non-compliance is 
mediated by warnings. 
 
Alternatively, it may not be whether or not a warning has been issued, but rather who 
issues the warning that makes a difference for supplier compliance-performance. When a 
reputation-conscious buyer issues a warning, it may be taken more seriously by suppliers, 
given the higher stakes involved. 
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Hypothesis II-c. The negative association between warnings and supplier non-compliance is 
more pronounced in the presence of reputation-conscious buyers. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
The management literature on supplier behavior has focused on opportunism and the 
nature of buyer-supplier relationships. The literature principally draws on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and relational exchange theory (RET), which have been integrated in many 
studies investigating buyer-supplier relationships and their impacts (Heide and John, 1992; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Jiang, 2009). 
The TCE approach is based on the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Unlike the deterrence theory that assumes perfectly rational 
actors, TCE (and more broadly new institutional economics) assumes that individuals are 
constrained by limited capacity to gather and process information, hence bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1952). Opportunism refers to lack of honesty in transaction, which can be active, 
such as lying, stealing, and cheating or passive, including subtle forms of deceit such as 
withholding of information (Williamson, 1985).  More broadly, behaviors that are 
inconsistent with an agreed contract or principle are considered opportunistic (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). From the TCE perspective, therefore, non-compliance with agreed CoC can be 
viewed as suppliers‟ opportunistic behavior vis-à-vis buyers.  
According to Williamson‟s logic, the degree of opportunism largely depends on asset 
specificity, or non-transferable investment in one‟s partner. When a buyer invests time and 
resources in its supplier, this investment cannot be redeployed elsewhere, and vice versa. A 
higher degree of asset specificity required in transaction, then, raises switching costs and 
induces commitment and reduces opportunism from the party that made such investment. The 
early TCE literature emphasized vertical integration, or hierarchy, as a solution to 
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opportunism given its superior capacity to monitor and align incentives than market 
(Williamson, 1975). Nonetheless, over the past decades, new organizational forms that are 
neither market nor hierarchy, or hybrids, have become more dominant (Williamson, 1991). 
Under the hybrid form of governance, the cost of replacing a partner is more expensive than 
market and thus parties work together to restrain opportunism (Joshi and Stump, 1999). 
Opportunism is often controlled through “learning by monitoring” characterized by 
collaboration and information exchanges (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel, 2000).  
Relational Exchange Theory (RET) 
A legal theorist Macneil (1980)‟s concept of relational contract, in which social 
relations shaped by prevailing norms and values are embedded in contracts, has been 
extensively applied to buyer-supplier relationships. Unlike the TCE approach that sees each 
transaction as a unit of analysis, the RET views the relationship based on the transactions as a 
unit of analysis (Vandaele, Rangarajan, Gemmel, and Lievens, 2007). While the RET does 
not reject the existence of opportunism, it rejects the assumption of universal opportunism 
(Hawkins, Wittman, and Beyerlein, 2008). Parties to relational exchange depend on relational 
norms such as trust and commitment, broadly defined as the mutual expectations that 
exchange partners will act in mutually beneficial ways. Hence, opportunistic behavior in 
relational exchange is controlled through mutual and self-regulation rather than threats or 
incentives (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer, 1995).  
Given their relative strengths, most scholars combine the TCE and RET to explain 
buyer-supplier relationships and related performance. For instance, Sako (1992) distinguishes 
two types of contracting relationships: arm’s-length versus obligational contractual relations. 
Arm‟s-length contracting is a transaction-based relationship where tasks, duties, and 
conditions are spelled out in explicit contracts. Obligation contracting, on the other hand, is a 
trust-based relationship characterized by a high level of interdependence, risk sharing, and 
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long term horizons. Each type of relationship involves a trade-off. While buyers pursuing the 
arm‟s-length strategy may be able to obtain the lowest price by playing one supplier off 
against another, they have more difficulty in inducing commitment and controlling 
opportunism. In contrast, parties to the obligational contracting can reduce uncertainty and 
opportunism through developing trust and frequent communication, but they are locked in the 
relationship.  
Empirical support for the importance of buyer-supplier relationships in influencing 
supplier compliance-performance is growing. A handful of case studies have shown that 
close and collaborative relationships between brands and suppliers encourage learning and 
value-sharing, contributing to better working conditions (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel and Scott, 
2002; Locke and Romis, 2006). Further, Locke, Amengual and Mangla (2009) argue that a 
traditional “compliance approach” based on policing and sanction has not induced progress in 
working conditions. Rather, they contend that a “commitment approach” characterized by 
joint problem solving and capacity building between buyers and suppliers is more effective at 
addressing the root causes of poor working conditions in supply chains. In line with their 
argument, Jiang (2009) shows through regression analysis that norm-based relationships 
characterized by open, two-way dialogue and joint problem solving are positively associated 
with supplier compliance with CoC. 
Long-term Relationship Hypotheses 
From the TCE perspective, long-term relationships tend to justify idiosyncratic 
investment because parties have long enough horizons to reap the benefits of their investment. 
Also, repetitive interactions provide opportunities to reward good behavior and punish 
opportunism. From the RET viewpoint, the duration of relationships helps foster trust and 
align firms expectations, reducing opportunistic behavior. Empirically, long-term 
relationships are found to increase commitment and reduce opportunism in inter-firm 
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relationships (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Hence, longer duration of the relationship, especially 
with the most important buyer, is likely to reduce suppliers‟ opportunism and non-
compliance.  
 
Hypothesis III-a. The duration of the relationship with a supplier’s most important buyer is 
negatively related to supplier non-compliance. 
 
Reputation-conscious buyers seek to ensure that their supply chains are constantly up to 
a high standard in terms of quality and compliance, which requires a higher degree of asset 
specificity. Accordingly, reputation-conscious buyers are likely to prefer a long-term 
relationship to foster trust and induce cooperation. This tendency may explain why suppliers 
of reputation-conscious buyers are associated with better compliance-performance. 
 
Hypothesis II-b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier non-compliance is 
mediated by the duration of the relationship with a supplier’s most important buyer. 
 
While a long-term relationship may be necessary to induce better compliance, it may 
not be sufficient if it is conditioned upon the type of buyers: reputation-conscious buyers are 
more likely to make idiosyncratic investment in their suppliers than other buyers. In other 
words, the duration of the relationship may significantly affect supplier compliance only 
when it is with a reputation-conscious buyer.  
 
Hypothesis III-c. The negative association between the duration of the relationship and 
supplier non-compliance is more pronounced in the presence of reputation-conscious buyers. 
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Market-based Relationship Hypotheses 
According to the TCE, market-based and thus arm‟s-length relationships are preferred 
when the degree of asset specificity required in transactions is low: it is more efficient to use 
the market to manage standardized transactions than to make idiosyncratic investment in their 
partners. While efficiency may be attained in a market-based relationship, controlling 
opportunism is more difficult given the lower switching costs despite safeguards such as 
threats and incentives. From the RET perspective, lack of relational norms in a market-based 
relationship precludes fostering commitment and trust. In sum, both the TCE and RET 
predict a higher degree of opportunism under market-based relationships. 
In the global garment industry, at least three types of buyer-supplier relationships exist. 
The first type goes through sourcing agents who match buyers with factories around the 
world, searching for the best combination of price, quality, and delivery demanded by buyers. 
Agents function as a “one-stop shop” or a supply chain manager, and the relationship 
between a buyer and a supplier factory is a contract-based one-off relationship (Play Fair, 
2008). The second type goes through vendors, which are MNEs with multiple production 
facilities. Vendors tend to have long and established relationships with buyers and distribute 
orders to their subsidiaries around the globe as well as to sub-contractors. The third type is a 
direct relationship between a buyer and a factory, which could occur when a factory or its 
head office enjoys a long and established relationship with its buyer. In sum, the first type 
represents a market-based relationship, which is likely to be associated with worse 
compliance-performance than the other relationships.   
 
Hypothesis IV-a. Market-based relationships through agents are positively related to supplier 
non-compliance. 
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On the other hand, reputation-conscious buyers demanding about quality and 
compliance standards are likely to avoid market-based relationships that do not encourage 
suppliers to commit to continuous improvement. Reputation-conscious buyers may be 
associated with better supplier compliance-performance precisely because they avoid such 
relationships.  
 
Hypothesis IV-b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier non-compliance is 
mediated by the absence of market-based relationships. 
 
Alternatively, even when transacting through agents, reputation-conscious buyers may 
still make idiosyncratic investment and induce supplier efforts in a way that other buyers do 
not. In this case, the negative effect of market-based relationships is mitigated by the 
presence of reputation-conscious buyers.  
 
Hypothesis IV-c. The positive association between market-based relationships and supplier 
non-compliance is less pronounced in the presence of reputation-conscious buyers. 
 
Learning Hypotheses 
The nature of buyer-supplier relationships also affects the degree of learning, which is 
likely to influence working conditions in supplier establishments. Technical assistance and 
knowledge spillovers from buyers signal buyers‟ credible commitment to the relationship, 
which then helps foster trust between buyers and suppliers (Sako and Helper, 1998; Bönte, 
2008). Although providing learning opportunities does not necessarily reduce supplier 
opportunism, it may help suppliers to improve production processes and work organization, 
which may in turn improve working conditions. 
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Case studies have found substantial scope for learning between buyers and suppliers 
that helps improve working conditions. In a matched-pair case study, Locke and Romis 
(2006) illustrate how a collaborative relationship between Nike and its supplier encouraged 
upgrading of a production system and work organization, leading to higher wage levels and 
shorter work hours. Specifically, the supplier that adopted a lean-production system with the 
help of Nike benefited from greater worker participation and higher productivity. Hence, it 
can be hypothesized that the more learning opportunities buyers provide, the better the 
supplier compliance-performance. 
 
Hypothesis V-a. Learning opportunities provided by buyers are negatively related to supplier 
non-compliance. 
 
Nonetheless, not all buyers provide similar learning opportunities. As the case studies 
of global brands corroborate, brands tend to provide more extensive training and assistance to 
upgrade their supplier production systems and to improve quality control than other buyers. 
Such asset specific investment is justified by high quality and compliance standards sought 
by reputation-conscious buyers. Therefore, reputation-conscious buyers may provide more 
learning opportunities than others, helping reduce supplier non-compliance. 
 
Hypothesis V-b.  The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier non-compliance is 
mediated by learning opportunities. 
 
Alternatively, it may be the „quality‟ of learning rather than the quantity of learning that 
affects supplier compliance-performance. Reputation-conscious buyers may provide „better‟ 
learning opportunities than other buyers, given the higher standards required.  
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Hypothesis V-c.  The negative association between learning opportunities and supplier non-
compliance is more pronounced in the presence of reputation-conscious buyers. 
4.3. Data and Methods 
This study exploits monitoring and firm characteristics data collected by ILO BFC. ILO 
monitors conduct un-announced visits of all the exporting garment factories every 6 to 8 
months on average. ILO monitoring covers the entire population of exporting factories in 
Cambodia (approximately 300) and the data are systematically available since 2006. 
Nevertheless, ILO BFC does not collect detailed information on buyer-supplier relationships, 
which is critical to testing the above hypotheses. For this reason, the author conducted a 
survey of supplier factories in the Cambodian garment industry in the latter half of 2008. 
Consequently, the size of the survey determines the size of the sample. 
Survey Data Collection 
The survey was conducted between June and October 2008 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
and the survey targeted general managers of exporting garment factories. A total of 51 
factory managers responded to the survey out of approximately 300 of Cambodia‟s export 
garment factories.
82
 While it covers only 17 percent of the industry population, the actual 
response rate is likely to be higher as explained below. Survey questions have been tested 
with industry experts and then piloted in four factories. Given that factory managers are 
predominantly Chinese speakers, the questionnaire and cover letter were written in both 
English and Chinese.  
The survey collection employed a multi-pronged approach to increase responses given 
limited time and resources. First, ILO monitors distributed and collected questionnaires 
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 In fact, as one survey respondent was responsible for four branches, the actual survey size is 54. While the 
survey response is identical for the four branches, their factory characteristics and compliance data vary. 
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during their routine factory visits. Second, the author accompanied ILO monitors and 
conducted face-to-face interviews with factory managers during factory visits. Third, the 
author sent emails to factory mangers asking to complete the questionnaire on-line. The three 
survey vehicles were used equally: monitors collected 16 responses, the author interviewed 
17 factory managers, and the web-based survey collected 18 responses.
 
 
The major issue in a survey is a problem of non-response, which introduces bias and 
distorts the representativity of a sample (Buckingham and Saunders, 2004). For this reason, 
Hansen and Hurwitz (2004) propose combining interviews and mail questionnaires to 
optimize the response rate given resource constraints. Indeed, interviews helped alleviate 
non-response problems pervasive in self-completed survey collection. When managers were 
present, which was almost always the case, the interview approach attained a 100 percent 
response rate (i.e. all managers agreed to be interviewed), while the response rate for the 
web-based approach reached only 15.5 percent.
83
 As ILO monitoring schedule is random (i.e. 
not affected by the level of compliance or any other explanatory variables), interviewing 
during factory visits reduces potential bias in the sample. Thanks to the multi-pronged survey 
collection approach, the sample profile is broadly in line with the population profile as shown 
in Table 4-1, although larger factories and better performers are slightly over-represented. 
Complete survey questions and answers are detailed in Appendix I. 
Dependent Variable 
ILO monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labor standards, which are based on 
the Cambodian labor law and the international labor standards. The checklist items are 
grouped into the following categories: contracts, wages, hours, leave, welfare, occupational 
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 A link to the web-based questionnaire was sent by email to 147 managers, of which 31 returned as delivery 
failures, and of which 18 responded (i.e. the response rate of 15.5 percent). Given the fast turnover of managers 
in the industry and lack of internet use in some factories, the likelihood of „deliberate refusal‟ is likely to be less 
than what the figure indicates. The response rate for collection through monitors is not available as the number 
of questionnaires distributed by monitors is not known. The response rate for the monitor channel is likely to be 
higher than the web-based one, but much lower than that of interviews. 
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safety and health (OSH), and fundamental rights. Un-announced visits span an entire day or 
longer for larger establishments, and the process includes an on-site inspection, meetings with 
human resource managers, union leaders, and shop stewards as well as off-site interviews 
with workers. When a factory is deemed out of compliance with a certain item, ILO monitors 
make a standardized suggestion for improvement. Therefore, the presence of a suggestion is 
equivalent to non-compliance and the absence of a suggestion, compliance. In general, a 
smaller number of suggestions or non-compliance items indicates better working conditions. 
The industry-average compliance level in 2008 was 90 percent (where a score of 100 
indicates full compliance), suggesting a very high level of overall compliance in the 
Cambodian garment industry. As in Chapter 3, the items under OSH and welfare are grouped 
together to form one category, „OSH-welfare‟ while the items under hours and leave are 
combined as „hours-leave.‟ In fact, giving equal weight to each checklist item leads to over-
representation of OSH-welfare, as together they account for 35.7 % of the total checklist 
items. To rectify this over-representation, the weight of each item under OSH-welfare has 
been reduced to half, leading to a better balance of issue categories in the composite: contract 
(15.4%), wage (24.6%), hours-leave (19.7 %), OSH-welfare (21.5 %), and fundamental rights 
(18.6%).
84 
  
Independent Variables 
Independent variables can be loosely organized under the categories articulated in the 
hypothesis section: deterrence, buyer-supplier relationships, and learning. Table 4-2 shows 
the survey responses regarding the channels of buyer influence.  
Deterrence 
One of the measures of deterrence is the frequency of visits by buyers‟ compliance staff. 
As shown in Table 4-2, there is large variation: 60 percent of factories receive up to 5 
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 The result based on the un-weighed composite is not substantially different from the output using the weighed 
composite, but the latter is more robust.  
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compliance visits per year while 22 percent receive 15 times or more. The frequency of visits 
is coded from 1 to 6 as an interval measure. The other measure of deterrence is a dummy 
variable of whether or not buyers have warned implicitly or explicitly about the consequence 
of non-compliance (i.e. cancellation of orders). 46 percent of the managers acknowledge 
having received implicit or explicit warnings.
85
  
There is a potential issue of endogeneity with the deterrence variables if buyers tend to 
visit problematic factories and issue warnings disproportionately to these factories. While 
endogeneity may be controlled by using instrumental variables or first-differencing variables, 
lack of appropriate instruments and temporal gaps between dependent and independent 
variables precludes using these techniques. Nonetheless, potential endogeneity may be less 
problematic considering that buyers‟ compliance visits have multiple purposes unlike ILO 
monitoring.  Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007:18) mention that Nike concentrates its resources 
on high-risk factories and suppliers with which they want to develop more long-term 
relationships.  
Similarly, the author‟s interviews with buyer local representatives find that they visit 
their suppliers not just to enforce their CoC, but to develop open and close relationships. 
Moreover, the problem of endogeneity for warnings may be less severe since the author‟s 
interviews have found that supplier perception of warnings varies considerably. Some 
managers considered accepting buyer CoC as equivalent to an implicit warning, given the 
clause stipulating that violation of CoC may lead to termination of contracts. Other managers, 
however, interpreted warnings as specific buyer remarks addressing particular compliance 
problems.  
Buyer-supplier relationships 
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 Nonetheless, only 10 percent of them responded that non-compliance has actually led to a cancellation of 
orders. This is because most suppliers rectify problems within a given time frame as demanded by buyers. Only 
when the problem is severe and recurrent do buyers terminate contracts. 
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The nature of the buyer-supplier relationships is measured by the duration of the 
relationship with a supplier‟s most important buyer and the mode of communication with 
buyers. The duration varies from 0-2 years (14 percent) to 10 years or more (16 percent), 
while the majority falls between 3 and 6 years (54 percent). The duration of the relationship 
is coded from 1 to 6 as an interval measure. The mode of communication with buyers is 
divided quite equally: directly with buyers (43 percent), through vendors (37 percent), and 
through agents (31 percent). The measure of a market-based relationship is a dummy variable 
of whether or not a supplier communicates through agents.  
Learning  
According to the surveyed managers, buyers share technical knowledge often (33 
percent) or sometimes (53 percent). The kind of knowledge commonly shared is quality 
control (95 percent), followed by work place skills (51 percent), and production system (40 
percent). 26 percent of the surveyed factories had buyers involved in determining their 
production systems. Buyers encourage training often (30 percent) or sometimes (50 percent). 
In general, there appears to be knowledge sharing between buyers and suppliers. From these 
questionnaire responses, three dummy variables have been created to measure learning 
opportunities: whether or not buyers often share technical knowledge, whether or not buyers 
have been involved in determining production system, and whether or not buyers often 
encourage training.    
Reputation-conscious buyers 
The last independent variable is a reputation-conscious buyer, which may be mediated 
by the other independent variables or interact with them to influence compliance performance. 
Following the preceding chapters, this chapter operationalizes the concept of a reputation-
conscious buyer by looking at whether or not a buyer participates in multi-stakeholder 
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initiatives (MSI).
86
 Since reputation-conscious buyers tend to participate in MSI to show their 
commitment to better working conditions and safeguard their reputation, it is a reasonable 
proxy. This study focuses on the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI), given their prominence and buyer-oriented nature.
87
 Hence, a dummy 
variable of a buyer participating in the FLA or the ETI (hereafter, MSI buyers) is used as a 
measure of a reputation-conscious buyer. 
Control Variables 
Firm characteristics found to be significant in Chapter 2 and 3 are controlled for: the 
size of the establishment as measured by the natural logarithm of total number of employees 
and the age of the establishment proxied by the total number of visits by ILO monitors since 
2001. In addition, firms‟ capacity and network are considered as follows. 
Firms may need to have a certain level of financial capacity to improve compliance 
performance (Winter and May, 2001). As the direct measure of financial capacity was 
difficult to obtain, the survey asked whether the factory provides Free-on-Board (FOB) 
services or Cut, Make and Trim (CMT) only. FOB is a full-package service, responsible for 
purchase of fabric and accessories, production, and transport until loading merchandises onto 
the export carrier. CMT literally refers to the production process only. The distinction 
between the two types of services is important because sourcing of fabric and financing 
import and export costs require substantial resources and managerial know-how unlike CMT 
(USAID 2007). Hence, a dummy variable for FOB is used as a measure of financial capacity. 
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 Following O‟Rourke (2006: 899), this thesis defines MSI in labor regulation as a scheme that involves various 
stakeholders in negotiating labor standards, monitoring compliance with these standards, and establishing 
mechanisms to encourage firms to comply with these standards. 
87
 The Fair Labor Association (FLA), an American initiative, is the oldest and the best known brand-oriented 
MSI in labor regulation. Member companies are required to implement the FLA code of conduct, submit to un-
announced monitoring by accredited auditors, and to commit to remediation and public reporting. Currently, 26 
companies are participating, most of which are well-known apparel and sportswear brands as well as university 
affiliates. The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), a UK scheme, is geared toward learning and self-reporting rather 
than monitoring. The ETI encourages its member companies to implement its base code in their supply chains 
and require them to submit annual progress report on their code implementation. If progress is deemed 
unsatisfactory, members may be asked to resign. Currently, 50 companies are participating, most of which are 
large European brands and retailers. 
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Financial and managerial capacity of factory can also be affected by firm network 
including parent companies and other branches, as they can provide access to capital, 
managerial know-how and best practices (Erickson and Jacoby, 2003). Independent firms 
deprived of such access are likely to have lower capacity than networked firms. The 
questionnaire asked whether the factory is independent, subsidiary of a group and/or one of 
multiple branches in Cambodia. Thus, the dummy variable of independent firm is used to 
measure the absence of firm network.    
Table 4-3 reports the descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of all the variables 
under investigation. A cursory examination shows statistically significant relationships 
between supplier non-compliance and agent, MSI-buyer, and factory size variables, which 
will be further evaluated using multi-variate regressions.  
Model Specification 
Given the small sample size, simultaneously incorporating all the independent and 
control variables as well as interaction terms depletes degrees of freedom. To circumvent this 
problem, regression analysis is conducted in two steps. First, baseline OLS regressions are 
run for each category of independent variables (i.e. deterrence, relationship, and learning), 
including MSI buyer and its interaction terms. Second, an OLS regression is run with those 
significant predictors identified in the baseline regressions, together with control variables. 
 
The baseline regression for deterrence:  
Non-compliance = α + β1 ∙ visit frequency + β2 ∙ warning + β3 ∙ MSI buyer + β4 ∙ frequency ∙ 
MSI buyer + β5 ∙ warning ∙ MSI buyer + ε  
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The baseline regression for relationship: 
Non-compliance = α + β1 ∙ duration + β2 ∙ agents + β3 ∙ MSI buyer + β4 ∙ duration ∙ MSI buyer 
+ β5 ∙ agents ∙ MSI buyer + ε  
 
The baseline regression for learning: 
Non-compliance = α + β1 ∙ knowledge sharing + β2 ∙ production system + β3 ∙ encourage 
training + β4 ∙ MSI buyer + β5∙ knowledge ∙ MSI buyer + β6 ∙ system∙ MSI buyer + β7 ∙ training 
∙ MSI buyer + ε  
 
The main regression with added control variables:  
Non-compliance = α + β1 ∙ significant deterrence variable + β2 ∙ significant relationship 
variable + β3 ∙ significant learning variable + β4 ∙ MSI buyer + β5 ∙ factory size + β6 ∙ factory 
age + β7 ∙ FOB + β8 ∙ independent + ε  
4.4. Results 
Baseline Regressions 
Table 4-4 shows the result for the deterrence model. Neither visit frequency nor warning is 
significantly associated with non-compliance although they both have negative signs as 
expected. The presence of MSI buyers is statistically significant in Model 1 and it reduces 
non-compliance by 7 items (p<0.05). This suggests that reputation-conscious buyers 
influence supplier compliance through a channel other than deterrence. When interaction 
terms are introduced in Model 2, none reaches statistical significance.  Visit frequency by 
non-MSI buyers is negatively associated with non-compliance, and in the presence of MSI 
buyers, this negative effect is reinforced. Warnings by non-MSI buyers are negatively 
associated with non-compliance although this negative effect is reduced when MSI buyers are 
present. In sum, even though the direction of effects is broadly in line with the stated 
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hypotheses, none of the deterrence hypotheses are statistically significant in the estimation 
results.   
Table 4-5 shows the relationship model results, in which transaction through agents 
increases non-compliance by 5.7 items (P<0.05) in Model 3. The presence of MSI buyers is 
equally significant though in the opposite direction, reducing non-compliance by 5.6 items. 
The duration of relationship is not significant and positively associated with non-compliance. 
Once the variable is interacted with MSI-buyer, however, it gains significance and reduces 
non-compliance as shown in Model 4.
88
 In contrast, the duration of the relationship with a 
non-MSI buyer is not significant and positively related to non-compliance. This suggests that 
the duration of relationship helps reduce non-compliance only when the most important buyer 
is an MSI buyer, rejecting the general hypothesis of long-term relationships and confirming 
the interaction hypothesis with reputation-conscious buyers. 
In Model 4, variable “Agents” measures the effect of agents in the absence of MSI 
buyers, and it is highly significant, increasing the number of non-compliance by 9.8 items 
(p<0.01). This is because the agent effect for an MSI buyer has been separated by adding an 
interaction variable (Agents*MSI buyer), which is non-significant and increases non-
compliance by only 1.4 items.
89 
 It is interesting to note that the significance of MSI buyer is 
lost once the interaction terms are included. The findings generally support the market-based 
relationship hypothesis that transaction through agents is associated with a higher level of 
non-compliance. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers is partially mediated by the agent 
                                                 
88
 The coefficient of the interaction term (duration*MSI buyer) measures the difference in the slopes for MSI 
and non-MSI buyers while the coefficient of “Duration of relationship” measures the slope for non-MSI buyers. 
Therefore, the effect of an extra year of relationship (i.e. 2 years in this case) with an MSI buyer on non-
compliance is the sum of coefficients for non-MSI and MSI buyers: 0.72-1.51= -0.79. 
89
 The coefficient of the interaction term (agents*MSI buyer) measures the difference in the slopes for MSI and 
non-MSI buyers while the coefficient of “Agents” measures the slope for non-MSI buyers. Therefore, the 
coefficient for the use of agents in the presence of MSI buyers is the sum of coefficients for non-MSI and MSI 
buyers: 9.75-8.36=1.39.   
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variable, but it also appears to interact with agents, implying the particularities of reputation-
conscious buyers. 
In the learning model in Table 4-6, none of the independent variables except MSI buyer 
are significantly associated with non-compliance. Buyers‟ knowledge sharing and 
involvement in determining production systems have expected negative signs while 
encouraging training has a positive sign, possibly due to a relatively high correlation with 
MSI buyer (i.e. 0.53). Running separate regressions for each independent variable renders 
none of them significant. None of the interaction terms are significant, suggesting that 
reputation-conscious buyers do not condition the effect of learning variables on non-
compliance. Overall, the learning hypotheses are not supported by the estimation results.  
Main Regressions with Added Controls 
Table 4-7 reports the results of main OLS regressions with the variables found 
significant in the baseline regressions (i.e. relationship and reputation-conscious buyer 
variables) and control variables. Model 7 includes all the variables, while Model 8 displays 
only the significant variables without interaction terms, which is more parsimonious. It shows 
that about one-quarter of the variation in non-compliance is explained by only two variables: 
transaction through agents and the size of the factory. 
The most consistent and significant predictor of non-compliance turns out to be the 
agent variable. Model 7 shows the conditional effect of agents: transacting through agents 
when MSI buyers are not present increases non-compliance by 10 items (p<0.01). Model 8 
shows the general effect of agents: when a supplier transacts through agents, regardless of the 
presence of MSI buyers, non-compliance increases by 6.5 items (p<0.05). The duration of the 
relationship with an MSI buyer is negatively related with non-compliance and slightly 
significant (p<0.1), suggesting that MSI buyers may be qualitatively different from other 
buyers in their approach to buyer-supplier relationships. 
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As for control variables, factory size is the only significant one. Larger factories tend to 
have fewer non-compliance items as expected (e.g. a one percent increase in the number of 
employees reduces non-compliance by 4.3 items). The significance of MSI buyers is lost 
once agents and factory size are included. Other firm characteristics such as age, FOB, 
independence are not significant. 
Interpretation of Results 
The above findings lend support to the relationship hypotheses that the nature of buyer-
supplier relationships importantly affects supplier compliance-performance. Specifically, 
market-based transactions through sourcing agents are consistently associated with poorer 
compliance performance across different specifications. This negative agent effect is 
augmented in the absence of reputation-conscious buyers. The significant effect of MSI 
buyers is likely to be mediated through their preference for close and established 
relationships with suppliers as very few MSI buyers use agents (only 3 out of 49 suppliers in 
the sample produce for at least one MSI buyer and use agents).  
On the other hand, the duration of the relationship is found to reduce non-compliance 
only with an MSI buyer. This conditional effect also attests to the particularity of MSI buyers. 
While a long-term relationship may be a necessary condition for fostering trust and 
developing collaboration, it is unlikely to be a sufficient one, which explains the variable‟s 
lack of significance in the main regression. With a better measure, the collaboration 
hypothesis is likely to be supported.
90
  In sum, it is likely that the absence of agents and the 
presence of collaboration underlie the negative and significant association between 
reputation-conscious buyers and supplier non-compliance found in the preceding chapters.  
Particularities of reputation-conscious buyers are corroborated by the buyer survey, 
completed by 13 major buyers in Cambodia‟s garment sector (Appendix II). First, MSI 
                                                 
90
 Jiang (2009) succeeded in showing the statistical link between such norm-based relationships and compliance 
while he failed to show a significant link between market-based relationships and compliance. 
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buyers tend to communicate directly with factories while other buyers tend to transact 
through vendors and sourcing agents. Second, MSI buyers often account for a large share of 
the production capacity of their suppliers whereas other buyers do not. This gives more 
leverage to MSI buyers vis-à-vis their suppliers. Third, MSI buyers have a tendency to 
emphasize continuous improvement while other buyers often turn to „zero tolerance‟ and 
„three strikes‟ policies. These rigid procedures are likely to prompt suppliers to hide problems 
rather than to be open about them. Overall, reputation-conscious buyers are indeed 
qualitatively different from other buyers in terms of managing relationships with suppliers.    
Although the learning hypotheses are not supported by the evidence, this channel 
should be further explored with a larger sample and different measures of learning. As the 
type of relationship is likely to affect the degree of learning between buyers and suppliers, a 
structural model may be used. On the other hand, there is little evidence to support the 
deterrence hypotheses, which may suggest that a policing approach through intensive 
monitoring and credible threats may not be the most effective strategy to improve supplier 
compliance. Nevertheless, the measures of deterrence may suffer from endogeneity, and 
therefore, the result is more tentative than conclusive.  
Based on these findings, Figure 4-1 depicts a model of buyer influence on supplier 
compliance-performance. Given the need to maintain high standards, which require a higher 
degree of asset specificity, reputation-conscious buyers tend to opt for direct relationships 
with vendors and factories. Theses buyers often form collaborative relationships and invest 
their time and resources in suppliers, encouraging supplier commitment. In contrast, other 
buyers, especially cost-conscious buyers specializing in more standardized products prefer 
market-based transactions through agents for efficiency reasons.  However, market-based 
transactions encourage neither buyers nor suppliers to make asset-specific investment as they 
have shorter time horizons. Consequently, suppliers in market-based relationships tend to 
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under-perform their peers enjoying collaborative relationships in terms of labor standard 
compliance. Supplier compliance is also affected by the size of the factory; larger factories 
tend to have better compliance levels than smaller ones, given their economies of scale and 
higher opportunity/monitoring costs.  
4.5. Conclusion 
While much has been studied and debated about CoC and monitoring procedures, how buyers 
influence working conditions in their supply chains remains poorly understood. In particular, 
a quantitative investigation into different channels of buyer influence has been lacking. This 
chapter has attempted to fill the gap by examining different channels (i.e. deterrence, 
relationship, and learning) through which buyers influence supplier compliance-performance. 
This chapter has also sought to assess how reputation-conscious buyers may affect those 
channels differently. To accomplish theses tasks, this chapter exploited the monitoring and 
firm characteristic data provided by ILO BFC as well as the original survey data collected by 
the author. 
This chapter has shown that the main channel linking buyers and supplier compliance-
performance is the nature of their relationships. Suppliers engaged in market-based 
transactions through agents systematically under-perform suppliers who do not depend on 
agents. In other words, market-based relationships are associated with poor compliance 
performance. While deterrence and learning variables generally show expected signs, they do 
not reach statistical significance. 
The findings have important practical and theoretical implications. The results indicate 
that market-based relationships through agents may be part of the problem rather than a 
solution from the viewpoint of improving working conditions. Market-based relationships 
characterized by short-term horizons motivate neither buyers nor suppliers to invest their time 
and resources to understand the root causes of poor working conditions and to commit to 
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continuous improvement. Rather, market-based relationships prompt suppliers to try to pass 
compliance audits with minimum efforts. Moreover, the non-significance of the deterrence 
variables suggests that a policing approach based on intensive monitoring and credible threats 
may not be the best way to bring about progress in supplier compliance. These, together, 
point to the limit of arm‟s-length, compliance-oriented relationships, which could breed 
mistrust and dishonesty.  
Conversely, the findings signal the need to develop collaborative relationships marked 
by open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which helps foster an environment supportive of 
continuous improvement. Close and open relationships with buyers enable suppliers to 
discuss problems and find solutions rather than to hide them from buyers. To improve 
supplier working conditions, therefore, buyers need to place more importance on the quality 
of their relationships with suppliers—openness, trust, mutual commitment—and not just on 
the traditional concerns of price, quality and delivery of goods. These points are echoed by 
other scholars (Locke and Romis, 2006; Locke et al., 2007; Jiang, 2009; Locke et al., 2009).      
Such collaborative relationships may well underlie the significant and positive effect of 
reputation-conscious buyers on supplier compliance-performance. Given the high degree of 
asset specificity required, reputation-conscious buyers tend to avoid market-based 
relationships and to form collaborative relationships with their suppliers. In fact, the duration 
of the relationship has a positive effect on compliance performance only when it is with a 
reputation-conscious buyer. In contrast, more cost-conscious buyers retailing highly 
standardized products tend to prefer market-based relationships that do not require asset 
specific investment. This suggests that attracting reputation-conscious buyers could bring 
important benefits not only in terms of upgrading products and processes but also in terms of 
forming collaborative relationships and improving working conditions.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the negative effects buyers—including 
reputation-conscious ones—can have on working conditions in supply chains. In fact, 
purchasing practices of buyers sometimes contradict with the goal of improving working 
conditions (CCC, 2009; Oxfam, 2004). In recent years, intense competition and rising prices 
have squeezed garment producer profits, making it difficult to invest in better working 
conditions or raise wages. On the other hand, buyers are increasingly demanding quicker 
delivery, which disrupts work schedules and increases overtime. Moreover, significant 
fluctuations in orders leave workers idol during low seasons, making it costly for factories. 
These buying practices have negative consequences on suppliers‟ capacity to improve 
working conditions, and thus need to be addressed. 
This chapter has several limitations. First, the sample size is small although the sample 
is broadly representative of the population. Second, the deterrence variables potentially suffer 
from endogeneity, which needs to be better controlled in the future work. Third, while 
interactions and mediation between reputation-conscious buyers and other independent 
variables have been considered, relationships among independent variables have not been 
taken into account, which may require simultaneous equation modeling. Considering these 
limitations, this chapter does not claim to have offered exhaustive hypothesis testing. Rather, 
it has provided support to the existing studies and some additional insights into buyer 
influence on their supplier compliance-performance. Future research could address these 
points and expand upon the inner-workings of the relationship channel. 
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 Table 4-1. Population and sample profiles 
 
  Non-compliance   Factory Size   Factory Age   Presence of MSI buyer 
  Population Sample   Population Sample   Population Sample   Population Sample 
Observation 300 52  300 53  300 54  300 52 
Mean 20.0 17.8  1197.5 1420.3  5.4 5.9  0.4 0.4 
S.D. 12.4 9.7  1056.7 1086.6  2.3 2.4  0.7 0.5 
 
 
Table 4-2. Responses to the questionnaire on the channels of buyer influence 
 
  Percent Valid Missing 
Deterrence       
How many times does buyers' compliance staff visit your factory per year? 50 1 
     0-2 times 30     
     3-5 times 30     
     6-8 times 14     
     9-11 times 2     
     12-14 times 2     
     15 times or more 22     
        
Your buyers have warned explicitly or implicitly about the risk of non-
compliance leading to a cancellation of orders 
46 50 1 
      
        
Relationship       
For how many years have you produced for your most important buyer?   50 1 
     0-2 years 14     
     3-4 years 28     
     5-6 years 26     
     7-8 years 10     
     9-10 years 6     
     10 years or more 16     
       
Do you communicate directly with buyers or through vendors or agents?  51 0 
     Mostly directly with buyers 43     
     Mostly through vendors 37     
     Mostly through agents 31     
        
Learning       
Your buyers share technical knowledge   51 0 
     Yes, often times 33     
     Yes, sometimes 53     
     No, not really 14     
        
Your buyers have been involved in determining the production system 26 51 0 
        
Your buyers encourage training for workers/supervisors/managers    50 1 
     Yes, often times 30     
     Yes, sometimes 50     
     No, not really 20     
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Table 4-3. Correlation matrix of dependent, independent, and control variables 
 
  Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Non-compliance 17.80 9.67             
2 Visit frequency 1.62 1.16 -0.18            
3 Warning 0.45 0.50 -0.02 -0.04           
4 Duration  3.07 1.60 0.08 -0.31** 0.07          
5 Agents 0.31 0.46 0.39*** 0.00 0.02 -0.01         
6 Share knowledge 0.32 0.47 -0.14 0.01 0.35** -0.03 0.08        
7 Production system 0.25 0.44 -0.24 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 0.29**       
8 Encourage training 0.30 0.43 -0.20 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 0.14 0.05      
9 MSI buyer 0.44 0.50 -0.36*** 0.26 -0.23 -0.04 -0.34** 0.04 0.06 0.53***     
10 Factory size 7.01 0.70 -0.38*** 0.14 0.08 0.02 -0.22 0.31** 0.14 0.40*** 0.61***    
11 Factory age 5.94 2.40 -0.01 0.10 -0.18 0.21 -0.16 -0.19 0.04 -0.13 0.17 0.18   
12 FOB 0.82 0.40 -0.17 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.21 0.12 -0.29** 0.24 0.31** 0.25 0.05  
13 Independent 0.20 0.40 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 0.32** 0.09 0.17 -0.04 -0.20 -0.23 -0.15 -0.39*** 
Note: ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01
 128 
                Table 4-4.  Deterrence model results 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Visit frequency -0.91 (1.15) -1.07 (1.72) 
     
Warning -2.41 (2.67) -3.13 (3.56) 
     
MSI buyer -7.01** (2.78) -5.07 (5.45) 
     
Visit frequency*MSI buyer  -1.47 (2.40) 
     
Warning*MSI buyer   0.95 (5.69) 
     
Constant 23.45**** (2.75) 22.74**** (3.27) 
     
Observation 50  50  
     
R-squared 0.16  0.16  
     
F-value 2.84**  1.73   
Note: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.  
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
                    Table 4-5. Relationship model results 
 
Variable Model 3 Model 4 
Duration of relationship 0.41  (0.76) 0.72 (0.81) 
     
Agents 5.71** (2.82) 9.75*** (3.01) 
     
MSI buyer -5.56** (2.63) 1.08 (2.98) 
     
Duration*MSI buyer   -1.51* (0.79) 
     
Agents*MSI buyer   -8.36 (5.64) 
     
Constant 17.44**** (3.21) 13.72**** (3.07) 
     
Observation 51  49  
     
R-squared 0.22  0.36  
     
F-value 4.57***  4.87***   
Note: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.  
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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                      Table 4-6. Learning model results 
 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
Share knowledge -1.65 (2.96) -3.81 (4.56) 
     
Production system -4.51 (3.20) -3.76 (4.82) 
     
Encourage training 0.19 (3.25) 3.19 (6.00) 
     
MSI buyer -6.44** (3.05) -6.09 (4.25) 
     
Knowledge*MSI buyer   3.58 (6.20) 
     
System*MSI buyer   -1.20 (6.66) 
     
Training*MSI buyer   -4.72 (7.25) 
     
Constant 22.17**** (1.97) 22.27**** (2.18) 
     
Observation 51  51  
     
R-squared 0.18  0.19  
     
F-value 2.55*  1.47  
Note: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.  
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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Table 4-7.  Main regression results with significant variables and added controls 
 
Variable Model 7 Model 8 
Duration of relationship 0.52 (0.83)   
     
Agents 10.09*** (3.24) 6.54** (2.66) 
     
MSI buyer 3.32 (3.31)   
     
Duration*MSI buyer -1.33* (0.79)   
     
Agents*MSI buyer -7.92 (5.73)   
     
Factory size -4.37** (2.16) -4.28** (1.80) 
     
Factory age 0.73 (0.55)   
     
FOB 0.34 (3.14)   
     
Independent -1.28 (3.23)   
     
Constant 39.34** (14.96) 45.85**** (12.94) 
     
Observation 49  52  
     
R-squared 0.44  0.24  
     
F-value 3.43***  7.74***  
Note: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.  
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Model of buyer influence on supplier compliance-performance 
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Overall Conclusion 
 
This dissertation consists of four inter-linked chapters on labor standard 
compliance in Cambodia‟s garment sector, starting from an overall picture and 
narrowing down to the central theme. Chapter 1 provides a contextual overview of the 
Cambodian garment sector and assessment of the ILO monitoring program. Chapter 2 
and 3 focus on the role of buyers and show that reputation-conscious buyers regulate 
their suppliers differently from other buyers. Then Chapter 4 examines the channels 
through which buyers influence their supplier compliance-performance. As a whole, this 
PhD thesis has made significant contributions to empirical and theoretical knowledge 
with important policy and managerial implications. 
In terms of empirical contributions, Chapter 1 constitutes the latest and the most 
comprehensive evaluation of the ILO monitoring program, Better Factories Cambodia 
(BFC), which is considered to be one of the most promising models of labor regulation. 
While BFC has overcome some of the weaknesses of private monitoring in terms of 
rigor, cost effectiveness, coordination, as well as credibility, BFC runs in parallel to the 
state institutions and enforcement depends on buyers. Further, the scheme‟s viability 
remains to be tested.  
Moreover, this dissertation contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of non-
state labor regulation. Although critics claim that buyer-driven regulation inevitably 
leads to limited coverage in terms of establishments and issue areas, lack of systematic 
data has precluded quantitative treatment of the subject. Chapter 2 and 3 provide strong 
evidence that very reputation-conscious buyers are increasingly regulating labor 
conditions in their supply chains across various issue areas including fundamental rights. 
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Even less reputation-conscious retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target are found to pay 
attention to a variety of labor conditions in their supplier factories. On the other hand, 
significant compliance gaps have been identified between suppliers of reputation-
conscious buyers and suppliers of the least reputation-conscious buyers, with the former 
systematically outperforming the latter. The findings thus contribute to a better and 
more nuanced understanding of the potential and limits of buyer-driven regulation.   
Further, the dissertation sheds light on the different channels through which 
buyers influence working conditions in their supplier facilities. Chapter 4 tests various 
hypotheses on deterrence, relationship, and learning and finds that it is the nature of 
buyer-supplier relationships (market-based versus established) rather than deterrence 
per se that significantly affects supplier compliance-performance. The findings provide 
support for the work of Richard Locke and his collaborators, who argue that 
“commitment-oriented approach” is more effective than the “compliance-focused 
model” for addressing the root causes of poor working conditions.  
This thesis has also made methodological contributions to the filed of reputation 
and labor regulation. First, I have come up with a new way of operationalizing 
reputation consciousness by categorizing buyers according to their membership status 
of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI). Studies of firm reputation have traditionally 
relied on Fortune magazine‟s ranking of World‟s Most Admired Companies. However, 
this ranking does not directly measure the extent to which companies are sensitive to 
negative publicity and thus willing to invest in improving labor conditions in their 
supply chains. MSI membership status is a better measure since companies join MSI 
mainly to manage reputation risk as confirmed by the buyer survey. 
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Another methodological contribution to the field is the use of mixed methods, 
which was enabled by the diverse data collected in Cambodia‟s garment sector. On the 
one hand, the existing studies of working conditions in supply chains are predominantly 
qualitative studies based on a single or few cases. However rich and insightful, these 
accounts are not amenable to generalization. On the other hand, a few emerging 
quantitative studies on the subject tend to leave out the context and assume away causal 
mechanisms. This dissertation has sought to demonstrate the utility of combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods in arriving at parsimonious conclusions while 
taking into account causal processes and contextual factors, thereby enriching our 
knowledge.    
This dissertation makes significant theoretical contributions as well. I have taken 
an evolutionary and eclectic approach to theorizing in order to demonstrate the utility 
and limits of different theories. The rational expected utility framework in Chapter 2 
was useful for explaining why reputation-conscious buyers would behave differently 
from other buyers and why that affects supplier compliance-performance. Nonetheless, 
Chapter 3 has shown the limits of the rational deterrence theory in explaining the 
comprehensive response by reputation-conscious buyers, which was better explained by 
the behavioral theory. Chapter 4 has provided support for the relationship hypotheses 
consistent with the transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory rather 
than the deterrence theory.  
In so doing, the thesis has provided a theoretical bridge for the disparate literature 
on labor conditions in global supply chains. On the one hand, there is critical literature 
by sociologists and development scholars assuming that firms are solely motivated by 
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incentives and threats in line with the rational deterrence theory.
91
 On the other hand, 
there is management literature that views buyers as a partner in problem-solving 
through collaboration and learning.
92
 Such divergent perspectives arise from the fact 
that the former camp studies all types of buyers including unscrupulous ones while the 
latter camp focuses on branded buyers who are conscious of their reputation and thus 
more responsible. This thesis has sought to reconcile the two perspectives and shown 
that while the least reputation-conscious buyers behave in line with the rational 
deterrence theory, reputation-conscious buyers act in a manner more consistent with the 
behavioral theory. Moreover, the thesis has explained the divergent behavior in terms of 
the varying degrees of asset specificity required by different types of buyers.   
This finding has important policy and managerial implications as it suggests that 
different strategies may be needed for different types of buyers. For buyers with higher 
stakes in their reputation, it makes sense to foster long-term and collaborative 
relationships with their suppliers to improve labor conditions in their supply chains. For 
these buyers, therefore, a “commitment-oriented approach” is a better solution than a 
“compliance-focused approach” as argued by Locke et al. (2009). Nevertheless, it is 
unrealistic to expect the least reputation-conscious buyers to take a commitment-
oriented approach to supply chain management. These buyers tend to favor market-
based relationships given the lower degrees of asset specificity required. Further, they 
are unknown to consumers and thus less vulnerable to negative publicity. In the absence 
of „moral‟ market forces, suppliers producing for these buyers need to be regulated by 
another regulatory mechanism, namely the state. 
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 Major authors in this camp include Stephanie Barrientos, Jill Esbenshade, and Gay Seidman. 
92
 Major authors in this camp include Stephan Frenkel and Richard Locke and his collaborators. 
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This leads us to the discussion on the next generation model of labor regulation. 
While state regulation in many developing countries is far from effective, non-state 
regulatory schemes including ILO BFC are limited by their coverage. To avoid 
“regulatory enclaves” and fill regulatory gaps, public and private initiatives should be 
better coordinated to make use of their relative strengths as Posthuma (2008) argues. 
Since non-state initiatives focus on exporting consumer goods sector, public 
enforcement should concentrate on other sectors and subcontractors. In the long-run, 
however, public and private regulatory efforts need to converge and government needs 
to take center stage.     
This dissertation has the following limitations. The scope of inquiry is limited to 
the exporting garment sector in Cambodia, which means that non-exporting garment 
factories, other sectors, and other countries are not considered. Despite the anecdotal 
evidence that working conditions in subcontractors and other sectors are worse, it was 
not possible to obtain systematic data to make a comparison. Besides, the Cambodian 
case is more unique than universal given its bilateral trade agreement with the US, 
susceptibility to pressures from the US, and extensive involvement of the ILO at 
institutional and program levels. Another limitation concerns the nature of the data. 
While the ILO has conducted factory-level monitoring since 2001, systematic data are 
available only from 2006, limiting the time-series element of the data.  In addition, the 
sample size of the surveys is smaller than originally envisaged due to resource 
constraints.  
Future work should address these concerns and further explore the determinants of 
working conditions in global supply chains and uncover the black box of buyer 
influence. Specifically, the following questions seem worth exploring. Which is good 
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for working conditions in supplier facilities, more buyer leverage or less? There seem to 
be conflicting interpretations about how buyer leverage influences suppliers. While 
buyer leverage may help enforce labor standards in some cases, lack of supplier 
leverage may squeeze profits and worsen working conditions. Identifying scope 
conditions would be helpful. Another promising question relates to the difference 
between the determinants of compliance and those of „beyond compliance.‟ The survey 
results indicate that different forces are at work: buyers may encourage compliance, but 
they are unlikely to motivate suppliers to go beyond compliance in most issue areas. It 
would be worthwhile to further investigate this issue.  
As a whole, this PhD thesis has made an original contribution to the literature on 
labor regulation in global supply chains and buyer-supplier relationships. The unique 
and systematic factory-level data from the Cambodian garment sector enabled me to ask 
questions that were not previously possible and to answer them in a comprehensive 
manner. Novel findings have challenged popular notions and improved our empirical 
and theoretical knowledge about the potential and limits of buyer-driven labor 
regulation. Furthermore, the dissertation has suggested practical solutions for tackling 
poor working conditions in global supply chains: a commitment approach for 
reputation-conscious buyers and coordination of public and private regulatory 
framework. 
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Appendix I. Supplier Survey in the Cambodian Garment Sector 
 
Survey Data Collection 
 
The supplier survey was conducted between June and October 2008 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, and the survey targeted general managers of exporting garment factories. 
Survey questions were developed, tested with industry experts and then piloted in four 
factories by the author. Given that factory managers are predominantly Chinese 
speakers, the questionnaire and the cover letter were written in both English and 
Chinese.  
The survey collection employed a multi-pronged approach to increase responses 
given limited time and resources. First, ILO monitors distributed and collected 
questionnaires during their routine factory visits. Second, the author accompanied ILO 
monitors and conducted face-to-face interviews with factory managers during factory 
visits. Third, the author sent emails to factory mangers asking to complete the 
questionnaire on-line. The three survey vehicles were used equally: monitors collected 
16 responses, the author interviewed 17 factory managers, and the web-based survey 
collected 18 responses.
 
In total, 51 factory managers responded to the survey out of 
approximately 300 of Cambodia‟s exporting garment factories. Although it covers only 
17 percent of the industry population, the actual response rate is higher as explained 
below. 
The major issue in survey is a problem of non-response, which introduces bias and 
distorts the representativity of a sample. Interview-based survey collection helped 
alleviate non-response problems pervasive in self-completed survey collection. When 
managers were present, which was almost always the case, the interview approach 
attained a 100 percent response rate (i.e. all managers agreed to be interviewed), while 
the response rate for the web-based approach reached only 15.5 percent.
93
 As ILO 
monitoring schedule is random (i.e. not affected by the level of compliance or any other 
explanatory variables), interviewing during factory visits reduces potential bias in the 
sample. Thanks to the multi-pronged survey collection approach, the sample profile is 
broadly in line with the population profile as shown in the table below, although larger 
factories and better performers are slightly over-represented.  
 
 
  Non-compliance Items Factory Size Factory Age Presence of MSI buyer 
  Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
Ob 300 52 300 53 300 54 300 52 
Mean 20.0 17.8 1197.5 1420.3 5.4 5.9 0.4 0.4 
S.D. 12.4 9.7 1056.7 1086.6 2.3 2.4 0.7 0.5 
                                                 
93
 A link to the web-based questionnaire was sent by email to 147 managers, of which 31 returned as 
delivery failures, and of which 18 responded (i.e. the response rate of 15.5 percent). Given the fast 
turnover of managers in the industry and lack of internet use in some factories, the likelihood of 
„deliberate refusal‟ is likely to be less than what the figure indicates. The response rate for collection 
through monitors is not available as the number of questionnaires distributed by monitors is not known. 
The response rate for the monitor channel is likely to be higher than the web-based one, but much lower 
than that of interviews. 
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Survey Results and Analysis 
 
I. General factory characteristics.  
This section asks about factory characteristics that are not in the ILO BFC database. 
Nonetheless, firm size has turned out to be the only consistently significant determinant 
of labor standard compliance.  
 
Question 1.  What is the name of your factory?  (All 51 answered)           
 
This question was asked in order to match the survey results with ILO monitoring data. 
Confidentiality was assured. 
 
Question 2.  What is your position? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
General Manager 52 22 
Administrative Manager 14 6 
Compliance Manager 12 5 
Other 21 9 
Answered  42 
Skipped   9 
 
While the questionnaire targeted general managers, other managers with sufficient 
knowledge on buyers and compliance were allowed to respond in the absence of general 
managers.  
 
Question 3. How many years has your factory been in operation? (50 out of 51 
answered) 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
More than 10 years
9-10 years
7-8 years
5-6 years
3-4 years
0-2 years
%
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The number of years in operation averages at 5.9 years, which broadly corresponds to 
the population average of 5.4 years. The age of the establishment can denote the degree 
of learning and physical constraints of the establishment.  
 
Question 4. Is your factory part of a larger firm network? (Multiple answers possible) 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Subsidiary of a group 75 38 
One of multiple branches in 
Cambodia 
29 15 
Independent 20 10 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
 
Three quarters of the factories surveyed are subsidiaries of a group while 20 percent are 
independent. In Cambodia‟s garment sector, subsidiaries are foreign-owned while 
independent establishments are predominantly domestically-owned. The presence or 
absence of firm network can affect the factory‟s financial and managerial capacity. 
 
Question 5. If it is a subsidiary, does your parent company have a long and established 
relationship with one or more of your buyers? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes 78 40 
No 0 0 
Not Applicable 22 11 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
 
All subsidiaries responded that their parent companies have long and established 
relationships with buyers 
 
Question 6. Which service(s) does your factory provide? (Multiple answers possible) 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Free on Board (FOB) 80 41 
Cut, Make, Trim (CMT) 20 10 
Subcontracting 2 1 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
 
80 percent of the surveyed factories provide FOB services while the rest provides CMT 
only. FOB requires more substantial financial capacity and managerial know-how than 
CMT. While only one factory admitted practice of sub-contracting, it is likely to be 
much more widespread.  
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II. Skill levels of workers and complexity of products  
Workers‟ skill levels are known to affect working conditions, in particular wage levels, 
as high-skill workers are paid more for their higher marginal product of labor. Given the 
lack of individual-level data, this section tried to ascertain the average skill level of 
workers in the factory. Nevertheless, none of the following measures of skills are 
significantly related to labor standard compliance. This may stem from the fact that 
Cambodia‟s garment sector generally produces cheap and simple products using low-
skilled labor.  
 
Question 7. Which production system does your factory use? 
 
    Response 
  Percent Count 
One-piece-flow, Lean system 45 22 
Bundle system 51 25 
Other 4 2 
Answered  49 
Skipped   2 
 
Factories using the bundle system slightly outnumber those using the one-piece-
flow/lean system in the survey. The one-piece-flow/lean system generally requires 
higher levels of skills and coordination than the bundle system given the need to 
carefully balance the skill levels of workers in the same line.  
 
Question 8. What is the percentage of multi-skilled workers in your factory? (24 
answered) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
More than 60%
50-59%
40-49%
30-39%
20-29%
10-19%
0-9%
%
 
In an attempt to measure skill levels, the question on multi-skilled workers was added 
later, which is why it has only 24 responses. The majority of workers are multi-skilled 
in half of the factories responded. 
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Question 9.  Normally, how long is the training your factory provides to workers in 
sewing section to improve their skills? (48 answered) 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
More than 12 w eeks
10-12 w eeks
7-9 w eeks
4-6 w eeks
1-3 w eeks
No training
%
 
 
While factories provide about one month of training on average, workers‟ training needs 
vary greatly depending on their experience. For instance, some factories recruit only 
skilled workers and give no training. Therefore, this question is unlikely to adequately 
measure skill levels of workers.  
 
 
Question 10. Does your factory undertake one or more of the following processes in-
house? (Multiple answers possible) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Dyeing
Dry Process
Speciality Finish
Print Work
Embroidery
Laundry
Not Applicable
%
 
41 percent of the surveyed factories handle processing in-house, which adds complexity 
and value to products.   
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Question 11. What products does your factory produce? (Multiple answers possible) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Other
Swimming suits
Blouse
Dress
Jean
Shirt
T-shirt
Sleepwear
Pant
Knitwear
%
 
 
Some products involve a large number of processes and thus are more complex than 
others. For instance, T-shirt, sleepwear, and men‟s pants generally involve fewer 
processes than jeans, dresses, blouses, and swimming suits. Nonetheless, product 
complexity depends also on styles, making it difficult to generalize. The most 
commonly produced product in the Cambodian garment sector is knitwear.  
 
 
III. Relationships with buyers 
This section seeks to learn about the type of buyers and the nature of buyer-supplier 
relationships, which is the focus of this dissertation. Chapter 4 has shown that the mode 
of communication rather than the duration of relationship has an important implication 
for suppliers‟ labor standard compliance. Specifically, suppliers that communicate with 
buyers indirectly through sourcing agents are systematically associated with worse 
performance.   
 
Question 12. How many buyers do you normally produce for? 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
More than 6
6
5
4
3
2
1
%
 
The surveyed factories produce for multiple buyers, most commonly 3 to 5, although 
24 % of them produce for more than 6 buyers. 
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Question 13. Please list three of your most important buyers (50 out of 51 answered) 
 
This question was necessary to match suppliers with buyers. Buyer names were asked 
with assurance of confidentiality. 
 
Question 14. How many years have you produced for your major buyers? 
 
  
0-2 years 3-4 years 5-6 years 7-8 years 9-10 years 
More than 
10 years 
Count 
Buyer 1 14% 28% 26% 10% 6% 16% 50 
Buyer 2 30% 21% 28% 10% 2% 9% 47 
Buyer 3 33% 23% 23% 9% 2% 9% 43 
 
The duration of relationship is an important measure of buyer-supplier relationship. For 
the most important buyer (Buyer 1), it ranges from 0-2 years (14 percent) to 10 years or 
more (16 percent) while the majority falls between 3 to 6 years (54 percent). The 
duration of relationship with the second and third buyers is shorter than that with the 
most important buyer.  
 
Question 15. Do you communicate directly with your buyers or through vendors or 
agents? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Mostly directly with buyers 43 22 
Mostly through vendors 37 19 
Mostly through agents 31 16 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
 
The mode of communication denotes the distance between buyers and suppliers. While 
43 percent of the factories said they communicate directly with buyers, it does not 
suggest that they discuss all issues directly with buyers. Business issues (i.e. price, 
quantity, delivery) tend to be settled between buyers and suppliers‟ headquarters (if they 
are subsidiaries or branches) while compliance and quality issues are often directly 
communicated with buyers. 37 percent of the factories transact through vendors and 31 
percent through sourcing agents.   
 
Question 16. How many times do buyers visit your factory per year (all combined)? 
 
  
0-2 times 3-5 times 6-8 times 9-11 times 12-14 times 
15 times 
or more 
Count 
Quality & 
Sourcing 
30% 30% 14% 2% 2% 22% 50 
Compliance 74% 10% 12% 0% 0% 4% 50 
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Buyers‟ compliance staff or agents normally audit factories prior to placing orders and 
then follow-up when problems are signaled. Buyers‟ quality staff or agents visit supplier 
facilities much more frequently. Often, they come to inspect before shipping, and a few 
visit monthly or even weekly. 
 
 
IV. ILO reporting and duplication 
The following questions were asked to find out about the extent to which buyers use 
ILO reports and whether or not buyers have reduced duplication of audits and replaced 
it with remediation as promised. 
 
Question 17. Have any of your buyers reduced or eliminated their own audits and 
started relying only on ILO reports?  
 
  Elimination Reduction No Change Not Applicable Count 
Buyer 1 4% 22% 22% 52% 46 
Buyer 2 4% 16% 31% 49% 45 
Buyer 3 13% 23% 20% 45% 40 
 
Approximately half of the surveyed factories deem their buyers are not using ILO 
monitoring reports. This is broadly consistent with the extent of buyer participation in 
the ILO program. Nearly half of BFC participating buyers have reduced or eliminated 
their own audits, but the other half has not changed their practices, as perceived by 
suppliers. 
 
Question 18. If yes to above, what have the buyers replaced their own audits with?  
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Focus on remediation & follow-up 68 13 
No replacement 16 3 
Other 16 3 
Answered  19 
Skipped   8 
  
Where buyers have reduced or eliminated own audits, it has been replaced by 
remediation and follow-up in the majority of cases.  
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V. Compliance issues 
This section tries to find out which issues buyers are particularly concerned about and 
whether they issue warnings and eventually cancel orders to regulate their supplier 
behavior. 
 
Q19. Please indicate the compliance issues that your buyers are particularly concerned 
about. Multiple answers possible. (All 51 answered) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Other
Leave
Contract
Welfare
Discrimination
Forced labor
Wage
Safety & Health
Overtime
Child labor
%
 
 
Buyers are perceived to be particularly concerned about child labor, overtime, safety & 
health, and wage. Some factories noted that buyers are equally attentive to the issues 
covered by their codes of conduct (CoC). 
 
Question 20. Has there been an implicit or explicit warning by your buyers about the 
risk of non-compliance leading to a cancellation of orders? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes 46 23 
No 54 27 
Answered  50 
Skipped   1 
 
Nearly half of suppliers surveyed have received implicit or explicit warnings by their 
buyers. Some factory managers felt that signing a contract, which stipulates that 
violation of CoC leads to termination, is an implicit warning while others perceived 
differently.  
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 Question 21. If yes, regarding which issues? (Multiple answers possible)  
(20 out of 24 answered) 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Other
Leave
Welfare
Contract
Forced labor
Discrimination
Safety & Health
Wage
Child labor
Overtime
%
 
Consistent with the previous responses, buyers tend to issue warnings with regard to 
overtime, child labor, and wage. 
 
Question 22. Has non-compliance ever led to a cancellation of order? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes 10 5 
No 90 46 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
 
Nevertheless, warnings rarely lead to a cancellation of orders because suppliers 
normally rectify non-compliance in accordance with buyer demands.  
 
VI. Learning 
This section tries to assess the degree to which learning occurs between buyers and 
suppliers. While Chapter 4 did not find a statistically significant association between the 
following learning measures and compliance performance, different learning measures 
may yield different results. 
 
Question 23. Do your buyers share technical knowledge? 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes, often times 33 17 
Yes, sometimes 53 27 
No, not really 14 7 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
Most buyers share technical knowledge either often (53 percent) or sometimes (33 
percent). 
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Question 24. If yes, what kind of knowledge do your buyers share? Multiple answers 
possible. (43 out of 44 applicable answered) 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Other
HR management
Production system
Work place skills
Quality control
%
 
Buyers share knowledge about quality control more than any other technical knowledge.   
 
Question 25. Have your buyers been involved in determining the production system? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes 26 13 
No 75 38 
Answered  51 
Skipped   0 
About one quarter of buyers help determine the production system used in supplier 
establishments. 
 
Question 26. Do your buyers encourage training for workers/supervisors/managers? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes, often times 30 15 
Yes, sometimes 50 25 
No, not really 20 10 
Answered  50 
Skipped   1 
 
Most buyers encourage training either often (30 percent) or sometimes (50 percent). It 
would have been interesting to ask whether buyers provide training or share the cost of 
training to measure the extent to which buyers are willing to invest in supplier learning.  
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VII. Purchasing Practices 
Some purchasing practices such as shorter lead time, low margins, and inability to 
negotiate are deemed to negatively contribute to working conditions. While the 
following measures did not have statistically significant association with compliance 
performance, other measures may yield different answers. 
 
Question 27. What is the typical lead time (from an order to shipping) demanded by 
your major buyers? (49 out of 51 answered) 
0 10 20 30 40
120 days or more
100-119 days
80-89 days
60-79 days
Less than 60 days
%
 
 
Buyers demand increasingly shorter lead time to catch up with the shorter fashion 
cycles. Although Cambodia tends to produce less trend sensitive products given the 
time to market, lead time of less than 60 days is uncommon (31 percent). The average 
lead time is 60-79 days. 
 
Question 28. What kind of penalty do your major buyers demand in case of delay in 
delivery? Multiple answers possible. (All 51 answered) 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Other
Cancellation
Discount
Air Freight
%
 
In case of delay, 90 percent of buyers demand shipping by air freight, whose costs 
virtually wipe out factory profits. When the delay is important and/or market demand is 
weak, buyers demand discount (63 percent) and possibly cancellation (24 percent), to 
the detriment of factories. 
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Question 29. In case of discount, which level of discount do your major buyers normally 
demand? (30 out of 32 applicable answered) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
More than 50 %
40-49 %
30-39 %
20-29 %
10-19 %
0-9 %
%
 
 
When buyers demand discount, it is mostly less than 20 percent: 0-9 percent (57 
percent) or 10-19 percent (37 percent). There was also a case where one day of delay 
equals one percent of discount. 
  
Question 30. If a buyer requires a last minute change in design or a delivery date, can 
you negotiate the price? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes, often times 14 5 
Yes, sometimes 54 20 
No, not really 32 12 
Answered  37 
Skipped   3 
 
About 80 percent of the surveyed factories have experienced such buyer demands, and 
most of them can negotiate the price sometimes (54 percent) or often times (14 percent). 
There was also a case where the price is fixed, but the delivery date can be postponed in 
case of last minute changes.   
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VIII. Working conditions beyond legal requirements 
This section seeks to understand the extent to which and the areas in which factories 
provide working conditions that exceed the legal requirements and how buyers may 
influence them. The data from this section is analyzed in the last part of Chapter 3, 
which shows that some buyers encourage suppliers to go beyond compliance, but they 
tend to be reputation-conscious buyers and the issues center around OSH and welfare.  
 
Question 31. Does your factory provide working conditions that go beyond what is 
mandated by the labor law (other than production bonus)? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Yes 65 32 
No 31 15 
Answered  49 
Skipped   3 
 
65 percent of the surveyed factories responded that they provide working conditions 
that exceed the national legal requirements. 
 
Question 32. If yes, in which areas does your factory go beyond the legal requirements 
other than production bonus? Multiple answers possible. (All 32 applicable answered) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Other
Contract
Leave
Safety & Health
Overtime pay
Welfare
Base salary
Allow ance
Bonus
%
 
 
Factories tend to provide pecuniary incentives that exceed the mandated requirements as 
regards bonus, allowance, base salary and overtime pay. As exceptional cases, some 
factories even organize birthday parties and provide literacy classes for workers. 
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Question 33. Have your buyers required or encouraged your factory to provide working 
conditions that go beyond the national legal requirements? 
 
  Response 
  Percent Count 
Required 6 3 
Encouraged 42 20 
No, not really 52 25 
Answered  48 
Skipped   3 
 
Buyers may encourage going beyond legal compliance (42 percent) but rarely require it 
(6 percent). One factory manager noted that buyers always want suppliers to comply 
with certain standards (i.e. the labor law, CoC) but they do not ask for beyond 
compliance because they also want lower prices.  
 
Question 34. If your buyer required or encouraged to go beyond the legal requirements, 
in which areas? Multiple answers possible. (13 answered out of 26 applicable 
answered)  
 
0 20 40 60 80
Base salary
Overtime pay
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Leave
Contract
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%
 
 
When buyers encourage or require suppliers to go beyond legal compliance, it is mainly 
with regard to welfare and safety & health because buyer CoC are often more detailed 
and stricter about these issues than the national labor law. In contrast, buyers rarely 
encourage or require an improvement in pecuniary conditions (i.e. base salary, overtime 
pay). 
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IX. Motivations and Buyer Influence 
This section asks what motivates factory management to improve working conditions 
and how buyers influence that decision.   
 
Q35. What are the main motivations for your factory to improve working conditions? 
Multiple answers possible. (49 out of 51 answered) 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Other
To attract more buyers
To get and keep orders
To avoid disputes and strikes
To increase productivity
To attract and retain workers
%
 
 
The most commonly cited reasons to improve working conditions are to attract/retain 
workers and to increase productivity (76 percent), followed by avoiding disputes and 
strikes (67 percent). While managers understand that improving conditions help attract 
buyers (53 percent) and keep orders (57 percent), labor market conditions and efficiency 
enhancing effects of better working conditions figure more prominently. Considering 
that this question was asked just after „beyond compliance‟ questions, respondents are 
likely to have associated „improve working conditions‟ with „beyond compliance.‟ In 
this sense, the result is likely to show the motivations behind improving conditions 
beyond compliance.   
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Question 36. How do your buyers influence your factory's working conditions?  
Multiple answers possible. (49 out of 51 answered) 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Other
Buyers help remediate compliance problems
Buyers' demands limit your factory's capacity to
improve working conditions
Buyers help improve quality/productivitiy and
indirectly working conditions
Buyers mandate the minimum requirements to
place orders
%
 
 
Buyers are often perceived as demanding the minimum requirements to place orders (59 
percent). While more than half factory managers acknowledge that buyers help improve 
quality/productivity (55 percent), one-third of them think that buyer demands (e.g. 
lower prices, faster delivery) limit their ability to improve working conditions (35 
percent).  
 
Summary 
Buyer influence on supplier working conditions is complex and both positive and 
negative. On the positive front, buyers require suppliers to comply with the labor law 
and CoC, setting and enforcing the minimum standards. While buyers may encourage or 
require improvement in welfare or OSH beyond the legal requirements, they rarely push 
for further progress in workers‟ pecuniary conditions. Factories appear to be principally 
motivated by labor market conditions and efficiency effects when they improve working 
conditions. This suggests that buyers can set the floor but cannot raise the ceiling for 
most issues. Buyers can also help improve supplier working conditions through 
technical assistance to ameliorate quality and productivity. Nevertheless, purchasing 
practices that require shorter lead time and lower profit margins constrain supplier 
factories capacity to improve working conditions. 
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Appendix II. Buyer Survey in the Cambodian Garment Sector 
 
Survey Data Collection 
 
The purpose of the buyer survey is two-fold. First is to understand buyer-supplier 
relationships from the viewpoint of buyers. Asking both buyers and suppliers similar 
questions helps construct a more complete picture. Second, the buyer survey enables us 
to understand the characteristics and behavior of different types of buyers. While this 
thesis makes an important distinction between reputation-conscious and other buyers, 
the difference is not fully understood. This buyer survey serves to fill the gap. 
The buyer survey was conducted on 9-10 October 2008 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia during the Buyers Forum, a bi-annual event hosted by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). At the Buyers Forum, major buyer representatives gather to 
exchange views with other buyers and stakeholders and to build consensus regarding 
the future of the ILO program. With assistance of ILO BFC, the author distributed 
questionnaires to 16 participating buyer representatives, of which 12 returned completed 
forms during the forum. Subsequently, the author contacted 15 other buyers who did not 
participate in the forum, of which 2 completed the questionnaire on-line. In total, 14 
responses were collected, of which 9 BFC participating buyers, 4 non-BFC buyers, and 
1 sourcing agent. These 13 buyers account for 45 percent of Cambodia‟s garment export 
value in 2006.
94
 
 
Survey Results and Analysis 
 
I. Buyer Characteristics.  
 
Question 1.  What is the name of your company?  (All 14 answered)  
Anonymity of company names was assured. 
 
Question 2. Please classify your company. (All 14 answered)  
 
         
Brand (7)
Retailer (4)
Licensee (1)
Other (1)
Agent (1)
 
                                                 
94
 The author‟s calculation based on the export figures from the Ministry of Commerce. 
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Of 14 companies answered, 7 classify themselves as brand, 4 retailers, 1 licensee, 1 
sourcing agent and 1 combining multiple roles. 5 out of 7 branded buyers belong to 
either the Ethical Training Initiative or the Fair Labor Association, meaning that they 
are “MSI (Multi-Stakeholder Initiative) buyers” and thus “reputation-conscious” 
according to the author‟s operationalization in the thesis. One respondent was a 
representative of a major sourcing agent, which functions as a one-stop shop or a supply 
chain manager that matches factories and buyers. To understand the differences between 
reputation-conscious buyers, other buyers, and agents, the following survey responses 
are disaggregated into these three categories next to the total count.      
 
Question 3. Does your company have staff based in Cambodia? 
0 5 10 15
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Yes No
 
 
5 out of 14 companies have local staff, of which 3 are MSI buyers, 1 other buyer, and 1 
agent. It is worth noting that MSI buyers tend to have more local staff than other buyers.  
 
 
Question 4. If yes to above, what are they in charge of? Multiple answers possible 
 
Quality 
Control (5)
Compliance (3)
Other (2)
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Other buyers
Agent
MSI buyers
Quality control
Compliance
Other
 
 
Among 5 companies with staff in Cambodia, all of them have local staff in charge of 
quality control, while 3 have compliance staff. 2 other responses are 1 shipping and 1 
sourcing. 2 MSI buyers have local compliance staff while other buyers do not (in fact, 
none of the other buyers sourcing from Cambodia have local compliance staff). Also, 
the agent has local staff in all categories (including sourcing). 
 
 
II. Buyer-Supplier Relationship 
 
Question 5. Does your company communicate directory with factories in Cambodia or 
through vendors or agents? Multiple answers possible. (All 14 answered) 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Directly with factories
Through vendors
Through agents
 
 
The mode of communication appears to vary with the type of buyers. 4 out of 5 MSI 
buyers mostly directly deal with factories while only 1 out of 8 other buyers do. 
Moreover, none of the MSI buyers transact through agents while other buyers do. This 
is consistent with the Chapter 4‟s findings that reputation-conscious buyers tend to 
avoid market-based relationships through agents and prefer direct relationships with 
factories. Agents deal directly with factories (and buyers) given their role as a supply 
chain manager.  
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Question 6. Does your company tend to have long and established relations with your 
suppliers? Multiple answers possible 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Yes, with factories
Yes, with vendors
Yes, with agents
 
 
9 out of 14 companies have long and established relations with vendors. While MSI 
buyers equally have established relations with factories, other buyers tend to form 
established relationships with vendors and agents.  
 
 
Question 7. Does your company account for a large share (i.e. more than half) of the 
production capacity of supplier factories? (12 out of 14 answered) 
 
0 4 8 12
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Yes, mostly
Yes, sometimes
No, not really
 
 
9 out of 14 companies answered account for a large share of suppliers‟ production 
capacity sometimes or mostly. While 3 out of 4 MSI buyers take up an important share 
most of the time, none of other buyers do. 
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Question 8. How many times per year does your company send staff or agents to a 
factory?  
 
 
Sourcing
1-2 times  (6)
3-4 times (4)
More than 8 times (1)
5-6 times (1)
 
Sourcing staff who decide about business visit factories on average twice a year. The 
agent sends sourcing staff more than 8 times a year. There was no difference between 
MIS and other buyers in terms of frequency of visits. 
 
Quality Control
1-2 times  (1)
More than 8 
times (10)
6-8 times (1)
 
Quality control staff visit factories more often, more than 8 times per year.  
 
Compliance
1-2 times  (4)
3-4 times (5)
6-8 times (1)
5-6 times (1)
None (3)
 
Compliance staff visit factories on average once or twice a year. Some BFC 
participating buyers have replaced their own compliance audits with ILO monitoring. 
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Question 9. Does your company check compliance levels of factories before placing 
orders? 
Yes (12)
Partially Yes(2)
 
 
All the companies responded check compliance levels of candidate factories. Two 
companies that check only partially are non-MSI buyers. 
 
 
Question 10. If yes to above, what is the percentage of factories that pass compliance 
checks at the first instance? 
 
0 1 2 3 4
Other
80-89%
70-79%
50-59%
30-39%
20-29%
0-9 %
 
 
The likelihood of candidate factories passing compliance checks at the first instance 
ranges from 0-9 % to 80-89 %. There is no major difference between MSI and other 
buyers. High probability of pass suggests that some buyers pre-screen candidate 
factories before conducting official audit. 
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Question 11. Which procedure, if any, does your company use to ensure an acceptable 
level of compliance at supplier factories? Multiple answers possible. 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Zero tolerance
Three strikes
Continuous improvement
 
 
All the surveyed companies have some kind of procedure to ensure an acceptable level 
of compliance. “Zero tolerance” means that certain non-compliance leads to immediate 
cancellation of orders. “Three strikes” suggests that factories are required to achieve an 
acceptable level of compliance in three audits. “Continuous improvement” indicates that 
they do not necessarily apply stringent rules but work closely with factories to solve 
problems. Some buyers combine these procedures. While the three procedures are 
equally used, it is worth noting that MSI buyers tend to opt for continuous improvement 
instead of three strikes. Agent uses three strikes only.  
 
 
Question 12. Which are the key compliance issues for your company? Multiple answers 
possible. (10 out of 14 answered) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Other
Discrimination
Harrassment
Freedom of Association
Safety & Health
Contract
Overtime
Child labor
Forced labor
Disputes/Strikes
Wage/Payment
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The key issue for most buyers is wage and payment while welfare and leave do not 
figure on the list. There is no major difference between MSI and other buyers. Other 
responses are inconsistent records and physical abuse. One buyer and the agent mention 
all issues covered by their CoC. 
 
 
Question 13. How often does your company issue warnings to supplier factories in 
Cambodia that certain non-compliance leads to cancellation of orders? 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Often Sometimes
Rarely Never
 
Most buyers issue warnings although not often. MSI buyers tend to issue warnings more 
frequently than other buyers or an agent.  
 
Question 14. If yes to above, regarding which issues? Multiple answers possible.  
(9 valid answers) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other
Discrimination
Safety & Health
Leave
Welfare
Freedom of Association
Disputes/Strikes
Overtime
Contract
Wage/Payment
Forced labor
Child labor
 
Buyer warnings tend to concern child and forced labor and payment issues. There is no 
major difference between MSI and other buyers.  
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Question 15. Has your company ever cancelled orders because of compliance problems 
in Cambodia? 
 
Yes (4)
No (10)
 
 
4 buyers have cancelled orders due to compliance problems, of which 2 are MSI buyers 
and 2 other buyers. One of the other buyers notes that Cambodia used to be a 
“terminated country,” meaning that the company prohibited sourcing from the country.  
 
Question 16. If yes to above, regarding which issues? 
 
Of 4 buyers that have cancelled orders, 1 buyer cites contract, 1 buyer cites freedom of 
association, 1 buyer cites wage/payment, child and forced labor, and disputes/strikes, 
and 1 buyer cites all issues. 
 
Question 17. How often do unions and NGOs contact your company about working 
conditions in supplier factories in Cambodia? 
 
0 5 10 15 20
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
All the time
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
 
 
The frequency of contact by unions and NGOs varies. While one MSI buyer whose 
local compliance staff has extensive contacts with union leaders is contacted all the time, 
three other buyers are never contacted. In general, MSI buyers tend to be contacted 
more often than other buyers.  
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Question18. Does your company enforce non-binding awards of the Arbitration Council 
in supplier factories? (13 valid answers) 
 
0 5 10 15
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Always
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
 
  
The Arbitration Council is a tripartite body set up by the ILO to resolve collective 
disputes. The degree of enforcement varies. While one MSI buyer with local 
compliance staff enforces all awards of the Arbitration Council by principle, other MSI 
buyers enforce often or sometimes. In contrast, other buyers never or rarely enforce 
non-binding awards.  
 
Question 19. Does your company rate compliance performance of supplier factories? 
 
All 14 companies rate compliance performance. 
 
Question 20. If yes to above, how does your company use the rating? Multiple answers 
possible (13 valid answers) 
 
0 5 10 15
To identify good
performers and reward
them with more orders
To identify very poor
performers and
reduce/cancel orders
To identify poor
performers and
encourage them to
improve
 
 
Buyers use compliance performance rating mainly to identify poor performers and 
encourage them to improve. Only two buyers use rating to reward better performers. 
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Question 21. Does your company offer training and/or learning opportunities to 
supplier factories in Cambodia? (14 valid answers) 
 
0 5 10 15
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Always
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
 
 
While most buyers offer some sort of learning opportunities some of the time, 
frequency varies. MSI buyers tend to offer training more often than other buyers. Agent 
also provides training systematically. 
 
 
Question 22. If yes to above, what kind of learning opportunities does your company 
provide to supplier factories? Multiple answers possible. (11 applicable answers) 
 
0 3 6 9
Production System
HR management
Workplace Skills
Safety & Health
Quality Control
Supervisory Skills
Compliance/Worker
Rights
 
 
The most common area in which buyers give training is compliance, followed by 
supervisory skills and quality control. These answers may be biased given that the 
respondents are in charge of compliance. Interestingly, agent claims to offer the most 
extensive learning opportunities, all the above items except HR management.   
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 Question 23. What is the typical lead time your company demands from factories in 
Cambodia? (10 valid answers) 
 
0 3 6 9 12
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
60-79 days
80-89 days
100-119 days
 
 
Typical lead time is 80-89 days and it does not differ among buyer types. 
 
 
Question 23. Does your company encourage or require factories in Cambodia to 
provide working conditions that go beyond the national legal compliance? 
(13 valid answers) 
0 3 6 9 12 15
Agent
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Require
Encourage
Neither
 
 
Most buyers encourage their suppliers to exceed the national legal requirements. 
Nonetheless, not all buyers were aware of whether or not their CoC exceed the national 
legal requirements. Agent was the only respondent that required beyond compliance. 
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Question 25. If yes to above, in which areas does your company push factories to go 
beyond the legal requirements? (9 valid answers) 
 
0 2 4 6 8
Overtime
Allow ance
Leave
Welfare
Wage
Contract
Safety & Health
 
 
The most common areas in which buyer CoC exceed the national legal requirements are 
safety & health, followed by contract, wage, and welfare. While there is no major 
difference between MSI and other buyers, agent responded affirmative for all the above 
items.  
 
Question 26. What are the main motivations for your company to join BFC? Multiple 
answers possible. (9 out of 9 applicable answered) 
 
0 5 10 15 20
MSI buyers
Other buyers
All
Economical and quality
monitoring
Reputation risk
management
Collaboration to bring
about positive change
To keep up with others
 
 
Buyers join BFC for various reasons, such as economical monitoring, reputation risk 
management, and collaboration.  Other buyers seem to see the economic benefit more 
than MSI buyers. None chose the option of competitive advantage (i.e. outperform 
others) although listed as one of possible answers.  
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Summary 
This buyer survey has reinforced the supplier survey results and in particular shown that 
different buyer types do differ in how they manage relationships with their suppliers. 
First, reputation-conscious MSI buyers tend to communicate directly with factories 
while other buyers tend to transact through vendors and sourcing agents. Second, MSI 
buyers often account for a large share of the production capacity of their suppliers 
whereas other buyers do not. This gives more leverage to MSI buyers vis-à-vis their 
suppliers. Third, MSI buyers have a tendency to emphasize continuous improvement 
while other buyers often turn to „zero tolerance‟ and „three strikes,‟ which is likely to 
prompt suppliers to hide problems rather than to be open about them. Fourth, unions 
and NGOs are more likely to contact MSI buyers than other buyers, reflecting the 
responsiveness of the former relative to the latter. Fifth, MSI buyers are much more 
likely to enforce non-binding awards of the Arbitration Council than other buyers, 
suggesting the rigor of their enforcement efforts. All in all, the buyer survey results 
indicate that reputation-conscious buyers are indeed qualitatively different from other 
buyers on various dimensions, which in turn affect their suppliers‟ compliance 
performance.    
